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Abbreviations and acronyms
ACP Countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
AGMUE
Mexico-European Union Global Agreement (Acuerdo de Asociación Económica, Concertación Política y 
Cooperación)
AICA Central American Sugar Association (Azucareros del Istmo Centroamericano)
AWU Annual Work Unit
CA Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica)
CA-4 Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua
CAC Central American Farming Council (Consejo Agropecuario Centroamericano)
CAN Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CAUCA Central American Uniform Customs Code (Código Aduanero Uniforme Centroamericano)
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CoAM Council of Agriculture Ministers
CMO Common Market Organization
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIECO
Council of Ministers for Central American Economic Integration (Consejo de Ministros de la Integración 
Económica)
CONARROZ National Rice Corporation (Corporación Arrocera Nacional)
DR-CAFTA Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement
EAA Economic Association Agreement
EAC East African Community
EAP Economically Active Population
EBA Everything But Arms 
EC European Commission
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
EU-15 European Union prior to the 2003 amplification
EU-25 European Union prior to the 2007 amplification but after the 2003 amplification
EU-Mex	FTA EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
EurepGAP European Good Agricultural Practices Program 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
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FCA Framework Cooperation Agreement
FDI Foreign direct investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
GSP-Plus
Special Incentive Arrangement for Good Governance and Sustainable Development of the Generalized 
System of Preferences
GVA Gross Value Added
HS Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
IFO International Financial Organization
LAICA Agro-Industrial Sugarcane League (Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar)
LDC Least Developed Country
MCCA Central American Common Market (Mercado Común Centroamericano)
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur)
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MSG Melanesia Spearhead Group
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NEM New Economic Model
POSEI
Specific Options for Remoteness and Insularity Program (Programme d’Options Spécifiques à l’Èloignement 
et. l’Insularité)
RCA Revealed comparative advantage index (exports)
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SICA System of Central American Integration (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana)
SIECA
Central American Secretariat for Economic Integration (Secretaría de Integración Económica 
Centroamericana)
TPA Trade Promotion Agreement
UAC Central American Customs Union (Unión Aduanera Centroamericana)
UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine)
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WTO World Trade Organization
ZELLC Euro-Latin American Free Trade Zone (Zona Euro-Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio)
Presentation
The Working Group on Trade and Agriculture was created 
in August 2005 as a result of a joint project between 
Alianza Social Continental, Red Capa and ActionAid In-
ternational Americas, with the support of IDRC.
 The objective of this project is to contribute to the in-
volvement of peasants, smallholder farmers, NGOs and  
developing research centers in the debates on trade and 
agriculture through three main activities: working group 
strengthening initiatives, capacity building programmes 
and research development.
 Increasingly, the initiatives of the working group are re-
garded as important tools to arouse public awareness 
and improve the efficiency of social movements. Accord-
ingly, the project includes activities that aim to strength-
en national and regional agricultural networks, trade and 
development, by broadening these initiatives through 
the inclusion of reserach centers. The main focus of this 
project is to bolster the ASC Latin American Working 
Group on Trade and Agriculture. By articulating small-
scale farmer organizations, NGOs and research centers 
dealing with these themes, the working group has been 
monitoring and analysing the current commercial and 
agricultural proposals made at the WTO and through bi-
lateral and/or regional agreements.
 In order to wield a bigger influence over the decision mak-
ing process relating to trade policies, social movements
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(especially small farmer organizations), national governments and international institutions working on the themes of 
trade and agriculture have been engaging in an important dialogue on the basis of the results produced by the re-
search.
The sdudies conducted through the project are intended to be used as an input for compiling capacity building ma-
terials focusing on peasant organizations and social movement leaders in order to improve their analysis and effi-
ciency for voicing concerns over important matters, such as biodiversity conservation and food security and sover-
eignty in trade negotiations as well.
Taking all these issues into account, CEPA (Alternative Political Studies Commission – Costa Rica) developed the re-
serach “The Impact of a Possible Association Agreement between the European Union and Central America in the 
agricultural sector: an approach to the initial phase of the negotiations”.     
In this research, the possible points of dispute are identified and the possible agricultural scenes are located, consid-
ered within the scope of the negotiation of an economic agreement between the European Union and Central 
American, and also as result of it. By analysing the existing relations between the European Union and Central 
America in agriculture and mapping their main interests in this sector, we try to identify which Central American prod-
ucts would be considered “winners” and which ones would be classified as “losers” if this economic agreement was 
approved. We also try to predict the possible scenarios and problems the agricultural sector in Central America would 
face in case this agreement is implemented.
The purpose of this research is to provide the different social actors in the region with tools for discussing. Accordingly, 
it was presented in Costa Rica on October 24th 2007 as part of an activity co-ordinated by the Working Group on 
Trade and Agriculture and by Grito dos Excluidos Mesoamericano during the first round of negotiations between the 
European Union and Central America and it is also intended to be used as input for the first meeting on stratregic 
planning related to this theme with local small farmer organizations.
I. Introduction
The present study aims to describe the current con-
text, identify the potential points of conflict and deter-
mine some of the possible scenarios within the set-
ting and as a result of the negotiation of an Economic 
Association Agreement (EAA) between the European 
Union (EU) and Central America (CA), in the specific 
case of the farming sector.
 The study is structured around the following set of spe-
cific objectives:
Objectives of the Study
Describe the relations between the European Union and Central America 
in terms of agriculture.
Identify the main interests of the EU and CA farming sectors in the nego-
tiations for an Economic Association Agreement.
Identify potential ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ products in Central American 
agricultural as a result of this economic association agreement.
•
•
•
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The study is organized into four parts: the first part (sec-
tions II, III and IV) describe the background to the EAA 
negotiations and the overall importance of the farming 
sector for both blocks; in the next part (sections V and 
VI), we present in separate form the most important 
commercial farming interests for each block; in the third 
part (VII and VIII), the information from the previous sec-
tions is compared in order to locate the potential points 
of conflict and generate a set of hypothetical scenarios 
for the potential outcome of the negotiations; and finally, 
in the fourth part (IX), we provide a set of final com-
ments that look to summarize the study’s findings.
Before beginning, it is important to clarify a number 
of points. Firstly, the fact that the negotiations for the 
EAA are only in their preliminary stages means that 
the present study is primarily exploratory in nature 
and, therefore, that its conclusions are above all tran-
sitory. Secondly, the profile of the study is for the 
most part regional. Only in those cases where neces-
sary are there references to the specific conditions of 
the different countries involved. In general terms, the 
idea is to treat the Central American region as a unit, 
but highlighting national differences and specificities 
where applicable.
II. Background
II.1. From San José to  
Vienna: towards the fourth 
generation agreements
Although the relations between both regions can be traced 
back many centuries, the formal political relations between 
Central America and the European Union took an important 
step closer with the San José Dialogue, agreed in 1983. 
This process was defined as a space of political dialogue 
between the blocks, as well as the institutional foundation 
for establishing a cooperation mechanism of considerable 
importance, especially given the high level of political in-
stability experienced by the CA isthmus during this period.
 However, after overcoming the period of conflict, com-
bined with the transformation of the international system 
as a result of the destabilization and fragmentation of the 
communist block, the institutional framework of cooper-
ationbetween Europe and Central America should have 
changed too. The period spanning from the implementa-
tion of the San José Dialogue to the current negotiations
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for an association agreement between the regions 
can be characterized within the setting of the so-
called ‘third generation’ agreements where the official 
European rapprochement had taken place through a 
considerable degree of bilateral cooperation with the 
region, linked to the existence since 1974 of the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP), which we shall 
discuss later on.
In spite of this, a new schema is taking shape. Its 
onset can be reduced to two main events: the Rio de 
Janeiro Summit (1999), which was a meeting of lead-
ers from the EU and Latin America, and the Frame-
work Cooperation Agreement (FCA) (agreed in 1993, 
though only coming into effect in 1999). 
The schema implied by the Rio Summit of 1999 is per-
haps more important since as a result of this meeting 
and a series of biannual summits, as well as dozens of 
lower level meetings, Europe had succeeded in estab-
lishing five different structures of political rapproche-
ment, cooperation and negotiation: Mexico, Central 
America, CAN, Chile, MERCOSUR and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the latter a member of the 
so-called ACP group (former European colonies of 
Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific). These structures 
are the background to the EU’s main strategy, aimed 
at the creation of a Euro-Latin American Free Trade 
Zone by 2010 (ICEI 2005), which can already be quali-
fied as a change in the inter-regional relations in pur-
suit of approval of ‘fourth generation’ agreements.
At the Guadalajara Summit (2004), both European and 
Central American countries reaffirmed in a joint dec-
laration “that the signing, between both regions, of an 
Association Agreement that includes a free trade area 
is a common strategic objective and that the aim of 
this agreement should be to provide a new impulse to 
strengthening the process of regional economic inte-
gration” (point 6). However, implementing this com-
mitment was conditioned by two important factors: 
the continuation of the Doha Development Program 
within the framework of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the continuing development of the Central 
America integration process.
As a result of the latter, point 7 of the joint declara-
tion also signalled the formal start of work on a Mixed 
Commission for assessing the process of regional in-
tegration, with the aim of determining whether or not 
to negotiate the trade agreement between the parties. 
This Commission subsequently approved the efforts 
towards regional integration, which allowed an agree-
ment to be reached on starting negotiations within the 
framework of the Vienna Summit (May 2006). 
II.2. After Vienna: 
the launch of 
negotiations
The Vienna Summit transformed into the starting point for 
the negotiations between the two blocks. In the EU’s 
case, the process has developed continuously and fairly 
unproblematically. Thus, in June 2006, the leaders of the 
European Commission’s Trade and External Relations 
prepared a first draft on the negotiation directives, and, 
by December of the same year, the European Commission 
had approved the negotiating mandate for the EAA with 
the Central American isthmus.
Formally, we can extract from this mandate that the 
overall objective of the EAA is to strengthen cooperation 
with the region, with the aim of consolidating the politi-
cal, economic and social stability of Central America, 
and of gradually establishing a Free Trade Zone between 
the two blocks. The latter is based on the supposition 
that adherence to and effective implementation of inter-
national norms in the social, labour and environmental 
fields is a necessary condition for achieving sustainable 
development. However, as we shall argue later, it is also 
evident that the underlying European interests in negoti-
ating the EAA are economic and commercial in kind.
Just as in the previous EAAs agreed between the EU and 
Latin American countries (Mexico and Chile), the Agreement 
with CA is built around three basic pillars: political dialogue, 
trade and cooperation, which, in formal terms, distinguish-
es them from the agreements reached with the USA.
On the other hand, in relation to CA, the process has 
been much more tortuous and conflict-ridden. The fact 
that the EU has demanded that the region negotiate as 
a single block has posed a significant challenge to the 
countries of the isthmus, especially in relation to two 
issues. First, advance in the process of integration de-
spite the historical low level of political will to do so (es-
pecially in Costa Rica); and, second, reconcile a joint 
and consensual formula for negotiation.
On the first issue, and as mentioned previously, an ad hoc 
Joint Evaluation Commission was set up within the frame-
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work of the Guadalajara Summit of 2004 with the objec-
tive of evaluating the advances made on consolidating the 
Central American Customs Union (UAC). At the beginning 
of 2006, this organ issued its findings: among the most 
important results observed was the progress made to-
wards the incorporation of the customs lines of the coun-
tries in the common Central American tariff: passing from 
70% in 2002 to 93.6% in 2005. Other important results 
include the harmonization of trade legislation. The fact was 
emphasized that, although a Central American Uniform 
Customs Code (CAUCA) exists, progress still needs to be 
made in terms of cross-border cooperation, technical bar-
riers to trade (such as the integration of the customs digital 
information programs), sanitary and phytosanitary norms, 
and protection of intellectual property rights.
On these issues, the Central American Secretariat for 
Economic Integration (SIECA), in its evaluation of the UAC 
for the final quarter of 2006, signalled more moderate 
progress towards incorporation reaching 94.6%, since 
the remaining lines comprise products such as medicines, 
metals, petroleum and petroleum derivatives, as well as a 
series of farming products that are more sensitive for the 
region’s economies.1 In relation to sanitary barriers, little 
progress has been observed: only 469 products are cov-
ered by common trade rules in terms of health certificates 
and import licenses, the same 469 evaluated at the time 
of the Joint Evaluation Commission.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this evaluation is 
that it reveals the region’s unequal progress vis-à-vis the 
UAC. On one hand, significant progress is observed 
among countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, which 
have managed to consolidate integrated customs control 
booths, a harmonization of their trade and immigration 
legislation, the establishment of joint electronic mecha-
nisms at customs houses, mutual reductions in inspec-
tions and the installation of peripheral customs check-
points. On the other hand, development in Costa Rica is 
delayed in comparison to the rest of the region, since it 
has not even ratified the CAUCA and has remained out-
side the projects for customs streamlining, such as the 
‘one stop’ program, which reduces the time spent cross-
ing borders by people and merchandise, customs digital 
information integration and other related programs. 
Meanwhile, in relation to defining an agreed formula for 
negotiating as a block, it should be said that, first of all, 
1	This is the case of rice, potatoes and onions (for Costa Rica), maize (for 
Guatemala), or sugarcane. This is joined by unroasted coffee, petroleum 
derivatives, ethylic alcohol, distilled alcoholic beverages and roasted coffee, 
all listed in Annex A of the General Treaty on Central American Integration as 
products not covered by free trade agreements due to restrictions imposed 
by the different countries involved.
Central America has never carried out a negotiation in 
this form.2 This has meant that the process of defining a 
structure for negotiation has been extremely complicat-
ed, especially given the circumstances: namely, the con-
tinuing distrust of the countries involved in relation to a 
common regional institution that could administer this 
process and the already mentioned inequality in the state 
of each country in relation to the integration process. 
After the 28th SICA Summit, therefore, held in June 2006, 
a discussion was launched on the optimal structure for 
dealing with this process. However, the problems in rec-
onciling diverging interests were expressed publicly in the 
middle of this year when Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua (CA-4) selected, during a brief summit 
meeting, a single negotiator without consulting Costa 
Rica. After a series of negotiations carried out within the 
context of the Council of Ministers for Central American 
Economic Integration (COMIECO), approval was given in 
December, during the 29th SICA Summit, to a structure 
based on two levels: one national, the other regional.
At national level, each country will define a negotiation 
team coordinated by the external trade or external rela-
tions ministers (depending on whether negotiations in-
volve trade or cooperation and political dialogue) from 
which a chief negotiator will be chosen. At regional lev-
el, the chief negotiators from each country will form a 
regional team, and following the dispositions of the gov-
ernments, as well as the regional coordination realized 
by COMIECO, will negotiate with the EU. It should be 
pointed out that this team will have a rotating spokes-
person, which means that the chief negotiator for 
Central America in the talks with the EU will vary with 
each round of negotiations.
According to the San José Declaration, obtained after 
the 29th SICA Summit, as well as the declaration ob-
tained after the 15th Meeting of the Mixed EU-CA 
Commission defined as part of the 1993 Cooperation 
Agreement, the negotiations between the two blocks 
will begin in October 2007, dependent on the signing 
of the Framework Agreement on the Central American 
Customs Union, undertaken during the 30th SICA 
Summit held in June this year. 
At this moment Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua have given their immediate approval to the 
document. Only Costa Rica abstained in view of the 
2	Although in the case CAFTA the negotiating tables were carried out in 
joint form among all the countries involved, each of the parties approached 
these negotiations independently. This is especially clear in the case of Cos-
ta Rica, which decided to extend negotiations for another round in search 
of better results.
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non-ratification of the Free Trade Agreement between 
the United States, Central America and the Dominican 
Republic, which was submitted for deliberation and sub-
sequently approved via referendum on the 7th of October 
2007. Recently, the EU questioned Costa Rica’s deci-
sion not to immediately approve the Agreement, despite 
the victory of the social groups favourable to DR-CAFTA; 
the country replied by reiterating its commitment. 
Currently there is no doubt that the negotiations will 
start in the final weeks of October 2007. According to 
official Central American sources, the process is set to 
be undertaken in ten rounds of negotiations, including 
an evaluation of results during the 5th Euro-Latin 
American Summit to be held in Lima in the middle of 
2008. This being the case, the negotiations should ter-
minate at the end of the same year, followed by the 
process of ratification by the EU and CA during 2009.
II.3. Other 
experiences: 
earlier 
agreements with 
Mexico and Chile
As mentioned above, so far there have been two other ex-
periences of EAAs between the EU and Latin American 
countries: the Mexico-European Union Global Agreement, 
which came into effect in 2000, and the Trade Association 
Agreement with Chile, which came into effect in 2003.3
Both agreements possess the same central pillars (po-
litical dialogue, economic association and cooperation) 
and are intended to go beyond a simple trade negotia-
tion. Hence, both agreements also include the so-called 
‘democratic clause,’ which, in writing, proclaims: 
“The respect for democratic principles and 
fundamental human rights, as set out in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
inspires the domestic and international 
policies of the Parties and comprises an 
	For a more detailed analysis of both Agreements, see Annex 8, included 
at the end of the present study.
essential element of the present Agreement” 
(Article 1 of both agreements).
This element, which is presented as one of the axes dif-
ferentiating the two EAAs from the FTAs promoted by 
the United States, has been highly controversial since, 
although the EU recognizes that the clause has a posi-
tive dimension (the willingness to carry out actions in 
favour of human rights), the more frequent interpretation 
has been negative in kind (imposing sanctions on gov-
ernments that have committed serious and repeated 
violations of human and political rights) (Meyer n.d.: 3). 
Thus, this clause seems to have proved more useful for 
the EU to press for and impose sanctions on Latin 
American governments, rather than defend the human 
rights violated by transnational companies.4 Undoubtedly, 
the clause has never been used in any substantial form, 
meaning that has been little more than empty words. If 
applied in effective form, though, it could indeed prove 
of great importance in the defence and promotion of 
Human Rights within the framework of trade relations.
In relation to the trade balance, at first sight the experience 
of both countries seems to be diametrically opposed. 
While Mexico’s trade balance deficit with the EU has been 
continually rising (US$ -12.1 billion as of October 2004), in 
the case of Chile the opposite trend has occurred with the 
South American country obtaining a substantial trade sur-
plus (more than US$ 3 billion as of September 2004).
However, if we focus in more detail on the products 
traded between both countries and the EU, the situa-
tion is fairly similar. On one hand, exports of raw materi-
als and products with little added value; on the other, 
imports of machinery and other merchandise with high 
added value. In the case of Mexico in 2004: 
“The EU’s main exports to Mexico are 
concentrated in power generation equipment 
(22.4%), transport sector materials (20.2%), 
chemical products (15.8%), telecommunications 
and office equipment (9.1%) and farming 
products (3.8%). The EU’s main imports from 
Mexico are energy (20.6%), transport sector 
materials (20.3%), telecommunications and 
office equipment (19.6%), chemical products 
(8.3%), farming products (6.7%) and power 
4	For more information on this topic, see Meyer’s study (n.d.).
generation equipment (3.7%). On the other 
hand, the service sector has also experienced 
a significant rise. The main areas are tourist 
services (27.7%), transportation (22.5%), 
construction (8.2%) and other business sectors 
(19.8%). Nonetheless, the main European 
companies in this sector work with Mexican 
subsidiaries and therefore fail to appear in these 
statistics” (Domínguez and Velásquez 2004: 14).
Furthermore, as we have argued elsewhere (CEPA 
2006), in the Mexican case specifically, 
“…the EU-Mex FTA supposes the exportation 
to Europe of petroleum, machinery and vehicles 
only, all produced through European investments 
established in Mexico and exported to the head 
companies for processing and distribution. 
Combined with this phenomenon, the lack of any 
regulatory framework which would imply rules 
of origin on the exported products, both in NAFTA 
and EU-Mex FTA… removes any possibility of 
tracing the productive chains involved in the 
process, which means that trade is confined 
to the commercial enterprises set up by FDI 
(foreign direct investment) and ends up failing 
to benefit the Mexican economy. This can be 
verified by the fact that, just as the exports 
are products manufactured and assembled in 
Mexico, the imports are also pieces of machinery 
to be assembled, that is, production is produced 
through assembly” (p. 8).
In the case of Chile, the main exports to the EU during 
2005 were ‘manufactured goods’5 (43.8%); inedible 
raw materials (26.6%), and livestock and foods (14%). 
The EU’s exports to Chile the same year were domi-
nated by transport equipment and materials (57.1%); 
‘manufactured goods’ (13%) and chemical products 
(7.5%) (EC 2006a).
5	Manufactured from wood, plastic, paper or metals, in accordance with 
the stipulations of chapters 6 to 8 of the Standard International Trade 
Code (SITC).
Hence it appears that the EAAs, like the FTAs, far from 
improving trade conditions and reducing the relations of 
subordination, have ended up strengthening and crys-
tallizing the relations of dependency through unequal 
trade in which the peripheral countries export primary 
products with little added value and the assembly of 
products, while they import finished products with a 
high added value.
In this sense, while in the Mexican case the minimum 
floor for negotiations was NAFTA parity, the same can 
be expected in the case of the CA isthmus in the form 
of CAFTA parity.6 This means that the EU will not admit 
anything less than what the region already agreed with 
the USA. It is important to make this clear so as avoid 
adopting an over-optimistic position, seeing the EAA as 
a chance to ‘recover’ what was lost in the context of the 
FTA with the USA.
II.4. On the FFT 
and its impact on 
the EU: CAFTA as 
a catalyser of the 
EAA with Central 
America
The EU’s strategy for promoting and negotiating an EAA 
should be situated in a wider context. At least at a dis-
cursive level, the European Commission continues to 
see the WTO – and especially the agreements of the 
Doha Round – as the most effective space for expand-
ing and coordinating trade within a multilateral system 
based on clear rules (EC 2005a: 1). However, the ar-
rested progress of these agreements, as well as the 
capture of markets by the EU’s direct competitors, has 
forced it to use the FTA strategy as a way of consolidat-
ing the position of its companies and avoiding the trans-
fer of trade elsewhere.
6	This is evident when we study the European documents that set out the 
block’s trade strategy. In the text entitled ‘Global Europe,’ we can find the 
following: “Where our partners have signed FTAs with other countries that 
are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least. Quantitative 
import restrictions and all forms of duties, taxes, charges and restrictions on 
exports should be eliminated” (EC 2005a: 11).
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In this sense, the EU sets three criteria for choosing the 
counterparts with which trade agreement should be 
signed: comprising a potential market (size and economic 
growth), level of protection against the EU’s export inter-
ests (tariff-based and non-tariff-based) and the potential 
impact that trade agreements with direct competitors of 
the EU may have on European interests (EC 2005a: 11).
Clearly, the Central American region fulfils two of these 
three criteria: a relatively high level of protection against 
certain European export interests and a FTA with one of 
the EU’s direct global competitors ( CAFTA-DR). Another 
two elements help the reinforce this argument. Firstly, it 
is strikingly evident that the EU has only negotiated 
EAAs in Latin America with countries that have agreed 
FTAs with the USA. This is especially interesting if we 
observe that across Latin America, only Brazil is found 
among the EU’s twenty most important trading partners 
(1.8% of European trade for 2005). However, the moves 
towards a possible EAA are going much more slowly 
with MERCOSUR (2.3% of European trade) than with 
Central America (just 0.3% of European imports and 
0.4% of exports) and the Andean Community (0.69% of 
European trade), where two countries have already 
signed Trade Promotion Agreements (TPAs) with the 
USA (Colombia and Peru).7
Secondly, the process of negotiating the EAA with CA 
receives a clear impulse and acceleration after the 
7	With this we do not mean to say that this is the only reason why the 
negotiations with certain blocks have been proceeding more quickly than 
with others. We cannot examine compare in the same way negotiations 
with a block such as MERCOSUR, where  a set of sensitive products exist 
that seriously impede their advance, and blocks such as CAN or Central 
America, which have less political and economic power and trade other 
types of goods. What is clear is that negotiations with a block that already 
has an FTA with another power is relatively simpler, in the sense that most 
of the sensitive points are already covered. In other words, someone has 
already done the dirty work, leaving the newcomer merely to ensure the 
same benefits.
negotiation and approval of the CAFTA-DR. Of the initial 
requirements presented by the EU for negotiation, mak-
ing progress towards Central American integration and 
implementing the commitments of the Doha Round, 
only the first is maintained, albeit modified. While the EU 
initially demanded significant improvements in terms of 
regional integration, this requirement was later reduced 
to advances obtained in the process of the Customs 
Union and the demand for the CA to negotiate the EAA 
as a block with a single negotiating body. In other words, 
there was a shift from developing integration to unifying 
the entry conditions for European goods and services 
into the Central American region. Obviously, this tells us 
about the predominance of trade in European interests 
in negotiating the EAA.
In summary, the EU envisaged the promotion of an FTA 
as a strategy, on one hand, to advance and attempt to 
unravel the discussion which had been developing 
within the framework of the WTO and, on the other, to 
ensure certain guarantees for its interests in regions 
whose markets are being captured by direct competi-
tors, such as the USA. In this sense, although talks on 
a possible EAA between CA and the EU have been go-
ing on for several years, no sooner had the isthmus 
signed an FTA with the USA (CAFTA-DR), than the for-
mer process accelerated and took on the dizzying pace 
displayed today.
III. The New Central 
American Economic 
Model
Since approximately the 1990s, slightly earlier in the case 
of Costa Rica, the Central American region has been 
pushing forward a development model that diverges 
significantly from the previous regime. From a traditional 
agroexport model, based almost exclusively on the ex-
port of raw materials and especially fruits, the CA region 
has been shifting towards a model with clear transna-
tional overtones, whose main areas of capital accumu-
lation have been transferring from the primary to tertiary 
sector. The result has been the rise of a poverty-gen-
erating development model that combines large-scale 
capacities to generate surpluses and produces wealth 
with the ever deepening erosion of the living conditions 
of broad sectors of the population and the natural envi-
ronment in general. The central axis of this development 
model is what Segovia (2005) calls the New Economic 
Model (NEM), which possesses a clear liberalizing and
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externally-oriented tendency, and which depends on at 
least three fundamental pillars:
1. A new international integration with the USA through 
migrant workers and their remittances, which have so 
far enabled the restrictions on external growth to be 
overcome, and financial and banking stability to be 
maintained, as well as exports of assembled products; 
2. Financial and exchange rate stability, which different 
from the previous model, which rested on the capital 
accumulation derived from the primary sector, is 
based on the availability of dollars derived from new 
sources of foreign currency such as non-traditional 
exports and remittances;
3. The regional market, where “The novelty is its new 
role within the model that involves generating a solid 
base enabling the expansion of the spaces of capital 
accumulation of the main national economic groups 
and of the transnational companies that operate in 
the region, linked to banking, services (including ba-
sic services such as telecommunications and elec-
tricity) and commerce” (Segovia 2005: 9). An ex-
tremely important dimension of this pillar is the 
process of ‘real integration,’ which refers to the eco-
nomic integration that has been dynamizing these 
economically powerful groups on the margins of, 
though enabled by, the formal structures of integra-
tion (SICA, SIECA, etc.), and whose natural space of 
capital accumulation has ceased to be national be-
come regional.
In general terms, the NEM depends on six basic char-
acteristics (Segovia 2005: 6-9):
1. It possess a clear orientation towards the outside, its 
evolution depending both on exports (generation of 
foreign currency) and imports. Its impact on domes-
tic national markets is significant; the latter are left to 
be supplied essentially by the importation of cheap-
er foreign products. This makes the import sector 
one of the biggest winners within the NEM.
2. The private sector plays a preponderant role, espe-
cially the large businesses, linked to the financial, 
communications and energy (electricity) sectors, 
services, shopping centre and hotel chains, store 
and supermarket chains, restaurants, importers, 
etc. and in some cases assembled goods and non-
traditional exports (agroexports: citrus fruits, flow-
ers, sugarcane, etc.). The State, meanwhile, has 
shrunk back with the advance of the private sector, 
especially in terms of production and the provision 
of services. Its function within the NEM, therefore, is 
primarily to ensure and generate the conditions 
needed to maintain and deepen the model. Among 
the most traumatic actions provoked by this ap-
proach are the privatizations of public companies, 
the reform of pension and social welfare systems, 
the abandonment of universalist conceptions of so-
cial policy, as well as a focus on macroeconomic 
management, obsessed with generating a minimum 
level of financial and exchange rate stability. 
3. The importance of the financial sector within the pat-
tern of capital accumulation. while in the previous 
agroexport model, the exportation of primary prod-
ucts was the main source of foreign currency, within 
the NEM these sources come from remittances, for-
eign transfers and Foreign Direct Investment, as well 
as certain surpluses generated by the new activities 
linked to services and the exportation of non-tradi-
tional products. Moreover, due to the loss of state 
control over the banking system, as well as the rise 
of the new banking elite, “…a significant change has 
been provoked in the use of economic surpluses, 
which have been basically directed to financing rela-
tively unproductive activities related to consumption 
and services, and to financing the expansion of the 
trade and service-based activities of the economic 
groups linked to this sector” (Segovia 2005).
4. Because of the centrality of the tertiary sector, pre-
dominantly located in the urban zones, the impact 
of the same – beyond the continual generation of 
poverty – has been almost nil in the rural zones, 
which are already the most depressed in the region. 
In these rural spaces, what has predominated is the 
cultivation of certain non-traditional products for ex-
portation, such as citrus fruits and sugarcane. As a 
result, these activities, apart from the employment 
that they manage to create, fail to generate larger 
benefits for the people living in these regions, a fact 
exemplified in the very limited reduction in rural pov-
erty seen in Central American countries.
5. It is an intensive model in terms of the use of a non-
qualified manual labour. However, it has failed to 
generate sufficient quality jobs to absorb the work-
force. This has led to a process of undermining the 
job market and self-employment and intensified mi-
grations abroad. It is not by chance that for coun-
tries like El Salvador and Guatemala, their biggest 
export product is said to be people.
6. It thrives within a polyarchic system (votes = democ-
racy) which is widely legitimated and celebrated by 
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the international community, but which maintains 
high levels of corruption, the vertical use of power 
and curtails spaces for meaningful participation.
Due to its liberalizing and externally-oriented tenden-
cy, the NEM has been strongly boosted by the prolif-
eration of trade agreements approved by the region’s 
countries. In effect, agreements such as those signed 
by Mexico and Chile, but especially CAFTA, have 
been deepening this economic strategy and hence 
the poverty-generating development model. The ob-
vious effect has been the increase in the trade bal-
ance deficit: hence the much lauded increase in ex-
ports – concentrated in a small number of productive 
sectors, most of them in the hands of transnational 
companies or regional holding companies (Pellas 
Group, Roble Group, etc.) – and the striking rise in 
imports, apart from producing big dividends for im-
porters, has tended to flood the domestic markets 
with imported products, which means unfair compe-
tition and a strong impact on national producers. The 
result: a development model that destroys employ-
ment, reproduces poverty and expels people.
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IV. The Farming 
Sector in Central 
American and the 
European Union
Before examining the potential scenarios for the agricul-
tural sector vis-à-vis the negotiation of an EAA with the 
EU, it is important to situate the weight and importance 
of this sector for the economies of both blocks, as well 
as the fluxes of exchange between both.
IV.1. Farming in Central America
Despite the centrality of the service sector in the NEM, 
the farming sector continues to be extremely important. 
Over the last four years (2003-2006), the region has ex-
ported on average around US$ 6 billion in agricultural
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products,8 representing 43% of its total exports 
(SIECA 2007a). In the specific case of Costa Rica, in 
2005, agricultural products represented 32.8% of 
total exports; for El Salvador, 14.6%; for Guatemala, 
37.1%; for Honduras, 19.6%, and for Nicaragua, 
78.9% (WTO 2006). In the same year, the total value 
of agricultural exports in Central America rose to 
US$ 8 billion, contributing close to 21.5% of the re-
gion’s total gross domestic product (GDP). Also in 
2006, the exportation of agricultural products (con-
centrated almost exclusively on coffee, banana, sug-
arcane and pineapple), reached 43% of total region-
al exports. In terms of agricultural exports to the EU, 
for 2006 these were around US$ 1.7 billion, equiva-
	Except where provisos apply, in the case of agricultural exports, this refers 
to the products included in the customs lines listed in chapters 1 to 24 of 
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (usually ab-
breviated as HS).
lent to 10.6% of the total exports from Central 
America to Europe and 24.8% of the region’s total 
farming exports (SIECA 2007a).
Agricultural exports to the world, including to the 
EU, are primarily characterized by a considerable 
degree of concentration on a fairly reduced basket 
of goods. As can be seen in Graph 1, almost 51% of 
the region’s agricultural export base to the rest of 
the world is concentrated in new main products. 
This situation becomes more acute when we ob-
serve the same distribution in the case of trade with 
the EU, where 81% of exports are concentrated in 
six products (see graph 2). 
Graph 1.
Global distribution of Central America’s agricultural 
exports. 2006
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Graph 2.
Distribution of Central America’s agricultural exports  
to the European Union. 2006
SOURCE: SIECA 2007A.
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On the other hand, in terms of the Central American 
sociodemographic structure, in 2005 almost 19 million 
people (approximately 49.8% of the total population) 
lived in rural zones (51.61% male; 48.39% female). For 
the same year, the region’s rural economically active 
population (EAP) was around 6 million people (79.2% 
men; 21.8% women), representing 46.3% of the total 
Central American EAP. If we add to this the fact that in 
2003 around 30% of the employed population was 
found in the ‘farming and fishing’ sector (Trejos 2006:22), 
the high economic and social importance of the region’s 
agriculture becomes clear. 
Within the regional farming sector as a whole, tradi-
tional agriculture predominates and accounts for 
around a quarter of overall employment in the isth-
mus (23%) while its relative weight among Central 
American countries varies between 10% (Costa Rica) 
and around 30% (Guatemala and Honduras). Thus, in 
general terms,
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generates little paid employment since for the 
region as a whole, farming microcompanies 
account for just 26% of employment within 
traditional agriculture. This employment is 
relatively more abundant in Costa Rica (54% 
of traditional farming), while it represents just 
19% in Panamá” (Trejos 2006: 27-28).
In terms of socioeconomic conditions, it is clear that for 
the entire region poverty is much more extensive in rural 
zones than urban areas. This, for most Central American 
countries, around half or more of the poorest house-
holds are located in rural zones and the risk of poverty 
(incidence or percentages of poor households) in rural 
zones is between 25% (Nicaragua) and 50% (Costa 
Rica and El Salvador) greater than in urban zones, for a 
regional average of 45%. (Trejos 2006: 40). When we 
break down the data for the farming sector, the environ-
ment becomes much bleaker: the incidence of poverty 
in rural zones is 63%; for those households dedicated 
to traditional farming, the figure is 76%; this rises to 
80% where peasant productive units are involved (Trejos 
2006: 41). Furthermore, in contrast to what different 
International Financial Organizations (IFOs) and govern-
ments predict, there is no direct relation observable be-
tween employment and poverty. rather, in the case of 
rural zones,  “…the sure fact is that most people looking 
for work find it, ye it is insufficient to overcome the pov-
erty trap. it suggests that obtaining employment is not 
enough, it depends basically on the type of work ob-
tained” (Trejos, 2006: 40).
This data illustrates the urban bias shown by the NEM, 
as well as the low importance within it of the entire agri-
cultural sector whose production is not aimed towards 
external markets. The logic of the poverty-generating 
model is shown here in crude form: the sector is one of 
the those that produces more wealth, at the same time 
as it produces more poverty.
IV. 2. Farming 
in the European 
Union
For its part, the EU for 2005, in the agricultural sector, 
exported a total of  284 billion, representing 10.2% of 
total exports (internal and external) for the year. Of these 
exports, 250 million were shipped to CA, representing 
6.8% of all European exports to the region and 0.4% of 
the EU’s total agricultural exports, meaning that CA can 
safely be said to be insignificant for the EU in terms of 
the agricultural market. Of these agricultural exports, 
those directed to the regional market accounted for 
77% of the total (approximately  218 billion), while those 
directed towards external markets comprised the re-
maining 23% (approximately  65 billion) (EC 2007a).
While in Central America farming exports tend to be 
concentrated in a few products, in the European case 
the complete opposite applies. As we can see in graph 
3, the main exports are prepared drinks (including fruit 
juices and alcoholic drinks such as wine), followed by 
dairy products (including milk, cheese and other deriva-
tives), meat and derivative products (including fish along 
with beef, pork, goat, mutton and poultry) and vegeta-
bles and fresh fruit. Another feature distinguishing the 
regions is that while most of the CA exports comprise 
raw materials or unprocessed products, 70% of the 
value of the EU’s farming production is industrially pro-
cessed (CE, 2005b).
Graph 3.
Distribution by product of the agricultural  
exports outside the EU. 2005
SOURCE: CE 2005B.
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In 2005, the gross value added value (GVA) of the farm-
ing sector in the European Economy (EU-25) was just 
1.9%, meaning it is not a sector with a large commer-
cial significance. Nonetheless, it continues to be an 
economic activity of high value for certain countries, 
especially the recently incorporated members of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEEC),9 specifically Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, Greece and Estonia, where 
the GVA is between 4 and 5% (EC 2007b).
In terms of employment, the farming sector represent-
ed around 9.5 million annual work units (AWU)10, ap-
	  The EU has been subject to amplifications during the present 
decade (2000-2010), the first, in 2003, comprising Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia, with which the EU expanded to 25 countries, 
including those already members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Holland (all since 1957), Denmark, the United King-
dom, Ireland (joining in 1973), Greece (1981), Portugal, Spain (1986), 
Austria, Sweden and Finland (1995). The second recent expansion 
took place in 2007 with the entry of Bulgaria and Rumania. Current-
ly membership requests are being considered for Croatia, Turkey, 
Ukraine and Macedonia.
10	  The annual work unit (AWU) is equivalent to the volume of work cor-
responding to a worker employed full-time.
proximately 4.9% of the total within the EU, much low-
er than industry (27.5%) and services (67.6%). The 
workforce in European farming currently shows a re-
duction of 22% since 1997, when it represented 12.1 
million AWU. However, it continues to be socially im-
portant since, in countries like Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Austria and Slovakia, more than 10% of the workforce 
depends on this sector, rising to 20% in others such as 
Poland. In this same year, the first five countries in 
terms of manual labour were: Poland, Italy, Spain, 
France and Hungary, comprising two thirds of the la-
bour force in agriculture (GRET et al. 2005). 
European agricultural production has a market value of 
291 billion within which the vegetable, cereal and cattle 
sectors account for an important part, attaining be-
tween 9 and 15% (graph). The main contributors to this 
total are France (56 billion), Italy and Spain (36 billion) 
and Germany (43 billion) (EC 2007b). 
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Graph 4.
Break down of the output of the European farming 
industry (EU-25). 2005. 
SOURCE: EC 2007B
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A large part of the value added (around 90%) in the agro-
industrial sector comes from processing the raw materi-
als in the EU-15 countries, especially Italy, France and 
Spain (between 21 and 25 billion), followed by Germany, 
Holland and the United Kingdom (between 6 and 13 bil-
lion). The value deriving from the new members following 
the expansion in 2003 is fairly low: given the importance 
which the farming sector still possesses in these coun-
tries, we can deduce that these have been transformed 
into zones for extracting raw produce (EC 2007b). 
Finally, European production involves around 6.5 mil-
lion agricultural plantations, a quarter of which are lo-
cated in ten members of the block (2003). According 
to size, the largest number of farms (46%) are less 
than 5 hectares (ha), followed by those between 10 
and 30 ha (20%), 5 and 10 ha (18%), more than 50 ha 
(10%) and between 30 and 50 ha (6%). 92% of the 
farms over 10 ha in size are located in the old mem-
bers of the EU (EC 2007b).  
After this general description of the weight of the farm-
ing sector in both blocks, we can turn to the discussion 
on the interests that could come into conflict during the 
negotiations for the EAA. This will be the theme of the 
following two sections.
 V. The European 
Union’s interests
The European Union is one of the most powerful and pros-
perous economic blocks in the world. Its gross domestic 
product is approximately 10.8 trillion, which makes it the 
world’s largest economy, followed by the United States, 
which in 2005 produced approximately 10.1 trillion (EC 
2007c y d). However, despite its relative importance in the 
global scheme, the block’s long-term panorama is not so 
brilliant. Until 2000, the date when the current European 
development strategy was drafted, the block’s economy 
was in a weakened and backward position compared to 
its two main global competitors: the United States and 
Japan. While the US economy grew in 1999 at a rate a 
little below 4% per year (currently 9%), Europe’s growth 
rate was just 2% (currently 3.5%) (EC 2000).
 The current economic and social agenda is a ten-year 
plan defined within this setting, whose aim is to promote 
a structural change in the European Union’s productive 
system capable of generating increased regional eco-
nomic growth and expanding the supply of jobs for the 
European population. 
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The Lisbon Agenda, thus called because it had been 
approved by a full meeting of the Council of Europe in 
Portugal, aims – as can be surmised from the initiative’s 
eight key dimensions11 – to make the European econ-
omy more competitive by establishing more profitable 
productive processes or processes with higher value 
added, especially in the service (financial and high tech-
nology) sectors. Essential tools within this strategy in-
clude promoting innovation, the liberalization of internal 
and external markets (essentially in the service area, 
which accounts for up to 77% of the total value added 
of the EU) and the promotion of sustainable develop-
ment (WEF 2004). 
V. 1. The EU’s 
Global Agenda
The Global Agenda is the EU’s general strategy in rela-
tion to external trade. Its overall objective is multilat-
eral liberalization of trade through the opening up of 
markets, with the aim of producing a scenario in which 
European companies stimulate the economic growth 
of the EU. To attain this aim, the strategy conceives 
two primary agendas: one for the establishment of in-
ternal policies that promote and confront the econom-
ic liberalization of trade and investments; the other for 
the constitution of external policies with the aim of en-
suring rules of equity and open competition in foreign 
markets (EC 2005a).
Internally, it can be deduced that the improvement 
in European competitiveness derives from a balance 
between the liberalizing and protectionist policies in 
various economic areas or sectors. On one hand, 
the perception exists that Europe competitiveness 
is negatively affected by the high level of protection-
ism involved in certain industrial sectors, which 
means that regional exports fail to perform as effi-
11	These are: 1)  to create an information society accessible to all Europe-
ans; 2) to develop an area of innovation, research and development; 3) eco-
nomic liberalization, in two senses, the consolidation of the single market 
and the establishment of a state policy of assisting productivity (related to 
the liberalization of the barriers impeding business access to the mecha-
nisms of government concessions and tenders); 4) the construction of net-
work industries, especially in the field of telecommunications, public utili-
ties (primarily water and energy) and transportation; 5) to create integrated 
and efficient financial services; 6) improving the business environment (with 
monetary aid and the gradual dismantling of regulatory frameworks); 7) the 
increase in social inclusion through education and work training programs, 
and the modernization of social welfare systems; and finally 8) the promo-
tion of sustainable development (WEF 2004).
ciently as those of their competitors (USA and 
Japan). On the other hand, it is thought that the re-
sult of uncontrolled liberalization is damaging to ar-
eas and sectors where competitiveness is low. Thus, 
this European commercial progress should be real-
ized in a form that promotes access to investment 
and a greater regional share of world trade, while 
maintaining trade defences in the face of anti-com-
petitive imports and promoting programs that facili-
tate the adaptation of certain sectors to world trade 
(EC 2005a). 
Externally, a policy of ‘moderate liberalization’ on the 
part of the EU should be complemented by assuring 
conditions for ‘fair trade’12 on the part of its trading 
partners. This aim is intended to deal with three spe-
cific issues: reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
easing access to resources, and focusing on new 
trade areas.
In relation to the first issue, tariff and non-tariff trade bar-
riers, the EU is deemed to be fairly open to international 
imports, but faces tough barriers when it comes to ex-
ports. Hence, a levelling of conditions is essential for 
free trade to become possible, especially in the case of 
non-tariff barriers, since these tend to be the most sen-
sitive. Furthermore, these barriers are related to the 
definition of the domestic regulations of the trading 
partners more than decisions taken within the frame-
work of multilateral bodies (EC 2005a). Despite this, the 
EU has shown a complete refusal to negotiate issues 
such as subsidies for agricultural production in any 
space other than the WTO, where the discussion is 
completely bogged down.
Second, as the European Commission emphasizes 
(2005a):
“(...) Europe needs to import to export. 
Working for the removal of restrictions on 
the access to resources such as energy, 
metals and raw materials, including certain 
agricultural and animal products,, should 
be a high priority. The measures adopted 
by some of our main trading partners 
to restrict access to the supply of these 
12	 In this context, ‘fair trade’ should be understood to mean simply the 
absence of trade barriers that work to restrict the competitive capacities of 
the European productive sectors. It has little or nothing to do with the more 
general use of the term to mean the elimination of trade asymmetries and 
the different kinds of dumping practices (social, environmental, etc.).
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inputs is causing severe problems for the 
EU’s industries. Except where justified 
on environmental or safety grounds, the 
restrictions on these resources should be 
removed” (p. 7).
From this it can be inferred that in the trade measures 
it establishes with other partners, the EU will valorize 
primarily the access to goods essential to the func-
tioning of the region’s productive structure. This is 
particularly certain in the case of energy, where the 
EU has announced that, in addition to ensuring the 
elimination of barriers to certain fossil fuels and biofu-
els, it will also promote the good governance and po-
litical transparency of supplier governments (EC 
2005a). In other words, the EU retains the right to be 
able to intervene in questions of domestic policy of its 
trading partners when the latter harm its interests 
and energy needs.
Put succinctly, the European trade agenda posits that in 
order to be able to maintain its global economic posi-
tion, it must deepen the logic of unequal development 
(import primary goods, export finished goods) and en-
sure that the countries producing raw materials have no 
intention of introducing policies contrary to its interests 
(a euphemism for promoting good governance and po-
litical transparency).
Third, the EU asserts that trade opening should not 
be limited exclusively to the gradual elimination of tar-
iff and non-tariff barriers. Globalized trade also in-
cludes services (which are the cornerstone of the 
European economy) and investments, and, in this 
sense, other measures are required to consolidate 
the European global position. Some examples of 
these measures include: 1) the liberalization of the 
services market and access to investments, 2) the 
elimination of practices that could be considered to 
discriminate against foreign companies in public ten-
ders (such as performance requirements), 3) the es-
tablishment of clear norms for state help to the ‘com-
petition,’ and 4) the effective implementation of 
intellectual property laws (EC 2005a). This clearly 
points towards a trade strategy that aims to ensure 
control of the more profitable sectors falls to European 
companies. A quick look at these sectors in Central 
America is enough to verify this fact.
V. 2. The EU’s 
Common 
Agricultural  
Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established 
with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1959 and is 
today one of the EU’s oldest and most controversial 
polices. The CAP is in reality a group of measures for 
the farming sector that pursue a variety of objectives, 
which include: 1) increasing agricultural productivity 
through the promotion of technical progress and opti-
mization in the use of productive factors, 2) ensuring a 
fair living standard for European farmers, 3) market sta-
bilization, 4) ensuring the availability of the supply of 
agricultural goods to the market, and 5) ensuring rea-
sonable prices for consumers (Batty and Carswell 
2005; EC 2005b).
Recently, as part of the Lisbon Agenda, the EU under-
took two reforms in the farming sector, one in 2000 and 
the other more extensive reform between 2003 and 
2004. The first reform failed to have much impact and 
was basically confined to cuts of between 15 and 20% 
on the prices assigned to agricultural products such as 
meat. cereals and dairy produce.
The 2003 reform, on the contrary, is a ten-year policy 
that pursues the following three objectives. First, the 
relative decoupling of subsidy payments to EU farm-
ers, so that they are independent of production, but 
dependent on the fulfilment of conditions of environ-
mental sustainability, food security, animal and plant 
health and other welfare standards (some elements 
linked to production are always maintained to avoid 
production being abandoned). Second, the estab-
lishment of mechanisms to avoid the CAP budget be-
ing exceeded in relation to its 2013 target; this in-
cludes the regional commitment to a growth rate of 
1% per year in the direct aid policies and a rechan-
neling of the payments to the rural development area. 
Third, the execution of specific reforms in market 
policy, especially in relation to certain specific sec-
tors, especially banana and sugar. In others such as 
the dairy sector, no significant measures have been 
taken (EC 2003a).
To comply with the CAP objectives during the period 
of reform (2003-2013), the Council of Agricultural 
Ministers (CoAM) has established a support system 
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divided into two ‘pillars:’ the first includes the mea-
sures in support of prices and subsidies; the second 
includes those directed towards rural development. 
The text below briefly explains the measures used in 
the first pillar:
• Intervention in market prices. The CAP establishes 
prices for all each agricultural good that are usu-
ally higher than the market prices. If the price falls 
below the established level, an intervention pur-
chase is made by the State until the price rises 
again to the set level. Although the aim of this 
measure is to stabilize the market, many farm un-
doubtedly produce large surpluses in the knowl-
edge that the EU will buy all their production at an 
artificially inflated price, allowing them to obtain 
enormous profits. 
• Export subsidies. The EU has established a series 
of export subsidies to prevent the market from be-
ing flooded with the production of goods that the 
same CAP stimulates; the measure also helps re-
duce the cost of storing surpluses. This allows the 
EU to inundate the world market with the surplus-
es of certain goods, making its production more 
competitive. This is the central feature of the 
European export model. In contrast to the case of 
CA, which specifically produces for the external 
market, the EU produces to cover its own internal 
agricultural demands and only exports if and when 
productive surpluses exist.
• Import tariffs and quotas. The CAP includes high 
tariffs on imports, which forces a rise in the prices 
of foreign goods to above the market price, 
thereby protecting domestic European produc-
tion. The quota mechanism, as its name sug-
gests, involves the setting of limits on the impor-
tation of specified goods.
• Direct payments. These are payments made to 
farmers; before the 2003 reform, they took into ac-
count solely the size of the terrain or plantation, or 
the livestock held, while after this year compliance 
with environmental sustainability norms were in-
cluded as a criteria.
According to various authors, the 2003 reform does 
not correspond to an express interest of the EU in 
reducing those of its policies that distort the interna-
tional agricultural trade. On the contrary, it makes 
more sense to say that the reform was intended to 
introduce changes to the budgetary structure, making 
it more sustainable in relation to the rest of the 
European model. This derives from the excessive 
weight possessed by the CAP within the European 
budget (almost 12% in 2000), as well as external fac-
tors, such as the entry of ten new members to the 
European block in the same year, all of them with 
large farming sectors (EC 2002). There is no evidence 
to indicate that the reform was due to the abandon-
ment of the intransigent European interests in main-
taining the agricultural policy as an instrument to pro-
tect the sector internally or make it more competitive 
externally (Batty and Carswell 2005).
V. 3. The 
EU’s relation 
with African, 
Caribbean and 
Pacific countries
Historically, the EU has maintained extremely impor-
tant political, economic and commercial relations 
with the ACP countries, offering highly favourable 
trade cooperation schemes for this block, especially 
in terms of raw materials: non-agricultural products 
like petroleum, diamonds and minerals, and agricul-
tural products like coffee, cacao, sugar and banana 
(see box 4; also see annex 3 on the trade between 
the EU and the ACP block). Since the beginning, 
these relations have been of particular interest to 
France in maintaining the ties of dependence of its 
colonies in Africa (France accounted for 50% of their 
exports and comprised the origin of 70% of their im-
ports), through a regime of association that was in-
cluded in the Treaty of Rome. 
With the entry of new members into the EU in 1975, 
an important change took place, primarily because 
the United Kingdom, like France wished to maintain 
the agreements previously obtained with its former 
colonies, which led to the establishment of a new se-
ries of agreements called the Lomé Conventions, 
which were renewed various times until their aban-
donment in 2000. In its last period (1991-2000), the 
Convention included 71 ACP countries. Number 71, 
South Africa, since it possessed a more developed 
economic base than the rest of the ACP, was included 
in a special regime. Likewise, the agreement con-
ceived the existence of a variety of cooperation instru-
ments (especially commercial).
Currently, these relations are part of a complex 
framework of regional EAAs13 signed within the con-
text of the Cotonou Agreement (2003). Through 
these agreements, the EU has assured itself unre-
stricted access to the markets of these nations, lib-
eralization in terms of services and investments, in 
accordance with the three points of the Global 
Agenda, and the generation of unimpeded commer-
cial flows for unprocessed goods of high value to the 
EU, such as petroleum (equivalent to 32% of exports 
to the EU, and 7% of the petroleum imported by the 
block), diamonds (10.9% of exports and 24.4% of 
EU imports), raw cacao (5.4% and 95.8%, respec-
tively), aluminium (2.7% and 14.6%), raw sugar 
(2.4% and 71.2%), untoasted or decaffeinated cof-
fee (1.7% and 17.1%) and banana (1.4% and 20.6%) 
(EC 2007a). In the case of sugar and banana, in par-
ticular, many of the original benefits of Lomé IV have 
been gradually eliminated.
V. 4. The EU’s 
interests in 
relation to the 
EAA with Central 
America in the 
farming sector
Based on the external trade and agricultural policies 
sketched out above, it is possible to say that agricul-
tural is not the EU’s priority in terms of the EAA with 
Central America. The EU’s current development mod-
el aims to raise its rates of economic growth through 
1	  The ACP group is currently composed of 78 countries, divided re-
gionally into 7 multilateral organizations. The EU has separately negotiated 
an EAA with each economic block; these offer the same conditions as 
CA, primarily a degree of consolidation of customs unions. The regions in-
volved are: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), CARICOM, the Common Market 
of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC) and the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG). 
the formation of productive practices with an ever 
higher added value: this primarily translates into im-
proving the competitiveness of the service and indus-
trial sectors, which are undoubtedly the cornerstones 
of the European economy.
However, although European farming accounts for a 
very small part of GVA 4.9%), its importance within this 
development model is indisputable, not necessarily as 
a competitive sector that can offer greater dynamism 
to the economy in the context of foreign trade, but 
rather as a result of the sector’s socioeconomic impor-
tance in ensuring the permanent supply of farming 
goods (food security) and the sustainability of the 
block’s rural economies. 
For this reason, in terms of the agricultural issue, pre-
vious experiences such as the negotiation of the EAA 
with MERCOSUR or in the context of the WTO strong-
ly suggest that the EU will maintain a clearly protec-
tionist policy, especially when the goods that could be 
imported from Central America within a free trade re-
gime would pose a direct threat to the stability of its 
domestic production. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that the EU also has clearly defined offensive 
interests. Likewise, we recall that the EU needs to im-
port in order to export; that is to say, it requires a sig-
nificant quantity of raw material in order to sustain es-
sential areas of its agroindustrial production, explaining 
why it would aggressively aim to remove the trade 
barriers on these goods.  
At this point, we can now examine in more detail the 
EU’s offensive or defensive interests, as cited above, 
by separating out the following lists of products. List 
A includes some of the products where the EU shows 
a high level of competitiveness, but faces strong tariff 
barriers in Central American countries, which the EU 
would presumably aim to reduce. List B includes 
products where the EU would be expected to pro-
mote free trade with the aim of ensuring their supply, 
given these are not goods that it produces internally 
– or its production is unable to cover internal demand 
– but that are essential in terms of maintaining its ex-
port base. Finally list C comprises products where the 
EU would probably prefer to minimize access to trade 
benefits, since these goods are more competitive 
than those produced by the EU and hence threaten 
the European agricultural model.
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Table 1. Products included in lists for European liberalization or protection in the EAA with CA.
List A List B List C
Cereals
Dairy Produce
Pork
Coffee
Biofuels
Palm Oil
Banana
Sugar
Beef
of the total agricultural production. Exports tend to be 
concentrated on wheat, where approximately € 1.7 bil-
lion is exported (76% of the total), followed by barley 
with € 308 million (13%), maize with € 95 million (4%), 
rice with € 85 million (4%) and finally rye with € 35 mil-
lion (2%) (EC 2005c). 
Pork comprises the most important EU export within 
the meat sector as a whole, making up more than 65% 
of total exports, generating a little more than € 2 billion 
in 2006 (EC 2007a). Internally pork, like beef and poul-
try, is very important in the European diet, as well as the 
region’s food security logic, with internal consumption 
reaching the level of 42.9 kilos per person per year (EC 
2005d). It is worth highlighting that, broken down, 
European exports produce the highest value added due 
to the fact that almost € 1.77 billion of the exported total 
corresponded to boneless pork (EC 2007a).
The products from list A described above possess two 
specific qualities: they are subject to and face high lev-
els of protectionism, in their regions of origin and desti-
nation alike. The dairy sector, for example, was guaran-
teed 2% of the overall CAP budget for 2005. Over the 
last few years, this sector has been affected by reforms 
designed to improve its competitiveness through a re-
duction in the intervention prices to protect domestic 
production. Here the aim is made to level the average 
price of the sector in € 230 per metric ton, a result which 
even so is considerably high compared to the world 
price of a little over € 170 (EC 2006h). In the case of 
pork, due to the level of self-sufficiency assured, ex-
ports reach a considerable surplus, which explains the 
payment within the CAP to this sector where at least 
50% is made up of export subsidies (AGRA-CEAS 
2005). Finally, in the case of cereals, export subsidies 
during the 2002-2003 period were in a phase of clear 
reduction. As part of the measures introduced to de-
couple production and tariffs in the 2003 CAP reform, 
the measures favouring wheat were eliminated, while 
V.4. 1. The EU’s offensive 
interests: lists A and B
List A comprises three products with an enormous im-
portance to the EU and considered sensitive for Central 
America: dairy produce,14 cereals and pork. 
The EU is the world’s largest exporter of dairy produce. 
In 2004, its production attained € 5.4 trillion, 25% of 
world exports. Breaking down this figure, the EU ex-
ported 39% of the butter, 40% of the cheese, 26% of 
the skimmed milk and 29% of the powdered milk ex-
ported globally. The value of its intraregional trade in 
dairy produce was more than € 18 billion in 2005, inter-
nally concentrated in three products: cheeses (37.3% 
of the total), fresh milk (31.6%) and butter (16.2%) (EC 
2006h). Milk and its derivatives is also one of the es-
sential products in the farming industry of many of the 
EU’s countries, especially Estonia, Luxembourg, 
Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden, where it 
registers a relative value of between 23.7 and 33.5% 
(EC 2006h). 
For their part, cereals comprise one of the most com-
petitive and at the same time most important sectors of 
European farming. This is due to the fact they are con-
sidered basic goods within the logic of European food 
security.15 In productive terms, wheat equals 48% of the 
total, followed by barley with 20%, maize with 19% and 
other types of cereals (including rye, millet and sorghum) 
with 12%. Exports in 2006 attained a little less than € 
2.3 billion, corresponding to 3.4% of exports and 14.4% 
14	The dairy sector comprises the produce derived from fresh cow’s milk. 
Depending on the type of chemical processing employed, these products 
may include unconcentrated milk, concentrated milk (including powdered 
and condensed milk), butter, cream and buttermilk, and finally various types 
of cheese. 
15	In contrast to the situation in CA, where food security is conceived as ac-
cess to food, whether through production or imports, the EU’s view reflects 
its past, marked by two world wars, where overriding importance is given to 
ensuring as far as possible food autonomy and self-supply.
80% of other cereals (including maize and rice) were 
exported without subsidies (EC 2005c). 
In terms of the entry into the CA isthmus, the three 
products or groups of products observed faced high 
tariff barriers. This is particularly so in the case of dairy 
produce, where Costa Rica and El Salvador maintained 
a tariff of between 50 and 65%, followed by Nicaragua, 
with a stable tariff of between 40 and 60%. Some coun-
tries such as Costa Rica maintain additional protection-
ist agricultural policies based on the use of import quo-
tas, allowing it to protect the national farming from the 
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impact resulting from the entry of more competitive 
goods. These measures have been applied to the dairy 
sector (especially in relation to powdered milk, butter 
and cheeses), sausages and pork (SICE 2007).
In relation to pork, the highest tariff is again in Costa 
Rica, with 45%, followed by El Salvador. In terms of 
cereals, Guatemala attains one of the highest levels of 
the Central American Import Tariff (ACI), reaching 
237% in the case of rice. In Costa Rica, rice is also 
subject to protections through the use of trade safe-
guard mechanisms. 
Table 2. Import tariffs on goods in list A on the part of Central America
Product Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Unconcentrated milk 65% 40% 15% 35% 15%
Whole powdered milk 65% 20% 15% 15% 60%
Semi-skimmed powdered milk 65% 15-20% 15% 15-20% 60%
Evaporated and condensed milk 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Cream 65% 20% 15% 20% 40%
Fresh cheese 65% 40% 15% 20% 40%
Processed and grated cheeses 65% 40% 15% 35% 40%
Special cheeses 50% 15-40% 15% 15-35% 5-40%
Fresh and frozen pork 45% 0-40% 15% 15% 15%
Wheat, rye, barley and oats 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maize for sowing 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Popcorn, yellow and white maize 0-15% 5-20% 20-35% 15% 10-15%
Paddy rice 35% 0-40% 0-237% 0-45% 20-45%
Flaked rice 35% 40% 118-237% 45% 60%
Split and medium-grained rice 35% 40% 118-237% 45% 60%
SOURCE: SIECA 2007A.
The products from list B are those which the EU consid-
ers it needs to import since they are essential to the 
European development model and are not produced 
internally. Two of these products are especially impor-
tant to the EU: coffee and biofuels. 
Coffee is an important case of importation of raw goods 
that are processed for subsequent resale and exported as 
goods with higher added value. While its importation 
reaches around € 4.4 billion, its exports are also signifi-
cant, reaching nearly € 4.1 billion during 2006. The differ-
ence concerns the type of product: 96.8% of imported 
coffee is unprocessed (unroasted or decaffeinated); while 
exports are concentrated into decaffeinated and unroast-
ed coffee (€ 1.7 billion) and toasted and decaffeinated cof-
fee (€ 1.8 billion). This objective is exemplified in the tariff 
policy for the sector, which favours exportation of raw cof-
fee through tariff exemptions and penalizes the processed 
good through an ad valorem tariff of 11.5% (BITD 2006). It 
is obvious that coffee is therefore an essential product for 
which the EU establishes productive chains that provide it 
with a high added value, making it essential for the block 
to maintain unrestricted access to its market.
A second example of the products from list B are the 
biofuels (box1).
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Box 1. The European biofuels strategy
The European biofuels strategy involves a plan until 2010 in which an increase in the use of these fuels is expected (attaining 
5.75%), making use of biomass originating both internally and externally. To this end, the EU proposes a series of pillars, the 
essential of which are as follows:
• Stimulate the demand for biofuels within the EU. Here the biofuels directive (approved in 2003 by the EC) aims to increase the 
part of the market dedicated to these goods from 2% in 2005 to 5.75% in 2010. 
• Develop the production and distribution of biofuels. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will be used to promote this produc-
tion through the introduction of state aid or resources through rural development policies aimed towards developing biomass 
processing plants.
• Expand the supply of raw materials. This will be achieved through the use of the 2003 CAP reform: the latter included the 
obligation to set aside fallow areas, involving a payment to farmers for them not to use a portion of their lands with the aim 
of avoiding the overproduction of cereal crops. Since higher production is required in order to supply the growing demand 
for biomass, the obligation to set aside fallow areas has been converted into a payment for the cultivation of biomass crops 
in these restricted areas. A similar accord has been reached in the production of sugarcane, beetroot and wine grapes.
• Increase trading opportunities. The trade in ethanol does not possess a separate international commercial description, since 
it is included under code 2207 of the HS as alcohol with a content of 80% or over. This tariff code has allowed tariff-free 
access through various trading initiatives of the EU: 1) the ‘Everything but arms’ (EBA) agreement for Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs), 2) the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, 3) Special Regime for Good 
Governance and Sustainable Development of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP-Plus) and 4) some bilateral nego-
tiations such as the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement. The liberalization of ethanol is equally important for the EU within the 
framework of the WTO and at regional level with the EAA being negotiated with MERCOSUR, given Brazil’s competitiveness 
in sugar and ethanol.
• Support for developing countries. The EU has established its willingness to help developing countries affected by the variation 
in the liberalization of the sugar production protocol (primarily ACP-Caribbean) with the aim of directing their production to-
wards ethanol. This is a point where European cooperation would be important.
The trend evident so far is for a sizeable increase of 64.7% in biodiesel production and 48.6% in bioethanol. Furthermore, there 
has been an increase in the capacity of processing, with capacity reaching 8 million metric tons in 2007 and at least 58% of 
rape oil being used as biofuel. 
Source: EC 2006 b, c y d
Ethanol and biodiesel are fuels that can be produced 
on the base of agricultural goods such as sugarcane, 
maize and other cereals, and plant oils such as palm. 
Due to Europe’s need to supply a growing demand 
in energy consumption, these foods have begun to 
acquire considerable importance. Between 2004 
and 2005 alone, the production of biodiesel in the 
EU rose from 1.9 million tons to 3.1 million, with eth-
anol production rising similarly from 491,000 to 
730,000 tons. Even so, biofuels represent a small 
value within the total energy consumption of the EU 
(2%) (EC 2006b). 
In terms of the international trade of these goods to 
the EU, it should be emphasized that, in the case of 
biodiesel, imports from CA are not subject to tariffing 
as a result of GSP-Plus. This has not yielded an in-
crease in Central American exports of palm oil since 
Europe, despite being the largest purchaser at inter-
national level, tends to favour the use of rape oil. 
Ethanol, on the other hand, is a product of growing 
importance in the commerce between CA and the 
EU, showing an increase of 36.288%, rising from 
US$ 926,000 in 2003 to US$ 34.5 million in 2006 
(SIECA 2007a). This value, as well as exports of palm 
oil, can be expected to grow since the EU will only 
be capable of supplying 25% of the biomass needed 
to produce fuels in 2010, which means that it will 
depend considerably on foreign commercial sources 
to fill the gap in relation to domestic consumption 
(EU 2006 b, c y d).
V. 4. 2. The EU’s defensive 
interests: list C
List C includes goods produced in the EU which are how-
ever uncompetitive internationally, making them subject 
to a high degree of protectionism that affects exports 
coming from regions such as Central America. Of spe-
cial importance here are banana, sugar and beef, since 
these are three of the most competitive exports of the 
CA isthmus and, at the same time, goods offered a high 
degree of protection by the EU. Europe’s position can 
be expected to be highly protectionist in relation to 
these products.
The production of banana in the EU is important be-
cause of the growth in domestic demand for the crop. 
Nonetheless, it can only provide 16% of this demand 
through its own production (originating primarily from 
more isolated regions belonging to members of the EU). 
As a result, it depends on the ACP and Latin America to 
complete the remaining 84%. However, as Central 
American banana production is more competitive (with 
a comparative advantage of 0.369 compared to -0.514) 
and much larger than European production (41,000 kg 
per hectare compared to 28,000), the EU has opted to 
protect its domestic market through the imposition of 
high tariffs on imports deriving from Latin America (€ 
680 per metric ton), making it less competitive than its 
own domestic production. Likewise, it has provided ex-
tensive aid to the banana market through POSEI, an aid 
program for more isolated regions of the EU (where the 
increase for 2008 is expected  to attain € 278.8 million), 
as well as direct assistance through the CAP to produc-
ers in continental Europe (directed primarily towards 
Spain) (EC 2006e). Equally, the ACP benefits from trade 
in this specific product with the EC, which it can export 
tariff-free under the Cotonou Agreement (PWC and 
SOLAGRAL 2004). 
In relation to sugar, the EU is a key figure in the global 
market, representing 13% of production, 12% of con-
sumption, 15% of exports and 5% of imports at world 
level (EC 2003b). Its exports to the rest of the world 
were a little under € 1.9 billion in 2006, 99% of which 
consisted of white or refined sugar. Nonetheless, in 
contrast to the case of coffee, the EU possesses a spe-
cific CMO designed to produce raw sugar in sufficient 
quantity to satisfy its own domestic demand if not also 
its industrial demand (related to activities that range 
from refining to medicines). For this reason, the EU has 
implemented strong protectionist measures (with a 
budget of approximately € 1.5 billion for the sector) 
which include high import tariffs (up to € 41.9 per 100 
kg net), production quotas and sales quotas for internal 
consumption (avoiding very high supply levels and fa-
cilitating price policies), aid towards production that 
raises the market price, as well as preferential prices for 
the purchase of beetroot from which European farmers 
extract sugar. 
However, although the internal production of raw sugar 
succeeds in meeting sections of the European market 
and tends to generate large exportable surpluses, some 
import quotas have been kept below preferential price 
schemes for ACP and other countries with which bilat-
eral accords exist, including India (one of the main pro-
ducers and exporters) and the Balkans. Nonetheless, 
these cards have undergone a number of variations so 
that the EU could ensure a more financially stable CAP 
(see box 2).
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Box 2. Reforms to the Sugar and Banana Protocols between the EC and ACP.
The Sugar and Banana Protocols are agreements between the EU and ACP designed under the Lomé Conventions. In the case 
of both products, they include preferential tariff quotas for these products. In the specific case of sugar, these include guaranteed 
prices (subsidies so that the price equals European prices) and commitments to sell (ACP) and purchase (UE) the product. 
Following the end of Lomé IV in 2000, and the beginning of negotiations for the EAAs within the Cotonou framework, the EU 
committed itself to a variation in the access conditions for both goods to enable adjustment to the WTO’s regulations. As a result, 
in 2006 the quota measures for European banana were eliminated, although high tariffs on the product entering the EU were 
maintained as a form of protecting the production of ACP-Africa countries (€ 680 per metric ton). In the case of sugar, the Protocol 
continued, but set within the CAP’s budgetary reduction. Although sugar is still subject to purchase and sales agreements, export 
quotas, tariff exemptions and guaranteed prices, these benefits were reduced.
The biggest negative impact of this variation in the Protocols was felt by ACP-Caribbean, which, in contrast to Central America 
and Ecuador, has less competitive advantages since it produces small and relatively unproductive amounts, as well as facing 
problems in marketing both products. The result has been a reduction in its contribution to exports to the EU. 
On the other hand, the measures have benefited ACP-Africa and other nations with which the EU possesses advantages in this 
are, as in the case of India, with which it has a bilateral agreement that assures a portion of the sugar market. Central America 
is excluded from these measures, which actually remain ill defined, since it lacks the capacity to export sugar to the EU. In terms 
of banana, despite the negative tariff conditions, Latin America (especially CA and Ecuador) remain the origin for 68% of the 
banana supply to the EU, though the continuance of barriers prevents an even higher penetration of the market. 
SOURCE: PWC AND SOLAGRAL 2004; CASANOVA 2005 AND EC 2006E.
Finally, in relation to beef, it should first be mentioned 
that this is one of the central goods in the EU block’s 
food security policy and hence is subject to some of the 
principle protectionists measures. It therefore counts on 
high intervention prices (up to € 2.224 per metric ton, 
even following the reduction of the 2003 CAP), and 
equally high import tariffs (with an ad valorem of be-
tween 12.8% combined with another of up to € 
304.1per 100 kg net). European beef production (8% of 
total farming production) is clearly aimed at meeting the 
demands of the internal market and, consequently, 
there are no significant surpluses capable of being used 
for exportation (the EU succeeded in exporting just € 
266 million in 2006). In fact, it has been unable to meet 
domestic demand for beef, meaning that it has been 
gradually opening export quotas for this product, to the 
point that the long-term production forecasts shown 
that this trend will continue and that the EU will need 
increasingly high levels of imports (EC 2005d). 
A more detailed account of these interests will be pro-
vided later on; before this, though, we present a descrip-
tion of the Central American interests in this negotiation.
 VI. Central  
American  
Interests
Although the USA is the main market for agricultural goods 
for the CA isthmus, the EU is also extremely important, 
comprising the second largest destination for product 
exports from the region’s primary sector (Graph 5).  Thus 
any coherent strategy where the export of these types 
of products is important must look for mechanisms that 
allow CA to consolidate and improve its access to these 
markets. As part of this logic, a primary interest for the 
region in relation to the EAA with the EU must be to con-
solidate and improve access to the European market. 
This in mind, it seems clear that the farming sector and 
the attraction of FDI should be the central and primary 
interests of the isthmus in terms of the negotiations. For-
mally, the Central American region’s negotiating position 
is to achieve the same treatment as that received by ACP 
countries, that it to say ‘Everything but Arms.’ 
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Graph 5.
Distribution of Central American agricultural exports by 
destination market
SOURCE: SIECA 2007A.
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In the next section, we shall deepen out study of the 
regional farming interests in light of the EAA negotia-
tions. Following the procedure adopted above in rela-
tion to European interests, first of all we shall examine 
the offensive interests – that is, areas in which the aim is 
to improve or consolidate the conditions for entry of a 
product – before describing the defensive interests, 
those products whose domestic market requires pro-
tection for a variety of reasons.
VI.1. Offensive 
interests: GSP-
Plus, banana  
and sugar
The large majority of Central American farming exports 
enter the European market through the GSP-Plus (ap-
proximately 77.3%)16 tariff-free or with very low tariff 
levels. This system is unilateral and depends exclusively 
on the EU deciding to maintain it and on how it decides 
to implement it. 
16	In order to determine this figure, we have taken the region’s main farming 
exports until reaching 80.1% of the exporting base to the European Union. 
Then we defined what quantity of the export entered with some degree of 
tariff reduction, the obtained percentage being equivalent to the part of the 
selected base that enters tariff-free.
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Box 4. Brief sketch of the Generalized System of Preferences
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was created in 1971 as part of an initiative of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to eliminate discrimination against the export products of peripheral nations. The mechanism 
is based on a qualification clause that allows unilateral exemptions from the application of tariffs below the ‘most favoured nation’ 
norm (MFN) with which the products from these countries obtain preferential access compared to central nations.
The European GSP is not a permanent mechanism and is set for revision after a period of time (a minimum of ten years). In the 
case of Central America and CAN, the 2001 review proved favourable since it included the GSP Drug Regime, which ensured 
complete exemption from the MFN tariff to States involved in combating drug trafficking. However, India’s complaint concerning 
the preferential advantage given by the Regime to Pakistan in the production of textiles and the subsequent ruling of the WTO on 
this issue meant the EU had to re-establish it. In 2005, it set up a new GSP regulation with a variant called GSP-Plus, of which 
Central America and CAN continue to be beneficiaries, albeit under different conditions.
Currently the GSP is divided into three preferential schemas: 
• The General GSP, which offers preferential relations to almost 7,000 products, 3,750 of which are considered non-sensitive and 
receive guaranteed tariff-free access to the beneficiaries, and the remaining 3,250 which are considered sensitive, obtaining 
a reduction of 3.5% from the ad valorem MFN tariff.
• GPS-Plus, a preferential regime which exempts the 7,000 products of the GSP from MFN duties for nations that comply with 
norms for strengthening good governance and protecting the environment. It should be highlighted that the beneficiaries of 
this regime are the same as those of the Drug Regime and that, furthermore, textiles were excluded.
The Special Regime for Most Favoured Nations or ‘Everything but arms’ (EBA) offers a benefit of tariff-free access to all the export 
products of the 49 least favoured nations of the world. As its names suggests, the only restriction is on access to arms.
SOURCE: RESOLUTION 980/2005 OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND OSTERLOFF 2005.
In principle, GSP-Plus runs until 2015, which gives it 
a certain stability. Even so, it is clear that one of the 
central interests in relation to the negotiations is en-
suring that the privileges acquired within the GSP-
Plus framework become governed by rules defined in 
bilateral fashion within the EAA framework. In this 
sense, obtaining what has already been acquired 
within the GSP-Plus is the minimum floor of negotia-
tion of the CA isthmus. Nothing less than this will be 
acceptable.
However, although the large majority of Central American 
agricultural products enter the European market in pref-
erential manner, this does not apply to all the region’s 
exportable products. Products as important to the re-
gion as banana and sugar confront fairly significant tariff 
and non-tariff barriers.
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Box 5. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade on the part of the EU on sugar, banana and beef
The Central American production of beef, banana and sugar faces high tariff and non-tariff barriers on its entry to the European 
Union, which ensures an overall increase to the sales price of the goods on the European market , and, as a result, lower com-
petitiveness.
• In the case of banana, CA faces an ad valorem tariff of € 680 per metric ton exported; likewise, the EU sets an access quota 
of 2.2 million tons on this product below an additional tariff of € 75 per ton.
• In the case of sugar, the EU sets an ad valorem tariff of € 33.9 per 100 kg net of raw sugar for later refining and € 41.9 in the 
case of any other type of sugar, such as refined or white sugar. Moreover, a series of preferential import quotas are set, one 
of 1.3 million tons of sugar, exempt from tariffs, specifically for India and ACP countries; and another of 85,000 tons with an 
additional tariff of € 9.8 per 100 kg open to the general level.
• In the case of beef, the tariff is higher. This is double since it includes one ad valorem tariff on the price, set at 12.8%, and an 
additional tariff on the exported weight of between € 176.8 per 100 kg net in the case of whole dead animals and up to € 
304.1 in relation to deboned meat or fine cuts.
In relation to non-tariff barriers, all the goods are subject to fulfilling a series of requirements that include: the certificate of valid-
ity for exportation from the European Program of Good Agricultural Practices (EurepGAP), compliance with strict phytosanitary 
measures for entry to the EU, import licences (which must be renewed every three months in the case of banana), compliance 
with norms on labelling, certificates of compliance with the quality standards for European sale and, in addition, measures for 
cross control to ensure compliance with rules of origin and satisfaction of international standards.
SOURCE: EUREPGAP 2007 AND BITD 2006
In relation to banana, the product is extremely important 
for the region and represents 6.2% of its total exports. 
Moreover, Costa Rica is among the world’s largest pro-
ducers of the fruit. The problem with access to the 
European market has centred on certain tariff barriers im-
posed by the EU in detriment to Latin American banana 
exports and in favour of the fruit produced by ACP coun-
tries. This has generated a set of multilateral conflicts, 
known generically as the ‘banana wars’ (see box 6).
As a result, for Central American banana producers, 
obtaining privileged (low or zero tariffs), constant (inde-
pendent of political changes at the heart of the EU) and 
secure (difficult to eliminate) access to the European 
market would be of huge benefit, since it would improve 
the sector’s trading conditions vis-à-vis direct competi-
tors, such as the ACP countries, and would ensure a 
competitive advantage compared to other world com-
petitors, such as Ecuador.
Box 6. The ‘banana wars’ and the international market
The history of the trading relationship in bananas between the European Union and other blocks producing this fruit has become 
increasingly conflict-ridden over the last few decades. For Latin America, there are two main reasons behind the conflicts over 
sales of bananas to the EU: the deepening of the European integration process, and the increasingly close historical and eco-
nomic connections between this region and the developing countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (commonly referred 
to as ACP). In addition to these factors, the EU’s different import regimes in relation to the ACP countries and Latin America in 
the supply of banana and the presence of US marketing companies in Latin American nations, with the political and economic 
rivalry between Europe and the USA, has added a political element to the trade rows over banana which have been rife since the 
beginning of the 1990s.
The first banana controversy followed in the wake of the constitution of a single European market in 1993 and the changes 
subsequently made to the import regimes of the fruit into the EU. Unfolding between 1992 and 1993, this led to Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua contesting the EU’s tariff regime (which comprised a tariff of 100 ECU1 per metric ton a quota of 
two million tons for banana for LFNs, which failed to represent the volume entering the EU market at that time, and tariff-free 
quotas for the ACP countries) within the GATT framework. The recommendations issued by the Special Group that analyzed the 
case were in favour of the plaintiffs, since it was ruled that the new regime was inconsistent with the GATT agreements. However, 
the adoption of these recommendations was vetoed by the EU. The climate produced by the Uruguay Round and the need for 
approval of the latter generated the idea conditions for placing the plaintiff nations and the EU at the negotiating table. This led 
to the signing of the 1994 Banana Framework Agreement, a negotiation which produced a extremely good outcome for the 
plaintiff countries, especially Costa Rica, though much less so for other Latin American countries who were not members of GATT. 
A third row was therefore provoked with new actors demanding changes, including Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, the United States 
and Guatemala.
The creation in 1995 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide a mechanism for resolving trade rows which up to now has 
mediated in solving the difference between countries and blocks selling the fruit, ever since 1996 when the fourth banana conflict 
erupted. Although the Banana Framework Agreement generated a climate of stability in marketing of the fruit by the end of the 
1990s, in 2001 during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, the ACP countries made their signing of the results of the 
conference conditional on the EU approving the amplification of its common trade agreement, extending the preferences for the 
ACP counties, including in relation to banana, until December 2007. Faced by this move, the banana producing countries of Latin 
America also succeeded in establishing an annex with conditions relating to banana in favour of suppliers from the Least Favoured 
Nations (LFN). For January 2005, the EU announced the application of a single tariff of € 230 per metric ton exported to its terri-
tory from January 1st 2006, which contravened the conditions included in the annex to the decision adopted in Doha during the 
Ministerial Agreement. The Latin American countries requested arbitration by the Director- General of the WTO, in order to analyze 
“whether the reconsolidation anticipated in the EC’s tariff applying to bananas would result in the maintenance, at least, of total 
access to the markets for LFN suppliers of banana, taking into account the commitments of the EC cited earlier.”
This is the basis of the fifth (and most recent) banana war between the EU and nine producer countries in Latin America: 
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela. In May 2006, three countries 
continued their legal action for discriminatory treatment in banana trading with the EU: Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador. In 
November 2006, the latter country made its lawsuit against the EU official, accusing it of treating banana imports in discrimina-
tory fashion. This accusation is also made by the Ecuadorian government; rather than being new, it is the continuation of an 
action initiated against the EU thirteen years ago and with which the community has failed to comply. For its part, Costa Rica has 
separated from the process it began with Colombia and Ecuador (who withdrew from the negotiating table). The latter then 
united with Guatemala. Costa Rica opted to resolve the conflict through talks and the mediation of Norway.
SOURCE: LóPEZ 2005. EL UNIVERSO. ‘SE REACTIVA LA ‘GUERRA’ DEL BANANO CON LA UE.’ NOVEMBER 17TH 2006. WWW.ELUNIVERSO.COM. 
‘BANANO: COSTA RICA SE CORTó SOLA y NEGOCIARá CON UE.’ MAy 8TH 2006 WWW.ADNMUNDO.COM
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In the case of sugar, this is one of the products that shows 
a greater export potential both for the region and globally 
(see box 7). Though historically sugar was already an ex-
tremely important product, the rise in international prices 
due to the biofuel boom has made it even more attractive. 
Thus, for example, the executive director of the Central 
American Sugar Association (AICA) calculates that the 
area cultivated with sugar will increase between 10 and 
12% (AZÚCAR ÉTICO 2006). Furthermore, the scenario 
is especially promising due to the introduction of CAFTA.
1 ECU: European Currency Unit.
44 the central american agricultural sector in the run-up to negotiations for the eaa with the european union: potential conflicts and scenarios
Box 7. Sugarcane in Central America
The production of sugar in Central America has a long history and a large importance within the region’s agricultural exports. Over 
the last 20 years, the crop has experienced a significant growth, tripling and almost quadrupling its production in the different 
countries of the isthmus. Studies have indicated that all the region’s countries have a strong potential for growth and improvement 
in current farming techniques. However, the limiting factors for actualizing this potential vary among the different countries.
The international marker
It is estimated that world production of standard sugar for 2006 rose to 147 million tons, 3% more than the year before. However, 
this is insufficient to cover forecast consumption (150 million tons). Thus, for the third consecutive year, there was a would deficit in 
terms of this market. 
Graph 6. World Sugar Supply and Demand Balance
The Central American market
The region’s sugarcane market, though important in terms of the isthmus’s exports (3% of total exports), is relatively insignificant in 
global terms. Furthermore, its weight in relation to national exports varies greatly between the countries. Thus for Costa Rica it 
represents 0.5%; for Guatemala, 8%; for Honduras, 1.4%; for Nicaragua, 4.9% and for El Salvador, 3.8%.
Table 3. Distribution of sugarcane production in Central American by year and country.
(in metric tons)
Year CR El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
2005 377, 989 320, 621 2, 015,396 281, 018 426, 907
2004 404, 576 332, 713 2, 006,000 366, 282 448, 458
2003 413, 370 305, 111 1, 800,719 356, 895 454, 810
Source: CEPA extrapolation from FAO data, 2007.
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The national markets
The Guatemalan sector possesses a high technological level. The area that has shown the biggest advances is irrigation, where the 
process is increasingly efficient. Moreover, the country has a genetic improvement program that has been running since 1991. 
In relation to the productive process, harvesting is managed and coordinated by the sugar refineries; 1% of the sector com-
prises independent farmers with control over the entire harvest system, however they are always coordinated by refineries.
The technological level of the sugar producing sector in El Salvador is medium to low. This is explained by the land distribution, 
where small producers with low technological levels (60%) live alongside medium and large producers (more than 100 ha). 
Despite this fact, the country shows the highest yield of sugar per ton of cane in Central America (242.21 lb. /ton), due primar-
ily to the climate conditions. The level of mechanization is low and the harvest is planned and coordinated by the sugar refineries, 
with labour mostly subcontracted. There are 26,000 fixed and temporary jobs during the harvest.
In Honduras the technological level used is generally medium to low. Land ownership is a limiting factor in terms of implement-
ing new techniques. 50% of land is occupied by small farmers who do not use modern technology or intend to adopt any kind of 
improvement program in the future. The remaining area is under the administration of the sugar refineries. Harvesting is coordi-
nated and conducted by the latter, who hand the work over to sugarcane managers.
The sugar agroindustry directly employs more than 25,000 people, indirectly benefiting a further 100,000; salary payments 
total more than US$ 30 million per year and more than US$ 55 million for sugarcane purchases from independent producers. 
The sugar industry is one of the largest contributors to state income, paying more than US$ 12 million in taxes annually.
In relation to Nicaragua, the technological level used is high and includes advances in terms of research. The size of the produc-
tive units are over 100 ha, including the smallest independent farms. In the case of the sugar refineries, apart from the final 
process of sowing the seeds, which is undertaken 75% by hand, the entire production process is mechanized and advance pest 
control programs are employed. In general terms, it is estimated that currently 50% of the cane is harvested manually; the 
harvest is planned and coordinated by the refineries, who outsource the cutting, threshing and transportation.
Finally in Costa Rica there are 44 non-independent producers (16 refineries and 28 producers each over 5000 TM) and 10,761 
individual producers. The first group possesses a fairly advanced technological level. The sector is represented by the Agro-
Industrial Sugarcane League (LAICA), which is responsible for research and genetic improvements.
The degree of mechanization depends on the size of the productive unit. In large properties, cultivation is 100% mechanized except 
for part of the harvesting. On the smaller units, the degree of mechanization is more varied, the harvest is coordinated by the re-
fineries and depending on the size of the productive unit, it may be carried out entirely by the independent producer, under the 
complete coordination of the refinery. A proportion of harvesting is mechanized and the trend is for this system to increase due to 
the lack of manual labour. The total job numbers are 30,000 during the harvest and 20,000 in the period between harvests.
SOURCE: SAGARPA 2006; LEAL 2007. 
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On the other hand, though, Central American sugar 
currently enters the European market with a tariff load 
that makes it very uncompetitive, especially in compari-
son with the production of ACP countries, which enters 
with preferential treatment. On this point, it can be ex-
pected that Central America will look to open up this 
market in order to benefit from the favourable global 
environment currently shown by the product. 
In addition to these general interests for the region 
(consolidate the GSP-Plus, banana and sugarcane), 
there are other smaller interests specific to each coun-
try. Due to their overall relative unimportance, as well as 
the fact that the negotiations will be carried out as a 
block, a detailed analysis of these products is not in-
cluded in the present study. Even so, we should like to 
highlight just a few of these.
In the Nicaraguan case, it would be important to obtain 
better import conditions for its meat production. This 
productive sector shows a high level of competitiveness 
with a comparative advantage index of 0.059, and the 
European market would definitely be highly attractive. 
However, as mentioned previously, the import condi-
tions are very unfavourable. 
A similar situation, albeit less extreme, is experienced 
by Costa Rica in the case of the manioc which it ex-
ports almost entirely to the EU (96% of the US$ 34.4 
million), despite facing a tariff of € 9.5 per 100 kg. 
Likewise, although the EU allows an import quota of up 
to 1.3 million tons of this product with a tariff of 6%, this 
is reserved for various Southeast Asian countries. 
Greater liberalization in the trade of this product can be 
seen to be an important offensive interest.
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Synthesizing the above points, the CA’s interests are 
clearly concentrated around three specific themes: 
consolidate the benefits acquired through the GSP-
Plus, improve and assure better access to the European 
market for Central American bananas and sugar. Any 
negotiation undertaken by the region that fails to include 
a significant improvement in these three elements would 
be difficult to describe as successful or advantageous. 
This position is consistent with the intention to agree to 
a trade relation of ACP parity.
VI. 2. Defensive 
interests: 
dairy produce, 
potatoes, onion, 
maize and rice
The defensive interests of the isthmus seem to be con-
centrated around two elements: those products that 
are tariff-free within the CAFTA-DR, though it would be 
desirable to exclude from the EAA, and; those Central 
American products that would be highly vulnerable to 
the opening up of the domestic market to European 
competition. It is important to add that there does not 
seem to be any defensive interest that could be gener-
alized to the isthmus as a whole, meaning that these 
interests assume a much more national character, 
therefore.
In relation to the first group, attention is drawn in par-
ticular to the issue of dairy produce, especially for Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras (producers one, two 
and three at regional level). This theme was included 
within the CAFTA-DR with a relatively long period of tar-
iff removal (20 years, plus 10 years grace period). This 
result was seen positively by the Central American dairy 
sector, due to the long period of protection and the rela-
tively low competitive level of US dairy production. This 
does not mean that this was not a burning issue in the 
negotiations with the USA:
“In the negotiations over the FTA, Costa 
Rica insisted that it wanted to safeguard 
the integration of its productive chain and 
protect its small national milk producers. 
For this reason, it opposed the entry into 
the region of powdered milk imported from 
the United States, which cost half as much 
as the liquid milk produced nationally 
due to the subsidies received by the US 
producers. In order to remain competitive 
in dairy produce, the processors would 
be forced to stop buying milk from small 
national producers. Nicaragua stated that 
it could not do this ‘favour’ for Costa Rica 
because Parmalat had threatened that 
were Nicaragua to bar the importation 
of powdered milk, it would abandon 
Nicaragua. Parmalat won. Costa Rica 
therefore replied that were Nicaragua to 
allow the entry of powdered milk – which 
would subsequently triangulate the entire 
region and Costa Rica – they would open 
the doors for maize imports, which was not 
its priority, nor that of Nicaragua” (STOP 
CAFTA 2007: 39).
The regional milk sector is clearly far from homoge-
nous, including contradictory – and even conflicting – 
interests between the different countries. Here the is-
sue of the organization of the productive process is 
extremely important:
“In milk and dairy products, the Costa 
Ricans, regional leaders in this area, have 
a highly integrated productive chain: milk 
production is national and in the hands of 
small producers; likewise, milk processing 
is national and so too its sale through the 
brand Dos Pinos, owned by a cooperative. 
In Nicaragua, production is national and 
undertaken by small producers; there is a 
large multinational processing company 
– Parmalat – with a small number of national 
companies. The main marketing company is 
also Parmalat, with small numbers of sales 
being made by national companies” (STOP 
CAFTA 2007: 39).
Nicaragua is therefore the biggest exporter of dairy pro-
duce in the region, but its production is controlled by a 
multinational company, which has succeeded in pro-
tecting its specific interests as interests of the national 
sector; that is, market liberalization and low tariffs en-
abling it to export, a situation that has been deepened 
by the low level of milk consumption in Nicaragua. 
Meanwhile, Costa Rica is CA’s biggest producer, but its 
production is dominated by a cooperative whose main 
market is first the Costa Rican domestic market17 and 
second the MCCA. 
17	According to data for 2002, Costa Rica was the sixth highest country 
in the world in terms of milk consumption per capita (158 kg milk per year) 
(BMI and CAMAGRO 2006: 16).
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This contradiction between the liberalization and pro-
tection of the Central American dairy market is likely to 
be revived in the context of negotiations with the EU. 
However, the fact that the isthmus has already made 
certain concessions within the framework of CAFTA-DR 
makes it difficult to believe that the Europeans will ac-
cept anything less than the deal agreed by the USA. In 
other words, although certain sectors of Central 
American milk industry, especially the Costa Ricans, 
can be expected to campaign for total exclusion of the 
product from the EAA, it is unlikely that the EU will ac-
cept a different form of access to the Central American 
market to that received by the USA. 
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Box 8. The dairy sector in Central America
Central America is an importing region, its trade balance having been historically negative. However, its intraregional trade has 
been increasing. Of the five countries from the region, only Nicaragua and Costa Rica have positive (dairy) trade balances. In 
terms of the overall exports of the countries, dairy products represent only 0.3% (unadulterated milk and processed cheese). In 
2005 the region produced around 14 million metric tons, representing just 2.62% of global production.
Even so, as table 4 shows, regional production has been experiencing a fairly significant increase in production, which suggests 
an increase in its importance within the regional productive structure in the future.
Table 4. Production and relative weight of fresh milk in Tons (2004)
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Production 752,310 394,000 270,000 598,000 641,091
Relative weight 28.3% 14.8% 10.2% 22.5% 24.1%
Regional production 2.7 million metric tons
Growth since
2000
22.3%
Growth since
1990
77.7%
The international market
The world production of milk from all animal sources in 2005 attained more than 630 million metric tons, the main source being 
cow’s milk (more than 530 million), representing around 85% of total production. Around 56% of this production was produced 
by 10 countries, led by the USA (15%), India (7%), Russia (5.8%) and Germany (5.2%). At the same time, less than 10% of 
global milk production is sold internationally, which means that the dairy market is determined by the surpluses in production 
rather than by the dynamics of demand.
SOURCE: BMI AND CAMAGRO 2006; MONTERO 2006
In relation to the second group, competitive European 
products that are sensitive products for CA, includes 
potatoes, onions and maize. The first two crops are 
sensitive for Costa Rica and maize for the rest of the 
region, which is why they were excluded from the agri-
cultural negotiations for CAFTA-DR. It is worth adding 
that these were the only agricultural exclusions within 
the framework of the treaty with the USA (potatoes and 
onions for Costa Rica; maize for the rest of the region).
Consequently, it can be expected that CA will also seek 
to exclude these products from the negotiations with 
the EU due to their high level of vulnerability vis-à-vis 
external production due to their low competitiveness 
(small productive units with low level technology, pro-
duced for the domestic market and subsistence). 
Currently, the region does not receive significant imports 
of these products, though this does not mean that their 
liberalization would not be an offensive interest for the 
EU during negotiations. However, the fact that these 
crops have been excluded in the context of CAFTA-DR, 
as well as the more than expected appeal for CAFTA 
parity from the Europeans, suggests that CA could suc-
ceed in excluding these products by appealing to the 
same principle (CAFTA parity in both directions).
VII. Comparison of 
interests in the 
farming sector
So far we have mapped the interests of the European 
Union and Central America, based on a description of 
the wider objectives of each block in relation to the 
EAA and concluding with a list of products that each 
block considers sensitive or competitive and where, 
depending on the case, a defensive or offensive strat-
egy is likely to be involved. However, in order to con-
textualize the situation of the farming sector in relation 
to the negotiations, we need to recognize the points 
of conflict and where we can expect greater tensions 
between the two parties.
 The aim of this section, then, is to examine the differ-
ences between the specific interests that each block has 
in the farming area. To this end, we have defined lists of 
products where, due to their importance or sensitivity, 
conflicts may come to the surface. 
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Table 5. Comparison of the products involving defensive and offensive interests on the part of Central American and the EU.
Product European Union
Revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) 
index1/
Revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) 
index1/
Central America Product
Product Subproduct Relative value 2/ Tariff barrier3/ EU CA Tariff barrier 3/ Relative value 2/ Subproduct Product
Dairy produce
Unconcentrated milk 1.2% Very high 0.071 -0.001 Very high 0.2% Unconcentrated milk
Dairy produceConcentrated milk 1.2% Very high 0.465 -0.040 Very high 0.2% Concentrated milk
Cheeses 4.1% Very high 0.513 -0.002 Very high 0.7% Cheeses
Meat
Beef 2.6% Very high -0.160 0.030 High 2.5% Beef
Meat Pork 3.6% Very high 0.505 -0.006 Very high 0.1% Pork
Poultry 1.1% Very high 0.062 -0.012 Very high 0.1% Poultry
Onions 0.2% Baja-SGP 0.009 -0.002 Medium 0.1% Onions
Fruit juice
Orange juice 0.6% Very high
-0.150 0.022
Medium 0.6% Orange juice
Fruit juice
Other juices 0.7% Very high Medium 0.7% Other juices
Cardamom 0.0% Very low -0.001 0.030 Medium 1.2% Cardamom
Peanuts 0.0% Very low -0.082 0.013 Low 0.6% Peanuts
Manioc 0.2% High -0.020 0.014 Medium 0.5% Manioc
Living plants, flowers  
and foliage
Bulbs and tubers 0.3% Low-GSP 0.107 -0.003 Very low 0.0% Bulbs and tubers
Living plants, flowers and 
foliage
Flowers and buds 1.3% Medium-GSP -0.034 0.014 Medium 0.6% Flowers and buds
Foliage, leaves and branches 1.0% Very low-GSP -0.039 0.031 Medium 1.2% Foliage, leaves and branches
Other living plants 1.0% Low-GSP 0.098 0.035 Very low 1.4% Other living plants
Palm oil 0.2% Very low-GSP -0.098 0.037 Very low 2.4% Palm oil
Melon 0.0% Low-GSP -0.036 0.043 Medium 1.7% Melon
Sugarcane 1.5% Very high 0.085 0.153 Very high 7.1% Sugarcane
Pineapple 0.2% Low-GSP -0.091 0.129 Medium 6.5% Pineapple
Banana 0.6% Very high -0.514 0.369 Medium 1.3% Banana
Coffee 1.4% Low-GSP -0.579 0.461 Medium 20.7% Coffee
Potato 0.6% Medium-GSP 0.042 -0.003 Medium 0.1% Potato
Orange 0.4% Very high -0.056 -0.002 Medium 0.0% Orange
Rice
Paddy rice 0.0% Low -0.001 -0.042 Very high 0.0% Paddy rice
Rice
White rice 0.2% Very high 0.001 -0.002 Very high 0.0% White rice
Dried beans
White 0.0% Very low -0.040 -0.010 Medium 0.1% White
Dried beans
Red 0.0% Very low 0.000 0.007 Medium 0.5% Red
Palm nut 0.0% Very low 0.000 0.005 Very low 0.4% Palm nut
Maize
For sowing 0.2% Very low -0.004 -0.021 High 0.1% For sowing
Maize
Other types 0.5% Very high -0.079 -0.089 Medium 0.0% Other types
COLOUR CODE
Very	important Important Not	very	important None Not	sensitive Sensitive Very	sensitive
1/ THE REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE INDEX IS OBTAINED By DETERMINING THE IMPORTANT OF AN EXPORT PRODUCT OVER THE VALUE 
OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND IN TURN OVER THE VALUE OF A COUNTRy’S TOTAL EXPORTS; THEN THE VALUE OBTAINED By THE SAME OP-
ERATION APPLIED TO IMPORTS IS SUBTRACTED FROM THE FIRST VALUE. THE VALUES ARE LOCATED ON A SCALE FROM -1 TO 1, WHERE CLOSER 
TO 1 INDICATES A HIGHER ADVANTAGE. 
2/ THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PRODUCT SIGNIFIES THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PRODUCT IN RELATION TO TOTAL EXPORTS IN THE NATIONAL 
FARMING SECTOR.
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Table 5. Comparison of the products involving defensive and offensive interests on the part of Central American and the EU.
Product European Union
Revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) 
index1/
Revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) 
index1/
Central America Product
Product Subproduct Relative value 2/ Tariff barrier3/ EU CA Tariff barrier 3/ Relative value 2/ Subproduct Product
Dairy produce
Unconcentrated milk 1.2% Very high 0.071 -0.001 Very high 0.2% Unconcentrated milk
Dairy produceConcentrated milk 1.2% Very high 0.465 -0.040 Very high 0.2% Concentrated milk
Cheeses 4.1% Very high 0.513 -0.002 Very high 0.7% Cheeses
Meat
Beef 2.6% Very high -0.160 0.030 High 2.5% Beef
Meat Pork 3.6% Very high 0.505 -0.006 Very high 0.1% Pork
Poultry 1.1% Very high 0.062 -0.012 Very high 0.1% Poultry
Onions 0.2% Baja-SGP 0.009 -0.002 Medium 0.1% Onions
Fruit juice
Orange juice 0.6% Very high
-0.150 0.022
Medium 0.6% Orange juice
Fruit juice
Other juices 0.7% Very high Medium 0.7% Other juices
Cardamom 0.0% Very low -0.001 0.030 Medium 1.2% Cardamom
Peanuts 0.0% Very low -0.082 0.013 Low 0.6% Peanuts
Manioc 0.2% High -0.020 0.014 Medium 0.5% Manioc
Living plants, flowers  
and foliage
Bulbs and tubers 0.3% Low-GSP 0.107 -0.003 Very low 0.0% Bulbs and tubers
Living plants, flowers and 
foliage
Flowers and buds 1.3% Medium-GSP -0.034 0.014 Medium 0.6% Flowers and buds
Foliage, leaves and branches 1.0% Very low-GSP -0.039 0.031 Medium 1.2% Foliage, leaves and branches
Other living plants 1.0% Low-GSP 0.098 0.035 Very low 1.4% Other living plants
Palm oil 0.2% Very low-GSP -0.098 0.037 Very low 2.4% Palm oil
Melon 0.0% Low-GSP -0.036 0.043 Medium 1.7% Melon
Sugarcane 1.5% Very high 0.085 0.153 Very high 7.1% Sugarcane
Pineapple 0.2% Low-GSP -0.091 0.129 Medium 6.5% Pineapple
Banana 0.6% Very high -0.514 0.369 Medium 1.3% Banana
Coffee 1.4% Low-GSP -0.579 0.461 Medium 20.7% Coffee
Potato 0.6% Medium-GSP 0.042 -0.003 Medium 0.1% Potato
Orange 0.4% Very high -0.056 -0.002 Medium 0.0% Orange
Rice
Paddy rice 0.0% Low -0.001 -0.042 Very high 0.0% Paddy rice
Rice
White rice 0.2% Very high 0.001 -0.002 Very high 0.0% White rice
Dried beans
White 0.0% Very low -0.040 -0.010 Medium 0.1% White
Dried beans
Red 0.0% Very low 0.000 0.007 Medium 0.5% Red
Palm nut 0.0% Very low 0.000 0.005 Very low 0.4% Palm nut
Maize
For sowing 0.2% Very low -0.004 -0.021 High 0.1% For sowing
Maize
Other types 0.5% Very high -0.079 -0.089 Medium 0.0% Other types
3/ A SCALE OF UNIFORM TARIFFS WAS CONSTRUCTED FOR BOTH BLOCKS: TARIFFS BETWEEN 0 AND 5% ARE CONSIDERED VERy LOW; BETWEEN 
5-10%, LOW; BETWEEN 10-15%, MEDIUM; BETWEEN 15 AND 20%, HIGH; AND OVER 25%, VERy HIGH. IN THE EUROPEAN CASE, WHERE MULTIPLE 
TARIFFS, EXPORT QUOTAS OR TARIFFS ON THE QUANTITIES PRODUCED EXIST, THE TARIFF RATE IS LISTED AS VERy HIGH. GSP IN THE EU COLUMN 
SIGNIFIES THAT THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION BENEFITS FROM THE GSP REGIME AND IS THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM TARIFFS.
SOURCE: CEPA EXTRAPOLATION FROM STATISTICAL DATA TAKEN FROM SIECA 2007A AND EC 2007A; TARIFF DATA TAKEN FROM SIECA 2007A AND 
BITD 2006.
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VII. 1. The 
interests of both 
blocks
First of all, it should be emphasized that the differences 
in the socioeconomic structures and the dynamics of 
development of the two regions are an important factor 
for consideration since, as a result of this fact, the inten-
tions concerning the negotiations for an EAA are equal-
ly dissimilar. On one hand, Central America focuses 
many of its expectations on consolidating benefits for 
exports, especially of its farming goods.
On the other hand, as we observed earlier, it is fairly 
clear that for the European Union the agricultural sec-
tor is less of a priority than the increased liberalization 
of investments and services. Nonetheless, the EU can 
be expected to exploit its comparative advantages in 
certain products by demanding a removal of tariff bar-
riers at the same time as it demands a reduction in the 
non-tariff barriers. To simplify the viewpoint of both 
blocks, we present table 5; we should point out that 
this is a reduced version of a larger table with more 
information included in annex 6.
The left and right-hand columns correspond to the list 
of products of the European Union and Central 
America (respectively). These were selected accord-
ing to their importance within each block and to the 
level of conflict that they may generate once negotia-
tions begin. The products are colour-coded to indi-
cate the nature of their importance for the block in 
question. Green, or variants of green, signifies that the 
product is considered ‘important;’ in other words, it 
stands out in the economy in question as a highly 
competitive product and hence can be very easily ex-
ported. Red, or its gradations, indicates on the con-
trary that the product is considered to be ‘sensitive,’ 
that is, its importance derives from the fact it is fairly 
uncompetitive but essential to the country’s domestic 
economy and could be adversely affected by the en-
try of imports. Finally blue indicates that the product is 
neither important or sensitive.
Let us examine the above through some examples. If 
complete liberalization of a product such as cheese, 
especially fine cheeses, exists between the two 
blocks, the expected situation would be the entry of 
European produce into the Central American mar-
ket. Since this produce is more competitive (see the 
central columns in the table), it may gain ground at 
the cost of national supplies. On the Central American 
side, by contrast, it would be difficult to see a very 
large effect on the European market since it is not a 
product with much international competitiveness for 
CA. The logical outcome would be for one side to try 
to open up the market while the other attempts to 
close it, meaning a potential conflict. The opposite 
would be observed in the case of sugarcane: the EU 
produces a significant amount of refined sugar, 
though this is destined for its domestic market. If lib-
eralization were to occur, it could negatively affect 
the internal production of sugar in the EU, meaning 
that it will aim to keep its tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
while CA will wish to open them: this indicates an-
other area of conflict.
However, there are special cases in this comparison, 
one of these being palm oil. As we know, plant oils are 
an important raw material for generating non-fossil fu-
els such as biodiesel. In this case, the importation of 
this product is essential for the EU, although its pro-
duction is small. In the Central American case, palm oil 
production has grown significantly over the last three 
years (26.5%) and plays an important role in farm ex-
ports (2.4%), meaning it would benefit from freer ac-
cess to the EU. In fact, it is highly likely that the trade 
agreement has a favourable effect in terms of biofuels.
Another special case is rice, since the product is heav-
ily protected by both blocks. From the Central American 
viewpoint, this crop is important domestically while its 
export value is less significant, primarily because the 
product is not particularly competitive (less than 0.001 
in RCA). However, it is still subject to strong protec-
tionism with general tariffs. In the Costa Rican case, to 
give an example, it is subject to various protective 
measures that include the definition of quotas and di-
rect support from the State through the National Rice 
Company (CONARROZ), which fixes internal consum-
er prices and makes various state purchases to this 
end (CONARROZ 2007).
However, in the EU rice is the cereal with the lowest 
production (1%), which explains why external ex-
ports comprise only € 85 million. Rice for the EU is 
an essential product for internal consumption, which 
is reflected in the level of its tariff barriers (BITD 
2006). This allows us to hypothesize a scenario re-
lating to this product in which the mutually imposed 
barriers are maintained or partially lifted since there 
is no way of ignoring that CA’s production is insuffi-
cient to supply its own demand.
VII. 2. Expected 
conflicts
A quick examination of the table reveals the existence of 
potential conflicts in relation to a series of farming prod-
ucts during the negotiations over the EAA between the 
EU and CA. Table 6 sets out these potential conflicts 
according to the probability of them taking place. In or-
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der to determine this probability we weighed: the im-
portance of the product for the economies, the degree 
of protectionism imposed and the willingness that a 
block may have to implement liberalizing measures in 
the area concerned. It should also be explained that the 
following is a shortened version of table contained in the 
annexes to the present document, which may be con-
sulted for more detailed information. 
Table 6. Distribution of farming products according to the expected level of conflict in the 
negotiations for the EAA between the EY and Central America
Very probable conflicts Probable conflicts Unlikely conflicts
Banana
Sugarcane
Dairy produce (milk and cheeses)
•
•
•
Beef
Pork
Manioc
•
•
•
Coffee
Fruit juices
Cardamom
Peanuts
Palm oil
Pineapple
Melon
Orange
Dried beans
Palm nut
Maize
Rice
Conflicts
Potatoes
Biofuels
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
VII.2.1. Very probable 
conflicts
As its name suggests, the ‘very probable conflicts’ col-
umn contains the products where the intentions of one 
block may collide strongly with those of the other. Here 
we register three goods where three factors occur si-
multaneously: first, one of the blocks has a highly com-
petitive production at international level but faces signifi-
cant obstacles or barriers in sending its exports to the 
recipient block; second, for this other block, the product 
is highly sensitive either because of its own production 
(which is probably less competitive) or because agree-
ments exist with third parties that it wishes to maintain 
despite the current negotiations (ACP). For the purposes 
of this section, we shall consider banana, sugarcane 
and the dairy sector (especially milk and cheese). 
In the case of banana and sugar, Central America is a 
highly competitive exporter. Compared to the EU, CA’s 
advantage is greater: 0.369 compared to -0.514, in the 
case of banana and 0.144 compared to -0.271 in the 
case of raw sugar. Although a sizeable portion of the 
Central American banana exports enter the EU (31% of 
total exports), the block’s tariffs prevent the CA region 
from exploiting its competitiveness, meaning that the 
product has provoked various debates in the context of 
the WTO. CA is likely to seek a removal of the tariff given 
the importance of the product and its competitiveness. 
The situation is more serious in the case of sugar since 
although CA exports an important amount, the portion 
exported to the EU is considerably reduced. Due to the 
importance of the product for CA and the existence of 
conflictual factors that potentially aggravate the situation, 
we could surmise that for Central America the retention 
of the current trading conditions in these goods after ne-
gotiations over the EAA would be unacceptable.
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Finally and in contrast to the situation observed with the 
other goods, we have the dairy sector. This emerges as 
a factor of conflict, essentially in specific products such 
as powdered milk and cheese, which are produced by 
the EU very easily due to the high subsidies given to the 
sector, a fact observed in the comparative advantages 
of Europe compared to CA (0.465 compared to -0.040 
in the case of powdered milk and 0.513 and -0.002 in 
the case of cheese). However, the situation of European 
exports is different since Central America presents high 
tariff barriers on importation of these products. Given 
the strong competitiveness of its produce, it is very like-
ly that the EU will demand liberalization of this market, a 
fact that is already perceived as a threat by some of the 
region’s sectors and which increases the possibility of 
conflict over the issue. Furthermore, as mentioned ear-
lier, the fact that CAFTA-DR led to an opening up of the 
Central American dairy market suggests that the 
Europeans will not accept anything less than the deal 
obtained by the USA.
VII.2. 2. Probable conflicts
The column of table 6 identified as ‘probable conflicts’ 
lists those products where the chances of conflict are 
smaller but still present. This corresponds to a series 
of factors determined by the products in question. 
First, manioc is an important product and subject to 
an offensive interest for the Costa Rican economy 
since this exports almost 96% of the total exported by 
the Central American block. However, entry of the 
product to the EU faces a relatively high tariff of almost 
€ 10 per 100 kg net weight, as well as the obligation to 
enter under tariff quotas, since a safeguard exists to 
protect imports from some Southeast Asian countries. 
Since this interest is strongly focused on one country, 
though, the most probable outcome is that any con-
flict will be relatively unimportant.
The meat sector, on the other hand, is set to be a point 
of conflict between the two blocks, particularly in rela-
tion to beef where Central America is likely to show 
offensive interests, and pork, where the EU will do the 
same. Beef is an important and competitive product for 
Central America (especially Nicaragua), since it makes 
up 2.5% of its farming exports and achieves a higher 
competitive advantage than the EU, 0.030 compared 
to -0.160. The problem is that this sector is one of the 
most protected in Europe due to the role it plays in its 
food security policy. Although the gap in production is 
gradually forcing the block to import larger quantities 
due to its incapacity to supply internal demand inde-
pendently, it is still considered a highly sensitive prod-
uct where concessions could be very small.
Pork presents an opposite situation. Due to high levels 
of subsidies, the EU is one of main exporters of this 
product worldwide (more than € 2 billion in 2006), mean-
ing it plays a very competitive role on the international 
market, which is expressed in the RCA index where CA 
is at a clear disadvantage: 0.505 compared to -0.006. 
As occurs in the case of beef, high tariffs exist in relation 
to pork in CA. Here we should add that during the 
CAFTA-DR talks, the region negotiated a liberalization of 
the sector with import quotas as a way of providing a 
degree of protection for domestic production, while it is 
also included under the tariff category D, meaning it will 
be subject to a gradual and linear lifting of tariff barriers 
over a fifteen year period (Morley 2006). 
Potatoes and onions are two crops where conflict is 
possible, primarily due to the defensive interest shown 
by Costa Rica, which succeeded in removing them 
from the negotiating table during the CAFTA-DR talks. 
Nonetheless, in the case of the EAA with the EU, ex-
ports to the international markets are much lower than 
in the case of more competitive goods such as pork. 
However, it is clear that both products are more com-
petitive than in CA (0.042 compared to -0.003 in the 
case of potatoes and 0.009 compared to -0.002 in 
that of onions), meaning that a degree of protection-
ism can be expected from the isthmus. 
VII. 2. 3. Unlikely conflicts
This point considers the products listed in table 6 where 
the chances of a conflict are much lower, primarily due 
to the fact that high tariffs are not faced in the destination 
country, the products are not very important to the other 
block, or they are subject to commercial benefits as in 
the case of the GSP-Plus. Products such as coffee, 
pineapple, melon, palm oil, beans, living plants, peanuts, 
cardamom, oranges and palm nuts are covered by tariff 
benefits for Central America, meaning that any change 
in this situation would be unacceptable for the region. 
Likewise, the effect would not be very serious since the 
tariffs for exporting to the EU are in the medium-low 
range and lifting these for the products in question 
would not be cost the European block too much to offer 
in any trade deal. This is particularly so if we consider 
that the blocks are not direct mutual competitors in 
these areas and in many cases the products comprise 
primary goods needed for their own productive struc-
ture, whether aimed at the external or internal market. 
Another similar case can be seen with palm oil, which, 
although less competitive than rape oil, which is more 
efficient in terms of producing biodiesel, has some po-
tential and could receive some trade benefit as a result 
of Europe’s rising demand for biomass.
Equally, most of the cereals produced (except for rice and 
maize, which are produced to some extent by the region, 
although complementary imports are always required), 
especially wheat, offer no problems insofar as Central 
America does not produce them and depends complete-
ly on imports. Here the EU’s objective would be to achieve 
the conditions needed for its entry into the region to be 
equal to or higher than that of the United States through 
CAFTA, since the US is its main competitor in this area.
We can conceive of maize and rice as special products 
within this group, since although they are internally sen-
sitive, factors exist that limit the potential for conflict. 
First of all, in relation to maize, it should be emphasized 
that the exports of both blocks are specialized: on one 
hand, Central America exports seed maize (90.2% of 
the total maize exported) while the EU exports other 
types, particularly yellow and white maize (72.9%). 
However, the sector, although subject to an exclusion in 
the case of white maize, was strongly affected by the 
entry into free competition with the United States, espe-
cially in the case of seed maize and yellow maize. 
Indeed, since CAFTA came into force, it has experi-
enced a reduction in the value exported of up to 47.9%. 
Imports for their part have grown by 22.78% over the 
same period. In other words, the impact of competition 
has already been felt and the product is unlikely to ex-
perience further dramatic consequences as a result of 
free trade with the EU. Even so, exclusions similar to 
CAFTA can be expected in relation to the EAA.
On the other hand, rice faces a distinct situation since 
the product is sensitive for both blocks. Rice cultiva-
tion for the EU corresponds to 1% of total cereal pro-
duction, making it less competitive than other staple 
grains such as wheat. For CA, the product is also rela-
tively uncompetitive (since it possesses a RCA index 
of -0.045, similar to the EU index of -0.066). For both 
blocks, the product is produced to meet important do-
mestic needs and lacks the conditions for exportation. 
in the case of CAFTA, rice was included in a tariff quo-
ta system under the P tariff P (except in the case of 
Costa Rica, where it fell under the V tariff), with a guar-
anteed grace period of ten years and the gradual elim-
ination of tariffs over the following 7 years until com-
plete removal of tariffs in the 18th year of the agreement 
coming into force.
A final topic important to consider is the question of bio-
fuels. Rather than being a point of potential conflict, the 
area could become a theme of mutual agreement bear-
ing in mind the EU’s incapacity to supply its own demand 
in biomass and the growing demand for the product.
Central America, for its part, although not an important 
producer of these fuels at international level, is looking 
to achieve the conditions needed to stimulate increased 
production. Towards this aim, in 2006 it exported a little 
more than US$ 206 million in non-denatured ethylic al-
cohol of 80% volume and over (tariff code 2207), with 
most of thus amount relating to the exportation of etha-
nol. However, although the EU maintains an import tariff 
of € 19.3 per hectolitre on this product, as a means of 
encouraging imports it is exempt under cooperation or 
association schemas such as EBA, ACP, GSP-Plus and 
within the framework of preferential agreements such 
as the Euro-Mediterranean Zone. The same treatment 
can be expected in the case of the EAA.
On the other hand, CA is not a region where ethanol 
presents a particularly high level of competitiveness 
and it is unlikely to be able to rival the conditions 
presented by Brazil in this area, particularly given 
that the expansion in this market is recent. What can 
be deduced is that CA will be benefited, not neces-
sarily with a discretionary opening of the market in 
this area, but rather with the assurance from the EU 
of a channel or quota of preferential access to this 
market, something like a commitment to sell and buy 
between regions. 
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Box 9. The importance of ethanol: a projection of future trade in the product
The unprecedented price levels of crude oil have produced a panorama in which the use of ethanol as a fuel has become 
highly attractive. The production of ethanol derived from starch-rich and sugar-rich plants (cereals and sugarcane) has increased 
53%, rising from 30 billion litres in the year 2000 to 46 billion litres in 2005. It is estimated that world consumption of ethanol 
will reach 54 billion litres by 2010, a figure corresponding to 1% of total world consumption of petroleum.  
Around 15% of sugarcane crops are estimated to be converted to ethanol rather than sugar. Forecasts show a future in which 
the use of biofuels grows exponentially. Carbon-offset sales (as negotiated under the Kyoto Protocol) may signify an added value 
in ethanol’s competitiveness in comparison of fossil fuels. Since the consumption of ethanol leads to a reduction in carbon diox-
ide emissions, users can obtain carbon credits that can be sold to those responsible for contamination, reducing the production 
costs of the former and raising those of fossil fuels. If petrol prices remain high, the incentives will increase to produce ethanol 
and other biofuels derived from various raw materials. Here it is important to add that there is a lack of in-depth research into 
the environmental and dietary impact of transforming large areas of land into fields for producing biomass.
The OECD estimates that the EU would need to transform around 70% of its arable land to cover just 10% of its energy needs, 
while the United States, Brazil and Canada would need to convert 30%, 3% and 0.3% of their arable lands respectively in order 
to cover the same quantity. The variation between countries depends on the raw materials used to produce biofuels and the per 
capita consumption of fuel for transport.
The trend towards a shortfall in sugar production is a problem with worldwide ramifications. It is estimated that for 2007 the 
EU will face a significant fall in its production indices due to the reforms proposed by the WTO for sugar, applied since July 
2006. As a result, of the 19 refineries existing in Italy, only 6 will remain in operation by the end of 2007, with the same 
number ceasing to operate in Poland. In France forecasts suggest that in 2007 there will be a decline in production of 12% 
in relation to 2006. 
SOURCE: AZÚCAR ÉTICO 2006; FAO 2006A y B.
VIII. Possible 
scenarios for the 
farming sector
In this section, based on the information presented so 
far, we intend to construct a set of potential scenarios 
in relation to the EAA negotiations. This is always a 
tricky undertaking since it consists of expounding on 
hypothetical situations, based on partial information 
and with limited possibilities of taking into account 
the chance factors always present in historically de-
termined situations.
 To this effect, what we propose is an analysis based 
on the construction of four scenarios located in a con-
tinuum that spans from an ideal scenario for Central 
American interests (ACP Parity scenario) to the ideal 
scenario for European interests (CAFTA-Plus scenario). 
It is important to emphasize that these scenarios have 
the function of archetypes (ideal types) and their aim is 
to help understand the potential different outcomes of 
the negotiations.
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 Two important explanations need to be made. Firstly, 
these models only take into account the themes of 
GSP-Plus, banana, sugar, manioc, meat, biofuels, dairy 
produce, potatoes and onions, and rice. Secondly, the 
scenarios are presented on the basis of Central 
American interests and centre on those relations that 
could engender conflicts.
VIII. 1. ACP Parity 
Scenario (the 
least probable)
As the titles mentions, in this scenario CA achieves 
the same treatment received currently by the ACP 
countries. The isthmus manages to consolidate all 
its offensive and defensive interests in the farming 
area. Thus, in the negotiation of the treaty, it suc-
ceeds in ensuring the preferential access already re-
ceived by most of its products within GSP-Plus, 
manages to open the European market to the re-
gion’s banana and sugar under conditions equal to 
those possessed currently by the ACP countries (in 
terms of a levelling of customs tariffs in relation to 
bananas and the establishment of large preferential 
purchase quotas for sugar); it succeeds in improving 
access for Nicaragua’s meat, as well as Costa Rican 
manioc (through preferential tariff conditions or com-
plete liberalization). Furthermore, CA succeeds in 
excluding the areas of dairy produce,18 potatoes, 
onions, rice and pork from negotiation. In the case of 
biofuels, the region receives preferential access 
through the elimination of tariffs.
If this set of conditions is achieved, the negotiation 
can be considered a complete success for the re-
gion. It would succeed in strengthening its position 
as a commercial partner of the EU, becoming much 
more competitive in relation to its global competitors 
(for example, Ecuador in bananas and Brazil in sugar) 
and would be simultaneously defending those prod-
ucts sensitive to European production.
1	Dairy produce is a highly complicated area within this negotiation. As 
mentioned earlier, a variety of interests are found in relation to opening 
up the market to external producers. As a result, a more detailed study is 
needed of the specific positions and interests of the distinct groups of milk 
producers in the CA isthmus, as well as their capacities to influence the 
negotiating group.
This scenario is highly improbable for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it does not include CAFTA parity. 
That is to say, Europe receives access to the Central 
American market less favourable than that received 
by the USA within the CAFTA-DR framework. This is 
especially cleat in the case of dairy produce, which is 
extremely difficult given the high competitiveness of 
the EU in this area.
Secondly, it is based on the fact that the EU would be 
disposed to allow a generous opening for banana im-
ports to a Latin American country. This is fairly unlikely 
for two reasons. First, although Costa Rica decided to 
support Norwegian intervention in the negotiations on 
the banana tariff, this position was not shared by other 
countries from the region (Guatemala). This could mud-
dy the waters in terms of the negotiations. Second, be-
cause giving highly favourable access to CA could set a 
bad precedent in terms of the EU’s negotiations with 
other trading blocks such as CAN, which includes 
Ecuador and Colombia, the first and third largest pro-
ducers at global level.
Thirdly, although the European and global demand for 
sugar and biofuels is increasing, any excessive open-
ing of its market to Central American production could 
set a somewhat uncomfortable precedent in relation 
to negotiations with MERCOSUR, given that Brazil is 
globally the most important producer and exporter of 
both products (sugar and ethanol). In addition, sugar 
obviously plays an important part of other productive 
processes in the EU, including in the beetroot market 
which is cultivated separately, as well as in productive 
processes with a higher added value that includes 
sugar refining and its use in other activities, including 
the pharmaceutical sector. 
Fourthly, it is taken for granted that the European meat 
market can be opened to competition from the likes of 
Nicaragua. Although Nicaragua’s production would be 
unlikely to ‘flood’ the European market (only US$ 87 
million in exports) and there is a growing demand to 
import meat, it is very unlikely that, due to the policy of 
food security and the importance of the cattle farming 
sector in the EU, this liberalization would take be ceded 
so easily. Moreover, as in the previous case, it would set 
an unfavourable precedent in relation to MERCOSUR 
where meat production, especially Argentinean, is high-
ly competitive. 
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VIII. 2. Scenario B 
(unlikely)
In this scenario, CA succeeds in consolidating its three 
main offensive objectives, but taking into account the 
elements that render scenario A improbable. Thus, the 
isthmus succeeds in ensuring the privileges acquired 
within the GSP-Plus framework; it gains preferential ac-
cess in relation to banana and sugar (low tariff levels), 
even achieving the levels of ACP countries. It obtains 
liberalization for Costa Rica’s manioc production and 
achieves an acceptable quota in relation to meat. 
Furthermore, in relation to biofuels, the region acquires 
a good-sized preferential quota with prices favourable 
to the sector’s development.
In relation to its defensive interests, it fails to exclude 
dairy produce due to Europe’s refusal to accept differ-
ent treatment from CAFTA but these enter through cer-
tain quotas with the definition of safeguards that enable 
protection of the domestic market from a ‘flood’ of 
products and with long-term barrier removal periods; it 
succeeds in excluding potatoes and onions, as well as 
pork and rice, from the negotiations since these are 
sensitive areas for both blocks.19
This would be a very good scenario for Central American 
interests. It would provide access to the European mar-
ket for products where the region is strongly competi-
tive. It fails to avoid the opening up of the dairy market, 
but manages to make this liberalization partial and with 
a relatively long period of barrier removal. Moreover, 
Costa Rica succeeds in excluding potatoes and onions 
from negotiations, along with rice.
VIII. 3. Scenario C 
(probable)
In this scenario, CA obtains a good outcome in terms of 
its three offensive interests. It manages to consolidate 
the access received through GSP-Plus; it gains fairly 
competitive access to the European market in relation 
to bananas, in the form of quotas, plus a small im-
1	Again this is a highly complex theme to approach. The type of rice pro-
duced by each block is different, meaning that technically they are not direct 
competitors. However, it is clear that the Central American production is 
exclusively for the domestic market and that the EU, based on its food 
security policy, will not want to open up its market.
provement in relation to sugar (agreeing to an import 
quota), and achieves a competitive quota for Costa 
Rican manioc. It succeeds in opening up the European 
meat market to Nicaragua’s production in the form of 
quotas and the possibility for the EU to apply safe-
guards. In the case of biofuels, it gains a preferential 
access quota under conditions similar or equal to the 
ACP countries; the same does not occur with sugar 
where Europe protects its interests in terms of negoti-
ations with MERCOSUR.
In relation to its defensive interests, it fails to prevent 
the opening up of the dairy market and Europe obtains 
the same access conditions received by US production 
under CAFTA-DR; the same occurs in the case of pork; 
potatoes and onions are excluded and rice is left out of 
the negotiations.
We believe that this is the most plausible scenario, 
though much depends on the decisions and hidden in-
terests of the Central American negotiating group. As 
mentioned earlier, the primary interests of the EU, in 
contrast the those of CA, are not related to the farming 
sector. This means that if CA wants to improve its con-
ditions in relation to its offensive areas (GSP-Plus, ba-
nana and sugar), it will have to make concessions in 
other sectors more attractive to the Europeans, such as 
services and telecommunications. In principle, this does 
not seem unviable given the liberalizing posture of 
Central America in these areas, its alignment with the 
NEM and the fact that this outcome was seen in the 
negotiations for CAFTA-DR.
In relation to bananas and sugar, it seems to us that the 
negotiations are going to be extremely complex. 
Although they are two of the central themes for CA, the 
EU will have to be extremely careful in how it tackles 
these areas within this EAA, due to the precedent it 
could set in relation to negotiating agreements with oth-
er blocks such as CAN or MERCOSUR. Another ele-
ment that needs to be taken into account is the outcome 
of the banana conflict within the context of the WTO.
In relation to dairy produce, it is evident that Europe will 
not accept anything less than that received by the 
United States (CAFTA parity) and will therefore demand 
the opening up of the market. For its part, negotiations 
over potatoes and onions could also become a sensi-
tive area. The fact that the EU is a fairly competitive 
producer of these crops makes it a sensitive topic for 
the Central Americans, whose production is relatively 
uncompetitive, concentrated in just one country (Costa 
Rica) and directed towards the internal market. 
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However, the fact that these products are excluded 
from the CAFTA-DR framework may be a point in fa-
vour of the isthmus, which can press for adherence to 
CAFTA parity in both directions. The same can be ex-
pected in the case of white maize, which was the pro-
duce excluded by the majority of CA countries.
VIII. 4. CAFTA-Plus 
Scenario (unlikely)
In this Scenario, CA fails to improve its position in rela-
tion to its primary offensive interests. It succeeds in 
consolidating its GSP-Plus access, but fails to achieve 
preferential treatment in bananas or sugar, and both 
manioc production and meat are maintained below the 
entry conditions in place today.
In relation to its defensive interests, it fails to exclude 
dairy produce and the Europeans gain an even more 
favourable access than that received by the USA; 
the same occurs in the case of pork; it fails to pre-
vent access to the market in potatoes and onions, 
and the Europeans gain unilateral opening of the 
Central American rice market.
As in Scenario A, this is very unlikely. The fact that the 
farming area is the most important dimension  for CA in 
the negotiations makes it likely that the EU will have to 
make concessions in this area if it wishes to open up 
other markets (telecommunications, services). If not, 
why negotiate?
On this point, it must be categorical that any negotiation 
that fails to include an improvement for CA in relation to 
bananas and sugar, as well as consolidation of GSP-
Plus, cannot be seen as acceptable to the region. 
Finally, the situation we can deduce concerning biofuels 
in anticipating the EAA negotiations is that, in the case 
of ethanol, the EU will offer the conditions needed for 
CA to supply in the most competitive form to its market, 
and hence liberalization would be expected. The energy 
theme in the EU, far from being an agricultural problem, 
is related to the internal security of the block: it is im-
perative for it to ensure access to the necessary sourc-
es to avoid a relation of dependency on a few sectors, 
since it would face the same problem it has with hydro-
carbons. The European strategy in this area would not 
only be in favour of CA exportation, but also in support-
ing the diversification of sources.
VIII. 5. Summary 
of the scenarios
Below we present a table that looks to summarize the 
general features of the four described scenarios. In the 
column for each block, we list the outcomes of the 
probable conflicts described earlier. Scenario C is 
placed in a different colour to highlight the fact that we 
consider it the most probable.
European Union Central America
ACP Parity
Consolidation GSP-Plus
Preferential access to sugar, biofuels and 
banana (low and competitive tariffs)
Opening of the European market through low 
tariffs (manioc and meat)
Exclusion from negotiation (rice, potatoes, 
onions, pork and dairy produce)
–
–
–
–
Scenario B
Opening of the dairy market (quotas, long-
term quota removal periods, safeguards)
–
Consolidation GSP-Plus
Preferential access to sugar and banana 
(significantly lower tariffs)
Preferential access to biofuels (low tariffs)
Opening of the European market through 
quotas (manioc and meat)
Exclusion from negotiation (rice, potatoes, 
onions and pork)
–
–
–
–
–
Scenario C
Opening of the dairy market (CAFTA Parity)
Opening of the pork market (CAFTA Parity)
–
–
Consolidation GSP-Plus
Preferential access to biofuels and bananas 
(competitive quotas)
Slight improvement in access through quotas 
(sugar)
Opening up of the European market through 
quotas (manioc)
Opening up of the beef market through quo-
tas and with safeguards
Exclusion from negotiation (rice, potatoes and 
onions)
–
–
–
–
–
–
CAFTA-Plus
GSP-Plus maintained as a unilateral regime
High tariff and non-tariff barriers maintained 
(sugar and bananas)
Highly controlled opening of the internal  
biofuels market
Exclusion (manioc and beef)
Opening of the dairy market (CAFTA-Plus)
Opening of the potato and onion market 
Opening of the pork market
Unilateral opening of the rice market unilateral 
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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IX. Final Comments
The present study has looked to show in schematic form 
the axes of conflict that may appear within the con-
text of the EAA negotiations between Central America 
and the EU. We started by briefly examining the farm-
ing sector of the two blocks and highlighted the main 
productive and structural asymmetries between them 
both. While the Central American sector is dominated 
by traditional agriculture and continues to be one of 
the region’s main employment sources, in the Euro-
pean case we find a highly advanced industry with im-
pressive levels of subsidies for production and with a 
very weak role within the labour market.
 We then studied the commercial interests of both blocks 
separately and divided these into offensive interests (ar-
eas in which they desire to improve or consolidate ac-
cess) and defensive (areas where they wish to prevent 
or limit entry).
 In the European case, we find that their potential offensive 
interests centre on cereals, dairy produce, pork, coffee, 
biofuels and palm oil. The EU’s defensive interests, mean-
while, are focused on bananas, sugar and beef. While the 
list seems extensive, the farming sector is undoubtedly
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 not the EU’s priority within the negotiations, though this 
does not mean it is not important. Furthermore, nego-
tiations for this agreement are clearly highly sensitive for 
the EU, since the outcome could set an important prec-
edent for its negotiations with CAN and MERCOSUR.
For Central America, on the other hand, the farming 
sector forms its priority in terms of the negotiations. The 
fact that one of the features of the NEM is the promo-
tion of non-traditional exports (primarily agricultural) 
makes it so. Consequently, the CA isthmus presents 
three central offensive interests: consolidate the access 
it already has to the European market through the GSP-
Plus within the framework of the EAA, and improve the 
import conditions for bananas and sugar. In terms of its 
defensive interests, these centre on the areas of dairy 
produce, potatoes and onions. Here the list is smaller, 
but its relative importance is much greater. Hence it is 
clear that any negotiation in which CA fails to achieve 
significant advances in relation to its main offensive in-
terests will be a clear failure for the region.
Subsequently, a comparison of these two elements (the 
interests of each block) allowed us to locate a set of 
axes of conflict organized in three categories: very prob-
able, probable and unlikely. The first group, very prob-
able, relates to those products which evidently present 
a conflict of interests or at least complex and turbulent 
negotiations. Here we can list bananas, sugar and dairy 
produce. In the case of the second group, the probable 
conflicts, we find beef, pork and manioc. Meanwhile, in 
the group of unlikely conflicts we situate coffee, fruit 
juices, cardamom, peanuts, palm oil, pineapple, melon, 
oranges, dried beans, palm nuts, maize, rice, onions, 
potatoes and biofuels. Although the overall list is fairly 
large, apart from the areas contained in the first group, 
it is fairly unlikely that these potential conflicts will mate-
rialize in the negotiations.
Finally, based on the findings of the previous stages, 
we proceeded to build a set of four hypothetical sce-
narios, which aim to show some of the possible out-
comes of the EAA negotiations. These scenarios are 
placed in a continuum spanning from the most favour-
able possible for Central American interests (ACP 
Parity) to the most favourable possible for European 
interests (CAFTA-Plus).
Of these scenarios, we believe that C is closest to the 
probable outcome of the negotiations. In this scenario, 
CA obtains a favourable outcome in relation to its three 
offensive interests. It manages to consolidate the ac-
cess already received through GSP-Plus; it gains fairly 
competitive access to the European market in relation 
to bananas, in the form of quotas, a small improvement 
in relation to sugar (agreeing to an import quota), and a 
competitive quota for Costa Rican manioc, but a limited 
and controlled opening to the EU meat market for 
Nicaragua’s produce. In the case of ethanol, the region 
obtains a quota for preferential access but with condi-
tions inferior to those of other blocks such as the ACP 
countries. In relation to its defensive interests, it fails to 
prevent the opening up of the dairy market and Europe 
obtains the same access received by US production 
within the CAFTA-DR framework; the same occurs in 
the case of pork; potatoes and onions are excluded 
and rice is left out of the negotiations.
In conclusion, we present below a set of final com-
ments, which look to deepen some of the specific 
themes covered in the present study:
• The economic association agreement between the 
EU and CA is not derived from a directly commercial 
priority for Europe. For the EU, it corresponds to a 
search for parity with its main trading rivals, espe-
cially in areas of strong European investment, as is 
the case of Latin America, where it has tended to 
invest in the service, financial and high technology 
sectors. For CA, on the contrary, the EAA is impor-
tant since the EU is the second largest economic 
destination for its exports; hence tightening com-
mercial ties between the blocks is a way of obtaining 
greater integration with the world through trade.
• The EU has a different trade policy, which is essen-
tially focused on the opening and liberalization of the 
services market, since this is more in line with the 
type of economic structure predominant in this con-
tinent, primary based on the service sector (77%). In 
the case of commerce in goods, the focus is dis-
tinct: for the EU, farming is important as a means of 
self-sufficiency and food security. For Europe, there 
is no clear interest in producing to export; on the 
contrary, it produces to be self-sufficient. In fact, 
European global exports that are more competitive 
result from an internal overproduction that gener-
ates vast surpluses, which can be sold easily on ex-
ternal markets. This explains why the most com-
petitive products are usually subject to equally 
strong tariff barriers. Along the same lines, it is im-
portant to note the EU’s reluctance to negotiation 
the issue of farming subsidies in any space other 
than the WTO, where no advances are observable. 
Here the EU can be expected to exclude the topic 
from the negotiating table.
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• The current conjuncture of the EU displays a varia-
tion in two policies that are essential to agriculture: 
firstly, the commercial policy designed to open up 
markets in which the EU's most competitive pro-
duction is failing to enter, maintaining open channels 
for the access to goods without which the EU can-
not produce (primarily energy resources) and the 
opening up of service markets. The other is the CAP, 
where the transformation has primarily occurred 
through sizeable reductions in the policy’s funding, 
as well as new guidelines for distributing to the 
funds. The most obvious explanation for this is that 
with the expansion of the block, leaving the CAP 
unchanged would have been financially unsustain-
able; the budgetary reduction was imperative. This 
explains why the main items affected by the reforms 
were the products sustained by the access of the 
ACP, and then all those goods that were not essen-
tial to the EU. Much aid was maintained with few 
returns, especially in goods susceptible to drastic 
reduction or in accordance with the logic of sustain-
ability describe above. As has been observed, the 
idea that regulates the logic of the new CAP is en-
suring the supply of the internal market, but gradu-
ally abandoning its international export capacity.
• The problem of the farming sector seen as a whole, 
taking into account both blocks, results from the 
mismatch between weak sectors and strong sec-
tors. This enables the conflicts between products 
such as bananas, sugar, beef, milk, cheese and 
pork. In most of the other goods, there is a certain 
match between the production of both blocks, 
meaning that the level of conflict in the negotiations 
should be relatively low.
• On the other hand, the EU requires the opening of 
some farming sectors, which coincide with sectors 
that are problematic for certain countries from the 
region. Here we should recall two situations: first, 
CA must negotiate as a block, that is, it must have a 
coordinated position vis-à-vis the EU. Any diver-
gences in sensitive interests, such as milk, will prove 
problematic. Equally, it must be clear that for the EU, 
CAFTA parity is the minimum result, meaning that 
there will be costly conditions for sectors where 
trade opening is practically inevitable. This is the 
situation faced by milk and pork.
• Given that the agricultural production models are 
diametrically different (the EU’s strongly structured in 
the basis of subsidies and production incentives, 
the CA’s lacking incentives and support towards 
production), it is very difficult to speak of conditions 
of fair competition between the agricultural produc-
ers of the two blocks, principally because the pro-
duction costs raise the market prices for the Central 
American products entering Europe.
• Finally, although the agricultural sector is not neces-
sarily the most directly affected by the EAA, it is im-
portant to recall that this trade agreement fits into 
the logic of the NEM and the poverty-generating de-
velopment model that has been sweeping the 
Central American region and which has been highly 
damaging to rural zones and especially for small ru-
ral producers and workers.
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XI. Annexes
XI. 1. Methodological  
and conceptual annex
Map of conflicts for trade negotiations  
at international level
In producing the present document, a series of method-
ological and conceptual approaches were undertaken. 
These are worth reviewing and explaining in order to 
understand the results obtained in the form of tables 
and other tools from which important conclusions are 
inferred. First of all, the use of the concept of offensive 
interests and defensive interests was conceived through 
the use of a simple model for detecting the conflicts that 
could surface during the negotiations.
 This methodological proposal is based on the supposition 
that within the context of a trade negotiation, the countries, 
or blocks of countries, involved possess a set of goods
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and services whose conditions they wish to improve or 
maintain (important or offensive) and a list of products 
they wish to limit or exclude (sensitive or defensive).
As a result, in cases where a product or service important 
to one of the parties is the same as one seen to be sensi-
tive by the other, the chances of a conflict erupting are 
likely to be higher. Evidently in those cases involving goods 
and/or services that are sensitive to both parties, there will 
be no conflict; while if two important products are involved, 
there is also the possibility of conflict since the situation 
places direct competitors in the same market. Hence by 
defining goods and services as important or sensitive, we 
can locate these points or elements of a potential conflict. 
Defining the characteristics that determine whether a 
product or service is important or sensitive is highly 
complex and corresponds to a large number of vari-
ables. An initial guide to indicators can be found in the 
following table.
Table. Characteristics of sensitive and important goods within the model for mapping 
conflicts in trade negotiations at international level.
Sensitive goods Important goods
Traditional product.
Job support for a significant number of  inhabitants.
Low level of competitiveness on the international market.
Product of strategic importance (food security perspective, 
for example).
Politically influential productive block.
Central product in cultural terms.
Subject to significant protectionist policies.
Commitments to market defence to third countries.
Considerable weight in the gross domestic product.
High level of exports.
High level of international competitiveness.
Central product in terms of the development of the block in 
question.
Politically influential productive block.
Management of statistical data
As may be observed, the present document had to 
make use of a large quantity of statistical data with 
the aim of determining levels of importance for the 
economy, competitiveness and comparative advan-
tages, as well as identifying the tariff rates imposed. 
For this document, two databases on foreign trade 
were compiled. The first served as a general map of 
the exports and the main products in the exchange 
between the two blocks. The second was built from a 
selection of products identified as important and sen-
sitive for Central America, in part derived from the ma-
trix described previously.
The second database included, among other things, 
the exports and imports of goods globally and be-
tween the blocks for a period of four years (2003-
2006), the percentage of both commercial flows with-
in the country’s total for each year of the period, 
performance levels (growth or reduction) of trade, the 
measurement of the comparative advantages re-
vealed index for each product, and the tariffs on im-
portation established by the EU and CA in relation to 
these products.
In order to build this table, the value of exports and 
imports for tariff lines – that is to say, making use of the 
customs codes of the EU and Central America, both of 
which use the Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS). Four digit headings are used 
to compile the table; when a further break down is nec-
essary to explain the specific situation of some sub-
products, six digit subheadings are used. The following 
table exemplifies this system taking as an example the 
exportation of Coffee from Central America to interna-
tional markets in 2006. It should be pointed out that 
this form of information management was used as it 
helped its comparison with import tariffs of other 
blocks, which are adjusted not to the product but to 
the tariff line in question.
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Table 8. Functioning of headings and subheadings in the HS
Section Chapter  (2 digits)
Heading  
(4 digits)
Subheading  
(6 digits)
Amount  
(in US$)
II.
 V
eg
et
ab
le
 P
ro
du
ct
s
09
 C
of
fe
e,
 te
a,
 m
at
é 
an
d 
sp
ic
es
0901 Coffee, whether or 
not roasted or 
decaffeinated, coffee husks 
and skins, coffee 
substitutes containing 
coffee in any proportion.
TOTAL HEADING 0901 1.475.437.772
090111 Coffee, not roasted and not 
decaffeinated
1.470.246.178
090112 Coffee, not roasted and 
decaffeinated
288
090121 Coffee, roasted and not 
decaffeinated
4.570.636
090122 Coffee, roasted and decaffeinated 100.071
090190 Other 520.599
Data which was particularly useful in the subsequent com-
parisons of products and defining the conflicts, including 
the importance or competitiveness of one sector in com-
parison with another, was the revealed comparative advan-
tage index (RCAI). The RCAI enables comparison of the 
relative importance of an exported and imported product 
for a country or region to a particular destination, within the 
exports of the same product made by a group of countries, 
with the relative importance possessed by the supply of 
products from the same group or economic sector within 
the total exportable supply of the group of countries under 
analysis. The formula used is presented below:
RCAI = VCE-VCI
      _PE_
VEC = __SE__
      SE
      TE
PE: product exports
SE: sector exports
TE: total exports
The RCAI results in decimals with a value lower than 
1 but higher than -1; values closer to 1 indicate a 
higher comparative advantage for the product, or a 
less comparative advantage when the value is closer 
to -1. Again in the case of coffee, the EU has an RCAI 
of -0.579 compared to 0.461 for Central America, 
which signifies that CA has a higher comparative 
advantage. However, examined in more detail, the EU 
has a comparative advantage in ‘processed’ coffees 
(roasted and/or decaffeinated) since it shows indices 
of around 0.050. In CA, the advantage is limited to 
‘unprocessed’ coffee, since it has a lower RCA with 
the other types of coffees.
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XI. 2. Statistical annex
Annex 1. Main agroindustrial exports of Central America and the Central American  
countries to the rest of the world. 2006.
Central America Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount
1 Coffee 1,475.2 Banana 645.1 Coffee 188.8 Coffee 464.2 Coffee 390.1 Coffee 201.8
2 Banana 1,021.4 Pineapple 434.6 Ethylic alcohol 157.3 Sugarcane 298.5 Banana 131.5 Beef 146.9
3 Sugarcane 503.7 Coffee 230.3 Sugarcane 71.7 Banana 233.0 Palm oil 66.2 Sugarcane 58.4
4 Pineapple 461.4 Living plants 184.5
Cereal-based 
products
53.9 Cardamom 83.4
Cigars and 
cigarettes
64.4 Peanuts 42.2
5 Living plants 231.9 Other food preps. 157.2 Bakery products 52.0 Palm oil 54.0 Melon 32.6 Livestock 39.1
6 Ethylic alcohol 202.6 Fruit juices 98.7 Fruit juices 26.6 Bakery products 43.0 Sugarcane 29.3 Dried beans 35.6
7 Other food preps. 187.8 Melon 84.6 Cereal flours 22.5 Living plants 37.1 Palm nut 21.0 Cheese 33.4
8 Beef 181.2 Palm oil 48.9 Other food preps. 15.0 Molasses 35.6 Fruit juices 13.4 Concentrated milk 20.6
9 Palm oil 170.4 Sugarcane 45.9 Confectionary 12.6
Cereal-based 
products
30.7 Raw tobacco 12.3
Extracts and essences 
of coffee, tea and maté
13.1
10 Fruit juices 161.4
Jams, jellies and 
fruit purées
40.5 Molasses 10.3 Ethylic alcohol 30.5 Bakery products 11.2 Cigars and cigarettes 12.4
11 Bakery products 148.7 Conserved fruits 36.8 Animal rations 8.7 Soup preparations 25.2 Animal rations 7.4 Banana 11.6
12 Melon 122.3 Sauce preparations 34.7 Margarine 6.6 Fruit juices 22.5 Cucumber 7.3 Peanut oil 8.7
13
Cigars and 
cigarettes
91.3 Bakery products 34.6
Plant and animal 
fats
5.3 Sesame seeds 16.2 Living plants 5.9 Ethylic alcohol 8.5
14
Cereal-based 
products
90.1 Manioc 34.4 Dried beans 5.2 Peas 15.4 Fresh tomato 5.9 Raw tobacco 7,8
15 Cardamom 83.5 Beef 30.3 Malt beer 4.6 Animal rations 15.2
Conserved 
vegetables
5.3 Bakery products 7.6
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON SIECA 2007A
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Annex 2. Main agroindustrial exports of Central America and the Central American  
countries to the European Union. 2006
Central America Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount Product Amount
1 Coffee 700.3 Banana 300.4 Coffee 96.0 Coffee 144.2 Coffee 278.1 Coffee 101.5
2 Banana 317.1 Pineapple 215.5 Living plants 2.9 Ethylic alcohol 20.1 Pineapple 12.2 Peanuts 10.7
3 Pineapple 228.1 Melon 30.0 Natural honey 2.0 Living plants 14.1 Banana 5.1 Sugarcane 3.9
4 Living plants 109.1 Watermelon 5.6 Ethylic alcohol 2.0 Banana 11.4 Living plants 5.1 Ethylic alcohol 1.9
5 Fruit juices 51.0
Jams, jellies and  
fruit purées
21.8 Sugarcane 1.1 Raw tobacco 8.3 Melon 3.3 Sesame seeds 1.2
6 Ethylic alcohol 34.5 Conserved fruits 21.7 Cotton 0.2 Sesame seeds 3.8 Grapefruit 2.7 Living plants 1.0
7 Melon 33.7 Fruit juices 49.9 Sesame seeds 0.1
Extracts and  
essences
3.0 Cigars 1.7 Tobacco 0.9
8 Conserved fruits 21.8 Living plants 85.3 Peas 2.5 Fruit juices 1.0 Natural honey 0.5
9
Jams, jellies and  
fruit purées
21.8 Coffee 79.7 Molasses 2.2 Molasses 1.0 Whole cacao 0.2
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON SIECA 2007A.
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Annex 3. Main exports of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to the European Union. 2005
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
Product
Absolute value 
(million)
Relative value of 
total ACP exports 
(percentage)
Relative value of 
total EU imports 
(percentage)
Metric tons
1 Petroleum and derived oils 11,492.0 31.9% 7.0% 35,702,879
2 Diamonds 3,934.8 10.9% 24.4% 11
3 Large ships 1,945.6 5.4% 26.8% 2,039,034
4 Raw cacao 1,764.9 4.9% 95.8% 1,355,960
5 Natural gas and derivatives 1,348.9 3.7% 3.9% 6,141,971
6 Unrefined aluminium 976.4 2.7% 14.6% 629,352
7 Airplanes and helicopters 943.4 2.7% 4.1% 2,403
8 Sugarcane or molasses 856.7 2.4% 71.2% 1,613,883
9 Sawn timber 667.2 1.9% 17.8% 951,871
10 Coffee, roasted or not roasted 629.1 1.7% 17.1% 450,112
11 Prepared or preserved fish 517.1 1.4% 30.4% 215,506
12 Banana 503.9 1.4% 20.4% 765,136
13 yachts and other boats 482.3 1.3% 14.0% 20,227
14 Fish fillets 412.1 1.1% 12.6% 120,219
15 Crustaceans 364.7 1.0% 15.3% 45,646
ACP-Africa
1 Petroleum and derived oils 11,479.4 37.0% 7.0% 35,658,002
2 Diamonds 3,914.8 12.6% 24.3% 11
3 Raw cacao 1,728.6 5.6% 93.8% 1,312,306
4 Natural gas and derivatives 1,243.5 4.0% 3.6% 5,361,030
5 Unrefined aluminium 975.8 3.1% 14.6% 629,014
6 Sawn timber 659.7 2.1% 17.6% 936,339
7 Airplanes and helicopters 602.2 1.9% 2.6% 1,376
8 Large ships 578.1 1.9% 7.9% 511,129
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Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
Product
Absolute value 
(million)
Relative value of 
total ACP exports 
(percentage)
Relative value of 
total EU imports 
(percentage)
Metric tons
9 Coffee, roasted or not roasted 562.7 1.8% 15.3% 413,851
10 Sugarcane or molasses 555.6 1.8% 46.2% 1,035,836
ACP-Caribbean
1 Large ships 772.2 20.4% 10.6% 446,848
2 yachts and other boats 352.1 9.3% 10.2% 16,086
3 Aluminium oxide 346.9 9.2% 59.3% 1,658,080
4 Airplanes and helicopters 341.2 9.0% 1.5% 1,027
5 Alcohol below 80% volume (rum) 281.9 7.4% 30.9% 48,641
6 Petroleum and derived oils 245.9 6.5% 0.7% 687,523
7 Sugarcane or molasses 210.6 5.6% 17.5% 400,130
8 Banana 186.0 4.9% 7.6% 323,167
9 Iron alloys 108.0 2.9% 2.2% 23,299
10 Natural gas and derivatives 105.3 2.8% 0.3% 780,914
ACP-Pacific
1 Large ships 598.2 48.0% 8.2% 1,081,056
2 Palm oil and fractions 136.4 11.0% 9.8% 379,300
3 yachts and other boats 116.9 9.4% 3.4% 3,425
4 Sugarcane or molasses 90.4 7.3% 7.5% 177,917
5 Copper 75.1 6.0% 3.9% 99,200
6 Coconut oil 58.8 4.7% 8.3% 109,796
7 Coffee, roasted or not roasted 57.9 4.7% 1.6% 32,892
8 Prepared or preserved fish 45.2 3.6% 2.7% 20,465
9 Raw cacao 18.7 1.5% 1.0% 12,809
10 Copra (dried coconut flesh) 11.6 0.9% 90.0% 41,999
SOURCE: CE 2007A.
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Annex 3. Central America: basket of products for study, with export dates, annual growth  
rate, average and percentage value. 2003-2006
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Maize 48.8 0.1% 100.8 0.2% 94.2 0.2% 49.0 0.1% 73.18 107% -6.57% -47.96% 50.02%
Seed maize 35.9 0.1% 79.4 0.1% 77.5 0.1% 41.1 0.1% 58.47 121% -2.42% -46.92% 62.74%
Other (white, yellow and others) 12.8 0.0% 21.4 0.0% 16.7 0.0% 7.9 0.0% 14.71 67% -21.98% -52.80% 14.47%
Palm nut 42.5 0.1% 70.2 0.1% 203.7 0.3% 271.2 0.4% 146.91 65% 190.07% 33.14% 245.84%
Dried beans 256.5 0.5% 253.3 0.5% 355.1 0.6% 441.9 0.6% 326.70 -1% 40.18% 24.44% 27.36%
Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung 6.8 0.0% 3.5 0.0% 0.6 0.0% 1.2 0.0% 3.02 -48% -83.28% 107.14% -55.20%
Adzuki bean 148.2 0.3% 137.2 0.3% 271.6 0.4% 361.0 0.5% 229.48 -7% 97.96% 32.92% 54.89%
Phaseolus bean 101.6 0.2% 112.6 0.2% 82.9 0.1% 79.7 0.1% 94.20 11% -26.35% -3.94% -7.30%
Other beans 0.7 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.32 -86% 263.99% -63.35% -53.44%
Rice 20.0 0.0% 24.3 0.0% 23.1 0.0% 28.9 0.0% 24.08 21% -4.68% 25.22% 20.42%
Paddy rice 3.1 0.0% 9.1 0.0% 4.6 0.0% 2.0 0.0% 4.69 196% -49.38% -56.77% 52.78%
Flaked rice (cargo or brown) 0.9 0.0% 1.3 0.0% 0.7 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.83 46% -49.59% -43.06% -9.82%
Semi-white or white rice 8.7 0.0% 8.1 0.0% 10.2 0.0% 14.5 0.0% 10.38 -7% 25.46% 42.99% 19.00%
Split rice 7.3 0.0% 5.7 0.0% 7.7 0.0% 12.0 0.0% 8.18 -21% 34.24% 56.86% 12.30%
Orange 31.4 0.1% 23.9 0.0% 24.5 0.0% 11.2 0.0% 22.74 -24% 2.74% -54.36% -27.59%
Grapefruit 18.6 0.0% 24.3 0.0% 16.3 0.0% 28.0 0.0% 21.83 31% -32.88% 71.61% 17.40%
Potato 31.3 0.1% 29.3 0.1% 69.1 0.1% 57.5 0.1% 46.81 -6% 136.00% -16.85% 49.58%
Seed potato 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.03 -94% -39.08% 59.09% -70.83%
Other potatoes 31.2 0.1% 29.3 0.1% 69.1 0.1% 57.5 0.1% 46.78 -6% 136.04% -16.86% 49.97%
Sorghum 4.4 0.0% 8.2 0.0% 9.6 0.0% 3.4 0.0% 6.41 84% 17.92% -64.13% 44.91%
Coffee 8,687.4 17.8% 10,358.8 19.0% 13,176.0 21.2% 14,754.4 20.7% 11,744.15 19% 27.20% 11.98% 35.19%
Not roasted, not decaffeinated 8,660.9 17.7% 10,327.3 18.9% 13,135.2 21.1% 14,702.5 20.6% 11,706.46 19% 27.19% 11.93% 35.16%
Not roasted, decaffeinated 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.00 -100% N/A -56.50% 19.25%
Roasted, not decaffeinated 24.0 0.0% 26.7 0.0% 35.9 0.1% 45.7 0.1% 33.07 11% 34.58% 27.34% 37.80%
Roasted, decaffeinated 0.1 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 1.0 0.0% 0.33 -5% -69.68% 2438.58% 138.62%
Others (instantaneous etc.) 2.4 0.0% 4.7 0.0% 4.8 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 4.29 97% 1.49% 8.19% 78.24%
Banana 9,239.0 18.9% 9,583.9 17.6% 8,998.0 14.5% 10,213.8 14.3% 9,508.66 4% -6.11% 13.51% 2.92%
Pineapple 2,174.0 4.4% 2,855.6 5.2% 3,534.1 5.7% 4,613.5 6.5% 3,294.28 31% 23.76% 30.54% 51.53%
Sugar 3,181.5 6.5% 3,208.8 5.9% 4,201.7 6.8% 5,038.0 7.1% 3,907.48 1% 30.94% 19.90% 22.82%
Raw cane 2,962.2 6.1% 2,950.2 5.4% 3,827.6 6.2% 4,912.2 6.9% 3,663.04 0% 29.74% 28.34% 23.66%
With flavouring 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.05 -85% -14.91% 93.38% -61.70%
Others (sugar) 219.1 0.4% 258.6 0.5% 374.0 0.6% 125.7 0.2% 244.38 18% 44.63% -66.38% 11.52%
Melon 1,011.9 2.1% 1,080.1 2.0% 1,086.8 1.7% 1,223.2 1.7% 1,100.50 7% 0.63% 12.55% 8.76%
Palm oil 1,345.6 2.8% 1,823.5 3.3% 1,672.6 2.7% 1,704.1 2.4% 1,636.44 36% -8.28% 1.88% 21.61%
Raw palm oil 966.8 2.0% 1,250.8 2.3% 1,316.9 2.1% 1,288.5 1.8% 1,205.74 29% 5.29% -2.16% 24.72%
Others (palm oil) 378.9 0.8% 572.7 1.0% 355.6 0.6% 415.6 0.6% 430.70 51% -37.90% 16.86% 13.69%
Living plants, foliage and flowers 1,955.1 4.0% 2,058.0 3.8% 2,134.8 3.4% 2,319.7 3.3% 2,116.91 5% 3.73% 8.67% 8.28%
Bulbs, tubers and roots 1.1 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 1.3 0.0% 3.2 0.0% 2.08 157% -50.49% 140.73% 97.64%
Annex 3. Central America: basket of products for study, with export dates, annual growth  
rate, average and percentage value. 2003-2006
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Maize 48.8 0.1% 100.8 0.2% 94.2 0.2% 49.0 0.1% 73.18 107% -6.57% -47.96% 50.02%
Seed maize 35.9 0.1% 79.4 0.1% 77.5 0.1% 41.1 0.1% 58.47 121% -2.42% -46.92% 62.74%
Other (white, yellow and others) 12.8 0.0% 21.4 0.0% 16.7 0.0% 7.9 0.0% 14.71 67% -21.98% -52.80% 14.47%
Palm nut 42.5 0.1% 70.2 0.1% 203.7 0.3% 271.2 0.4% 146.91 65% 190.07% 33.14% 245.84%
Dried beans 256.5 0.5% 253.3 0.5% 355.1 0.6% 441.9 0.6% 326.70 -1% 40.18% 24.44% 27.36%
Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung 6.8 0.0% 3.5 0.0% 0.6 0.0% 1.2 0.0% 3.02 -48% -83.28% 107.14% -55.20%
Adzuki bean 148.2 0.3% 137.2 0.3% 271.6 0.4% 361.0 0.5% 229.48 -7% 97.96% 32.92% 54.89%
Phaseolus bean 101.6 0.2% 112.6 0.2% 82.9 0.1% 79.7 0.1% 94.20 11% -26.35% -3.94% -7.30%
Other beans 0.7 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.32 -86% 263.99% -63.35% -53.44%
Rice 20.0 0.0% 24.3 0.0% 23.1 0.0% 28.9 0.0% 24.08 21% -4.68% 25.22% 20.42%
Paddy rice 3.1 0.0% 9.1 0.0% 4.6 0.0% 2.0 0.0% 4.69 196% -49.38% -56.77% 52.78%
Flaked rice (cargo or brown) 0.9 0.0% 1.3 0.0% 0.7 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.83 46% -49.59% -43.06% -9.82%
Semi-white or white rice 8.7 0.0% 8.1 0.0% 10.2 0.0% 14.5 0.0% 10.38 -7% 25.46% 42.99% 19.00%
Split rice 7.3 0.0% 5.7 0.0% 7.7 0.0% 12.0 0.0% 8.18 -21% 34.24% 56.86% 12.30%
Orange 31.4 0.1% 23.9 0.0% 24.5 0.0% 11.2 0.0% 22.74 -24% 2.74% -54.36% -27.59%
Grapefruit 18.6 0.0% 24.3 0.0% 16.3 0.0% 28.0 0.0% 21.83 31% -32.88% 71.61% 17.40%
Potato 31.3 0.1% 29.3 0.1% 69.1 0.1% 57.5 0.1% 46.81 -6% 136.00% -16.85% 49.58%
Seed potato 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.03 -94% -39.08% 59.09% -70.83%
Other potatoes 31.2 0.1% 29.3 0.1% 69.1 0.1% 57.5 0.1% 46.78 -6% 136.04% -16.86% 49.97%
Sorghum 4.4 0.0% 8.2 0.0% 9.6 0.0% 3.4 0.0% 6.41 84% 17.92% -64.13% 44.91%
Coffee 8,687.4 17.8% 10,358.8 19.0% 13,176.0 21.2% 14,754.4 20.7% 11,744.15 19% 27.20% 11.98% 35.19%
Not roasted, not decaffeinated 8,660.9 17.7% 10,327.3 18.9% 13,135.2 21.1% 14,702.5 20.6% 11,706.46 19% 27.19% 11.93% 35.16%
Not roasted, decaffeinated 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.00 -100% N/A -56.50% 19.25%
Roasted, not decaffeinated 24.0 0.0% 26.7 0.0% 35.9 0.1% 45.7 0.1% 33.07 11% 34.58% 27.34% 37.80%
Roasted, decaffeinated 0.1 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 1.0 0.0% 0.33 -5% -69.68% 2438.58% 138.62%
Others (instantaneous etc.) 2.4 0.0% 4.7 0.0% 4.8 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 4.29 97% 1.49% 8.19% 78.24%
Banana 9,239.0 18.9% 9,583.9 17.6% 8,998.0 14.5% 10,213.8 14.3% 9,508.66 4% -6.11% 13.51% 2.92%
Pineapple 2,174.0 4.4% 2,855.6 5.2% 3,534.1 5.7% 4,613.5 6.5% 3,294.28 31% 23.76% 30.54% 51.53%
Sugar 3,181.5 6.5% 3,208.8 5.9% 4,201.7 6.8% 5,038.0 7.1% 3,907.48 1% 30.94% 19.90% 22.82%
Raw cane 2,962.2 6.1% 2,950.2 5.4% 3,827.6 6.2% 4,912.2 6.9% 3,663.04 0% 29.74% 28.34% 23.66%
With flavouring 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.05 -85% -14.91% 93.38% -61.70%
Others (sugar) 219.1 0.4% 258.6 0.5% 374.0 0.6% 125.7 0.2% 244.38 18% 44.63% -66.38% 11.52%
Melon 1,011.9 2.1% 1,080.1 2.0% 1,086.8 1.7% 1,223.2 1.7% 1,100.50 7% 0.63% 12.55% 8.76%
Palm oil 1,345.6 2.8% 1,823.5 3.3% 1,672.6 2.7% 1,704.1 2.4% 1,636.44 36% -8.28% 1.88% 21.61%
Raw palm oil 966.8 2.0% 1,250.8 2.3% 1,316.9 2.1% 1,288.5 1.8% 1,205.74 29% 5.29% -2.16% 24.72%
Others (palm oil) 378.9 0.8% 572.7 1.0% 355.6 0.6% 415.6 0.6% 430.70 51% -37.90% 16.86% 13.69%
Living plants, foliage and flowers 1,955.1 4.0% 2,058.0 3.8% 2,134.8 3.4% 2,319.7 3.3% 2,116.91 5% 3.73% 8.67% 8.28%
Bulbs, tubers and roots 1.1 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 1.3 0.0% 3.2 0.0% 2.08 157% -50.49% 140.73% 97.64%
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PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Other living plants 910.0 1.9% 942.6 1.7% 912.4 1.5% 1,009.2 1.4% 943.54 4% -3.21% 10.61% 3.69%
Flowers and buds 331.9 0.7% 330.9 0.6% 375.4 0.6% 436.4 0.6% 368.67 0% 13.42% 16.27% 11.07%
Foliage, leaves and branches 712.1 1.5% 781.8 1.4% 845.7 1.4% 870.9 1.2% 802.63 10% 8.17% 2.98% 12.71%
Manioc 258.8 0.5% 353.5 0.6% 441.9 0.7% 355.9 0.5% 352.53 37% 25.00% -19.45% 36.23%
Peanut 285.4 0.6% 398.3 0.7% 436.1 0.7% 426.0 0.6% 386.46 40% 9.52% -2.32% 35.39%
Peanut with husk 1.3 0.0% 1.9 0.0% 3.1 0.0% 1.4 0.0% 1.95 45% 63.45% -54.23% 47.79%
Without husk, including cracked 284.1 0.6% 396.3 0.7% 433.0 0.7% 424.6 0.6% 384.51 39% 9.25% -1.95% 35.33%
Cardamom 793.9 1.6% 742.0 1.4% 702.6 1.1% 834.4 1.2% 768.23 -7% -5.31% 18.76% -3.23%
Fruit juices 896.0 1.8% 1,076.3 2.0% 1,226.4 2.0% 1,614.3 2.3% 1,203.24 20% 13.94% 31.64% 34.29%
Frozen orange juice 3.1 0.0% 3.0 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 12.9 0.0% 6.02 -3% 75.04% 148.51% 97.05%
Tomato juice 8.2 0.0% 11.8 0.0% 9.0 0.0% 10.3 0.0% 9.82 44% -23.47% 14.67% 19.97%
Apple juice 12.2 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.2 0.0% 3.22 -97% -82.52% 224.39% -73.70%
Other fruit or vegetable juice 239.4 0.5% 273.2 0.5% 322.0 0.5% 403.4 0.6% 309.49 14% 17.86% 25.30% 29.29%
Mixed juices 12.7 0.0% 32.7 0.1% 38.4 0.1% 55.2 0.1% 34.73 158% 17.35% 43.92% 174.18%
Unconcentrated milk 113.9 0.2% 133.5 0.2% 151.7 0.2% 146.3 0.2% 136.34 17% 13.69% -3.62% 19.70%
With fat content less than 1% 31.8 0.1% 34.5 0.1% 34.7 0.1% 39.9 0.1% 35.21 9% 0.70% 14.89% 10.83%
With fat content between 1% and 6% 78.4 0.2% 95.7 0.2% 113.4 0.2% 99.8 0.1% 96.80 22% 18.51% -12.02% 23.50%
With fat content higher than 6% 3.8 0.0% 3.3 0.0% 3.6 0.0% 6.6 0.0% 4.33 -11% 9.50% 81.56% 15.49%
Concentrated milk 179.5 0.4% 231.2 0.4% 183.8 0.3% 363.8 0.5% 239.57 29% -20.50% 97.96% 33.46%
Powdered milk, fat 1.5% or less 19.2 0.0% 17.1 0.0% 18.9 0.0% 15.1 0.0% 17.56 -11% 10.35% -20.31% -8.37%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% without added sugar 145.0 0.3% 176.9 0.3% 127.1 0.2% 309.7 0.4% 189.69 22% -28.18% 143.70% 30.78%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others 6.9 0.0% 23.5 0.0% 10.2 0.0% 12.4 0.0% 13.24 243% -56.66% 21.03% 92.96%
Others, with sugar (cream and evaporated) 7.6 0.0% 11.9 0.0% 23.1 0.0% 22.3 0.0% 16.21 57% 94.49% -3.58% 113.78%
Others (condensed) 0.8 0.0% 1.7 0.0% 4.5 0.0% 4.4 0.0% 2.87 99% 167.24% -1.14% 239.08%
Cheese and cottage cheese 275.7 0.6% 304.9 0.6% 334.4 0.5% 483.4 0.7% 349.59 11% 9.68% 44.55% 26.80%
Fresh cheese 29.4 0.1% 26.0 0.0% 23.6 0.0% 38.2 0.1% 29.28 -11% -9.41% 62.04% -0.24%
Grated or powdered cheese 22.1 0.0% 19.2 0.0% 21.5 0.0% 11.9 0.0% 18.68 -13% 12.29% -44.75% -15.59%
Processed cheese 99.3 0.2% 91.7 0.2% 100.1 0.2% 136.3 0.2% 106.86 -8% 9.12% 36.23% 7.60%
Blue cheese 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.01 N/A -100.00% N/A N/A
Other cheeses (fine cheeses) 124.9 0.3% 168.0 0.3% 188.4 0.3% 296.9 0.4% 194.55 34% 12.18% 57.59% 55.77%
Beef 1,138.9 2.3% 1,436.1 2.6% 1,559.0 2.5% 1,811.6 2.5% 1,486.38 26% 8.55% 16.20% 30.52%
Fresh or refrigerated 611.5 1.3% 768.7 1.4% 834.1 1.3% 1,027.4 1.4% 810.43 26% 8.52% 23.17% 32.53%
Frozen 527.4 1.1% 667.5 1.2% 724.8 1.2% 784.2 1.1% 675.95 27% 8.59% 8.19% 28.18%
Pork 3.1 0.0% 43.6 0.1% 76.0 0.1% 92.1 0.1% 53.71 1303% 74.48% 21.12% 1628.84%
Poultry 15.1 0.0% 56.0 0.1% 99.2 0.2% 66.3 0.1% 59.14 270% 77.15% -33.19% 290.39%
Onions 39.0 0.1% 39.1 0.1% 35.0 0.1% 49.1 0.1% 40.55 0% -10.56% 40.17% 4.05%
TOTAL PRODUCTS 32,047.2 65.5% 36,317.4 66.6% 40,845.7 65.7% 47,001.0 66.0% 39,052.81 13% 12.47% 15.07% 21.86%
TOTAL AGRICULTURE 48,894.2 100.0% 54,544.5 100.0% 62,204.0 100.0% 71,229.8 100.0% 59,218.12 12% 14.04% 14.51% 21.11%
TOTAL EXPORTED 116,182.0 126,936.0 144,107.5 165,281.5
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON SIECA 2007A.
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Other living plants 910.0 1.9% 942.6 1.7% 912.4 1.5% 1,009.2 1.4% 943.54 4% -3.21% 10.61% 3.69%
Flowers and buds 331.9 0.7% 330.9 0.6% 375.4 0.6% 436.4 0.6% 368.67 0% 13.42% 16.27% 11.07%
Foliage, leaves and branches 712.1 1.5% 781.8 1.4% 845.7 1.4% 870.9 1.2% 802.63 10% 8.17% 2.98% 12.71%
Manioc 258.8 0.5% 353.5 0.6% 441.9 0.7% 355.9 0.5% 352.53 37% 25.00% -19.45% 36.23%
Peanut 285.4 0.6% 398.3 0.7% 436.1 0.7% 426.0 0.6% 386.46 40% 9.52% -2.32% 35.39%
Peanut with husk 1.3 0.0% 1.9 0.0% 3.1 0.0% 1.4 0.0% 1.95 45% 63.45% -54.23% 47.79%
Without husk, including cracked 284.1 0.6% 396.3 0.7% 433.0 0.7% 424.6 0.6% 384.51 39% 9.25% -1.95% 35.33%
Cardamom 793.9 1.6% 742.0 1.4% 702.6 1.1% 834.4 1.2% 768.23 -7% -5.31% 18.76% -3.23%
Fruit juices 896.0 1.8% 1,076.3 2.0% 1,226.4 2.0% 1,614.3 2.3% 1,203.24 20% 13.94% 31.64% 34.29%
Frozen orange juice 3.1 0.0% 3.0 0.0% 5.2 0.0% 12.9 0.0% 6.02 -3% 75.04% 148.51% 97.05%
Tomato juice 8.2 0.0% 11.8 0.0% 9.0 0.0% 10.3 0.0% 9.82 44% -23.47% 14.67% 19.97%
Apple juice 12.2 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.2 0.0% 3.22 -97% -82.52% 224.39% -73.70%
Other fruit or vegetable juice 239.4 0.5% 273.2 0.5% 322.0 0.5% 403.4 0.6% 309.49 14% 17.86% 25.30% 29.29%
Mixed juices 12.7 0.0% 32.7 0.1% 38.4 0.1% 55.2 0.1% 34.73 158% 17.35% 43.92% 174.18%
Unconcentrated milk 113.9 0.2% 133.5 0.2% 151.7 0.2% 146.3 0.2% 136.34 17% 13.69% -3.62% 19.70%
With fat content less than 1% 31.8 0.1% 34.5 0.1% 34.7 0.1% 39.9 0.1% 35.21 9% 0.70% 14.89% 10.83%
With fat content between 1% and 6% 78.4 0.2% 95.7 0.2% 113.4 0.2% 99.8 0.1% 96.80 22% 18.51% -12.02% 23.50%
With fat content higher than 6% 3.8 0.0% 3.3 0.0% 3.6 0.0% 6.6 0.0% 4.33 -11% 9.50% 81.56% 15.49%
Concentrated milk 179.5 0.4% 231.2 0.4% 183.8 0.3% 363.8 0.5% 239.57 29% -20.50% 97.96% 33.46%
Powdered milk, fat 1.5% or less 19.2 0.0% 17.1 0.0% 18.9 0.0% 15.1 0.0% 17.56 -11% 10.35% -20.31% -8.37%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% without added sugar 145.0 0.3% 176.9 0.3% 127.1 0.2% 309.7 0.4% 189.69 22% -28.18% 143.70% 30.78%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others 6.9 0.0% 23.5 0.0% 10.2 0.0% 12.4 0.0% 13.24 243% -56.66% 21.03% 92.96%
Others, with sugar (cream and evaporated) 7.6 0.0% 11.9 0.0% 23.1 0.0% 22.3 0.0% 16.21 57% 94.49% -3.58% 113.78%
Others (condensed) 0.8 0.0% 1.7 0.0% 4.5 0.0% 4.4 0.0% 2.87 99% 167.24% -1.14% 239.08%
Cheese and cottage cheese 275.7 0.6% 304.9 0.6% 334.4 0.5% 483.4 0.7% 349.59 11% 9.68% 44.55% 26.80%
Fresh cheese 29.4 0.1% 26.0 0.0% 23.6 0.0% 38.2 0.1% 29.28 -11% -9.41% 62.04% -0.24%
Grated or powdered cheese 22.1 0.0% 19.2 0.0% 21.5 0.0% 11.9 0.0% 18.68 -13% 12.29% -44.75% -15.59%
Processed cheese 99.3 0.2% 91.7 0.2% 100.1 0.2% 136.3 0.2% 106.86 -8% 9.12% 36.23% 7.60%
Blue cheese 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.01 N/A -100.00% N/A N/A
Other cheeses (fine cheeses) 124.9 0.3% 168.0 0.3% 188.4 0.3% 296.9 0.4% 194.55 34% 12.18% 57.59% 55.77%
Beef 1,138.9 2.3% 1,436.1 2.6% 1,559.0 2.5% 1,811.6 2.5% 1,486.38 26% 8.55% 16.20% 30.52%
Fresh or refrigerated 611.5 1.3% 768.7 1.4% 834.1 1.3% 1,027.4 1.4% 810.43 26% 8.52% 23.17% 32.53%
Frozen 527.4 1.1% 667.5 1.2% 724.8 1.2% 784.2 1.1% 675.95 27% 8.59% 8.19% 28.18%
Pork 3.1 0.0% 43.6 0.1% 76.0 0.1% 92.1 0.1% 53.71 1303% 74.48% 21.12% 1628.84%
Poultry 15.1 0.0% 56.0 0.1% 99.2 0.2% 66.3 0.1% 59.14 270% 77.15% -33.19% 290.39%
Onions 39.0 0.1% 39.1 0.1% 35.0 0.1% 49.1 0.1% 40.55 0% -10.56% 40.17% 4.05%
TOTAL PRODUCTS 32,047.2 65.5% 36,317.4 66.6% 40,845.7 65.7% 47,001.0 66.0% 39,052.81 13% 12.47% 15.07% 21.86%
TOTAL AGRICULTURE 48,894.2 100.0% 54,544.5 100.0% 62,204.0 100.0% 71,229.8 100.0% 59,218.12 12% 14.04% 14.51% 21.11%
TOTAL EXPORTED 116,182.0 126,936.0 144,107.5 165,281.5
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON SIECA 2007A.
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Annex 4. European Union: basket of products for study with export dates, annual growth  
rate, average and percentage value. 2003-2006
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Maize 1,218.9 0.22% 1,317.2 0.24% 1,077.3 0.18% 962.6 0.1% 1,143.98 8.07% -18.21% -10.65% -6.14%
Seed maize 491.9 0.09% 553.8 0.10% 492.1 0.08% 679.2 0.10% 554.25 12.58% -11.13% 38.00% 12.68%
Other (white, yellow and others) 727.0 0.13% 763.4 0.14% 585.2 0.10% 283.4 0.04% 589.73 5.01% -23.34% -51.57% -18.88%
Palm nut 16.7 0.00% 20.3 0.00% 24.6 0.00% 37.4 0.01% 24.75 21.28% 21.23% 52.40% 48.09%
Dried beans 134.7 0.02% 122.4 0.02% 142.0 0.02% 114.5 0.02% 128.41 -9.14% 16.00% -19.36% -4.69%
Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung 13.6 0.00% 19.8 0.00% 11.6 0.00% 9.3 0.00% 13.56 46.22% -41.59% -19.57% 0.08%
Adzuki bean 2.0 0.00% 1.7 0.00% 117.1 0.02% 0.6 0.00% 30.37 -13.08% 6707.77% -99.45% 1434.27%
Phaseolus bean 119.2 0.02% 100.9 0.02% 13.3 0.00% 104.5 0.02% 84.48 -15.36% -86.82% 686.59% -29.13%
Other beans 16.4 0.00% 10.5 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 43.7 0.01% 18.55 -36.18% -65.08% 1095.08% 13.12%
Rice 983.0 0.18% 897.2 0.16% 968.0 0.16% 850.5 0.13% 924.66 -8.73% 7.89% -12.14% -5.94%
Paddy rice 1.0 0.00% 15.3 0.00% 13.9 0.00% 14.6 0.00% 11.18 1466.34% -9.64% 5.04% 1042.07%
Flaked rice (cargo or brown) 43.4 0.01% 49.8 0.01% 67.8 0.01% 64.2 0.01% 56.30 14.83% 36.16% -5.39% 29.78%
Semi-white or white rice 934.2 0.17% 827.8 0.15% 879.9 0.15% 760.4 0.11% 850.58 -11.39% 6.29% -13.57% -8.95%
Split rice 4.4 0.00% 4.2 0.00% 6.4 0.00% 11.3 0.00% 6.59 -4.62% 51.41% 76.46% 48.65%
Orange 990.4 0.18% 909.1 0.17% 923.4 0.16% 1,078.4 0.16% 975.32 -8.21% 1.58% 16.78% -1.52%
Grapefruit 66.9 0.01% 77.3 0.01% 92.0 0.02% 83.7 0.01% 79.96 15.54% 19.11% -9.09% 19.56%
Potato 2,735.0 0.50% 2,485.4 0.45% 2,051.0 0.34% 3,137.2 0.47% 2,602.17 -9.13% -17.48% 52.96% -4.86%
Seed potato 1,658.0 0.31% 1,722.0 0.31% 1,252.6 0.21% 1,995.6 0.30% 1,657.06 3.86% -27.26% 59.32% -0.06%
Other potatoes 1,077.0 0.20% 763.4 0.14% 798.4 0.13% 1,141.6 0.17% 945.11 -29.12% 4.59% 42.97% -12.25%
Sorghum 10.1 0.00% 2.2 0.00% 26.6 0.00% 6.0 0.00% 11.20 -78.51% 1128.28% -77.51% 11.22%
Coffee 3,905.9 0.72% 4,416.7 0.81% 5,187.9 0.87% 5,916.2 0.88% 4,856.69 13.08% 17.46% 14.04% 24.34%
Not roasted, not decaffeinated 218.3 0.04% 333.5 0.06% 364.6 0.06% 361.5 0.05% 319.50 52.75% 9.34% -0.86% 46.34%
Not roasted, decaffeinated 1,457.6 0.27% 1,593.4 0.29% 1,902.5 0.32% 2,116.5 0.31% 1,767.48 9.32% 19.40% 11.25% 21.26%
Roasted, not decaffeinated 2,063.5 0.38% 2,279.8 0.42% 2,723.8 0.46% 3,202.5 0.48% 2,567.39 10.48% 19.48% 17.58% 24.42%
Roasted, decaffeinated 131.8 0.02% 179.8 0.03% 170.9 0.03% 197.4 0.03% 169.99 36.39% -4.94% 15.45% 28.93%
Others (instantaneous etc.) 34.7 0.01% 30.2 0.01% 26.1 0.00% 38.4 0.01% 32.33 -12.92% -13.50% 46.94% -6.73%
Banana 99.4 0.02% 88.9 0.02% 59.6 0.01% 86.0 0.01% 83.49 -10.56% -32.92% 44.17% -16.02%
Pineapple 117.5 0.02% 124.6 0.02% 184.7 0.03% 263.4 0.04% 172.56 6.02% 48.25% 42.57% 46.82%
Sugar 9,481.5 1.74% 7,821.2 1.43% 13,878.4 2.33% 19,650.2 2.92% 12,707.81 -17.51% 77.45% 41.59% 34.03%
Raw cane 28.3 0.01% 33.6 0.01% 35.8 0.01% 41.9 0.01% 34.93 18.85% 6.56% 17.05% 23.43%
Molasses 18.5 0.00% 17.2 0.00% 6.3 0.00% 46.3 0.01% 22.08 -7.32% -63.07% 629.86% 19.18%
With flavouring 45.7 0.01% 58.1 0.01% 60.9 0.01% 85.5 0.01% 62.54 27.24% 4.80% 40.31% 36.92%
Others (sugar) 9,389.0 1.73% 7,712.3 1.41% 13,775.3 2.31% 19,476.5 2.89% 12,588.27 -17.86% 78.61% 41.39% 34.07%
Melon 304.3 0.06% 249.9 0.05% 276.3 0.05% 315.6 0.05% 286.52 -17.89% 10.59% 14.22% -5.84%
Palm oil 313.4 0.06% 378.1 0.07% 571.0 0.10% 693.5 0.10% 488.99 20.65% 50.99% 21.46% 56.03%
Living plants, foliage and flowers 12,771.9 2.35% 12,508.0 2.28% 13,531.7 2.27% 15,592.7 2.32% 13,601.10 -2.07% 8.18% 15.23% 6.49%
Bulbs, tubers and roots 3,818.2 0.70% 3,546.3 0.65% 3,984.2 0.67% 4,751.6 0.71% 4,025.09 -7.12% 12.35% 19.26% 5.42%
Other living plants 4,621.5 0.85% 4,781.2 0.87% 5,305.7 0.89% 5,908.6 0.88% 5,154.24 3.45% 10.97% 11.36% 11.53%
Flowers and buds 3,846.5 0.71% 3,683.0 0.67% 3,708.7 0.62% 4,329.3 0.64% 3,891.87 -4.25% 0.70% 16.73% 1.18%
Foliage, leaves and branches 485.7 0.09% 497.6 0.09% 533.1 0.09% 603.3 0.09% 529.90 2.45% 7.15% 13.16% 9.11%
Annex 4. European Union: basket of products for study with export dates, annual growth  
rate, average and percentage value. 2003-2006
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Maize 1,218.9 0.22% 1,317.2 0.24% 1,077.3 0.18% 962.6 0.1% 1,143.98 8.07% -18.21% -10.65% -6.14%
Seed maize 491.9 0.09% 553.8 0.10% 492.1 0.08% 679.2 0.10% 554.25 12.58% -11.13% 38.00% 12.68%
Other (white, yellow and others) 727.0 0.13% 763.4 0.14% 585.2 0.10% 283.4 0.04% 589.73 5.01% -23.34% -51.57% -18.88%
Palm nut 16.7 0.00% 20.3 0.00% 24.6 0.00% 37.4 0.01% 24.75 21.28% 21.23% 52.40% 48.09%
Dried beans 134.7 0.02% 122.4 0.02% 142.0 0.02% 114.5 0.02% 128.41 -9.14% 16.00% -19.36% -4.69%
Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung 13.6 0.00% 19.8 0.00% 11.6 0.00% 9.3 0.00% 13.56 46.22% -41.59% -19.57% 0.08%
Adzuki bean 2.0 0.00% 1.7 0.00% 117.1 0.02% 0.6 0.00% 30.37 -13.08% 6707.77% -99.45% 1434.27%
Phaseolus bean 119.2 0.02% 100.9 0.02% 13.3 0.00% 104.5 0.02% 84.48 -15.36% -86.82% 686.59% -29.13%
Other beans 16.4 0.00% 10.5 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 43.7 0.01% 18.55 -36.18% -65.08% 1095.08% 13.12%
Rice 983.0 0.18% 897.2 0.16% 968.0 0.16% 850.5 0.13% 924.66 -8.73% 7.89% -12.14% -5.94%
Paddy rice 1.0 0.00% 15.3 0.00% 13.9 0.00% 14.6 0.00% 11.18 1466.34% -9.64% 5.04% 1042.07%
Flaked rice (cargo or brown) 43.4 0.01% 49.8 0.01% 67.8 0.01% 64.2 0.01% 56.30 14.83% 36.16% -5.39% 29.78%
Semi-white or white rice 934.2 0.17% 827.8 0.15% 879.9 0.15% 760.4 0.11% 850.58 -11.39% 6.29% -13.57% -8.95%
Split rice 4.4 0.00% 4.2 0.00% 6.4 0.00% 11.3 0.00% 6.59 -4.62% 51.41% 76.46% 48.65%
Orange 990.4 0.18% 909.1 0.17% 923.4 0.16% 1,078.4 0.16% 975.32 -8.21% 1.58% 16.78% -1.52%
Grapefruit 66.9 0.01% 77.3 0.01% 92.0 0.02% 83.7 0.01% 79.96 15.54% 19.11% -9.09% 19.56%
Potato 2,735.0 0.50% 2,485.4 0.45% 2,051.0 0.34% 3,137.2 0.47% 2,602.17 -9.13% -17.48% 52.96% -4.86%
Seed potato 1,658.0 0.31% 1,722.0 0.31% 1,252.6 0.21% 1,995.6 0.30% 1,657.06 3.86% -27.26% 59.32% -0.06%
Other potatoes 1,077.0 0.20% 763.4 0.14% 798.4 0.13% 1,141.6 0.17% 945.11 -29.12% 4.59% 42.97% -12.25%
Sorghum 10.1 0.00% 2.2 0.00% 26.6 0.00% 6.0 0.00% 11.20 -78.51% 1128.28% -77.51% 11.22%
Coffee 3,905.9 0.72% 4,416.7 0.81% 5,187.9 0.87% 5,916.2 0.88% 4,856.69 13.08% 17.46% 14.04% 24.34%
Not roasted, not decaffeinated 218.3 0.04% 333.5 0.06% 364.6 0.06% 361.5 0.05% 319.50 52.75% 9.34% -0.86% 46.34%
Not roasted, decaffeinated 1,457.6 0.27% 1,593.4 0.29% 1,902.5 0.32% 2,116.5 0.31% 1,767.48 9.32% 19.40% 11.25% 21.26%
Roasted, not decaffeinated 2,063.5 0.38% 2,279.8 0.42% 2,723.8 0.46% 3,202.5 0.48% 2,567.39 10.48% 19.48% 17.58% 24.42%
Roasted, decaffeinated 131.8 0.02% 179.8 0.03% 170.9 0.03% 197.4 0.03% 169.99 36.39% -4.94% 15.45% 28.93%
Others (instantaneous etc.) 34.7 0.01% 30.2 0.01% 26.1 0.00% 38.4 0.01% 32.33 -12.92% -13.50% 46.94% -6.73%
Banana 99.4 0.02% 88.9 0.02% 59.6 0.01% 86.0 0.01% 83.49 -10.56% -32.92% 44.17% -16.02%
Pineapple 117.5 0.02% 124.6 0.02% 184.7 0.03% 263.4 0.04% 172.56 6.02% 48.25% 42.57% 46.82%
Sugar 9,481.5 1.74% 7,821.2 1.43% 13,878.4 2.33% 19,650.2 2.92% 12,707.81 -17.51% 77.45% 41.59% 34.03%
Raw cane 28.3 0.01% 33.6 0.01% 35.8 0.01% 41.9 0.01% 34.93 18.85% 6.56% 17.05% 23.43%
Molasses 18.5 0.00% 17.2 0.00% 6.3 0.00% 46.3 0.01% 22.08 -7.32% -63.07% 629.86% 19.18%
With flavouring 45.7 0.01% 58.1 0.01% 60.9 0.01% 85.5 0.01% 62.54 27.24% 4.80% 40.31% 36.92%
Others (sugar) 9,389.0 1.73% 7,712.3 1.41% 13,775.3 2.31% 19,476.5 2.89% 12,588.27 -17.86% 78.61% 41.39% 34.07%
Melon 304.3 0.06% 249.9 0.05% 276.3 0.05% 315.6 0.05% 286.52 -17.89% 10.59% 14.22% -5.84%
Palm oil 313.4 0.06% 378.1 0.07% 571.0 0.10% 693.5 0.10% 488.99 20.65% 50.99% 21.46% 56.03%
Living plants, foliage and flowers 12,771.9 2.35% 12,508.0 2.28% 13,531.7 2.27% 15,592.7 2.32% 13,601.10 -2.07% 8.18% 15.23% 6.49%
Bulbs, tubers and roots 3,818.2 0.70% 3,546.3 0.65% 3,984.2 0.67% 4,751.6 0.71% 4,025.09 -7.12% 12.35% 19.26% 5.42%
Other living plants 4,621.5 0.85% 4,781.2 0.87% 5,305.7 0.89% 5,908.6 0.88% 5,154.24 3.45% 10.97% 11.36% 11.53%
Flowers and buds 3,846.5 0.71% 3,683.0 0.67% 3,708.7 0.62% 4,329.3 0.64% 3,891.87 -4.25% 0.70% 16.73% 1.18%
Foliage, leaves and branches 485.7 0.09% 497.6 0.09% 533.1 0.09% 603.3 0.09% 529.90 2.45% 7.15% 13.16% 9.11%
7annexes
 the central american agricultural sector in the run-up to negotiations for the eaa with the european union: potential conflicts and scenarios
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Manioc 4.9 0.00% 3.5 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 4.3 0.00% 4.09 -27.06% 3.12% 17.82% -15.81%
Peanut 38.3 0.01% 48.6 0.01% 47.5 0.01% 69.1 0.01% 50.88 26.82% -2.13% 45.44% 32.86%
Peanut with husk 7.5 0.00% 9.4 0.00% 6.7 0.00% 10.8 0.00% 8.61 24.87% -29.20% 62.10% 14.15%
Without husk, including cracked 30.8 0.01% 39.1 0.01% 40.9 0.01% 58.3 0.01% 42.27 27.30% 4.38% 42.72% 37.45%
Cardamom 5.9 0.00% 3.8 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 4.9 0.00% 4.57 -36.03% -2.18% 31.75% -22.75%
Fruit juices 3,567.3 0.66% 3,588.5 0.65% 3,847.1 0.65% 4,568.7 0.68% 3,892.89 0.59% 7.21% 18.76% 9.13%
Frozen orange juice 131.6 0.02% 126.3 0.02% 115.9 0.02% 134.9 0.02% 127.17 -4.06% -8.21% 16.37% -3.38%
158.5 0.03% 153.4 0.03% 160.5 0.03% 176.3 0.03% 162.19 -3.19% 4.60% 9.84% 2.32%
Other orange juices (concentrated) 158.0 0.03% 143.5 0.03% 201.2 0.03% 293.9 0.04% 199.17 -9.16% 40.14% 46.13% 26.04%
Grapefruit juice 48.8 0.01% 37.6 0.01% 60.8 0.01% 48.7 0.01% 48.97 -22.90% 61.37% -19.92% 0.29%
Citrus juices 189.4 0.03% 196.0 0.04% 214.0 0.04% 239.2 0.04% 209.65 3.49% 9.19% 11.75% 10.69%
Pineapple juice 112.2 0.02% 145.9 0.03% 146.3 0.02% 175.0 0.03% 144.87 30.04% 0.26% 19.57% 29.08%
Tomato juice 38.8 0.01% 36.0 0.01% 31.8 0.01% 33.7 0.01% 35.08 -7.27% -11.46% 5.82% -9.57%
Grape juice 382.3 0.07% 422.8 0.08% 547.3 0.09% 639.4 0.10% 497.95 10.57% 29.45% 16.84% 30.24%
Apple juice 788.4 0.15% 845.0 0.15% 668.5 0.11% 660.5 0.10% 740.61 7.18% -20.88% -1.20% -6.06%
Other fruit or vegetable juice 853.0 0.16% 865.9 0.16% 985.1 0.17% 1,259.7 0.19% 990.90 1.52% 13.76% 27.88% 16.17%
Mixed juices 706.2 0.13% 616.0 0.11% 715.7 0.12% 907.4 0.13% 736.33 -12.76% 16.18% 26.79% 4.27%
Unconcentrated milk 1,887.1 0.35% 1,814.1 0.33% 4,578.8 0.77% 1,842.7 0.27% 2,530.69 -3.87% 152.40% -59.75% 34.10%
With fat content less than 1% 48.6 0.01% 48.9 0.01% 55.4 0.01% 63.7 0.01% 54.17 0.56% 13.37% 14.94% 11.41%
With fat content between 1% and 6% 770.9 0.14% 722.5 0.13% 1,102.7 0.19% 658.6 0.10% 813.66 -6.28% 52.63% -40.28% 5.55%
With fat content higher than 6% 1,067.6 0.20% 1,042.8 0.19% 3,420.6 0.57% 1,120.5 0.17% 1,662.86 -2.33% 228.04% -67.24% 55.76%
Concentrated milk 18,089.4 3.33% 17,530.6 3.20% 16,564.2 2.78% 13,601.5 2.02% 16,446.42 -3.09% -5.51% -17.89% -9.08%
Powdered milk, fat 1.5% or less 4,954.6 0.91% 4,482.8 0.82% 3,420.6 0.57% 1,700.8 0.25% 3,639.71 -9.52% -23.69% -50.28% -26.54%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% without added sugar 9,967.3 1.83% 10,585.3 1.93% 10,730.6 1.80% 9,330.9 1.39% 10,153.52 6.20% 1.37% -13.04% 1.87%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others 78.1 0.01% 79.2 0.01% 28.9 0.00% 30.3 0.00% 54.10 1.37% -63.53% 4.86% -30.72%
Others, with sugar (cream and evaporated) 2,587.9 0.48% 1,924.7 0.35% 2,054.6 0.35% 2,215.6 0.33% 2,195.69 -25.63% 6.75% 7.84% -15.16%
Others (condensed) 501.5 0.09% 458.7 0.08% 329.4 0.06% 323.9 0.05% 403.39 -8.54% -28.17% -1.68% -19.57%
Cheese and cottage cheese 19,855.9 3.65% 20,331.5 3.71% 20,328.7 3.41% 22,081.0 3.28% 20,649.27 2.40% -0.01% 8.62% 4.00%
Fresh cheese 1,332.4 0.25% 1,795.5 0.33% 1,778.1 0.30% 1,853.3 0.28% 1,689.83 34.75% -0.97% 4.23% 26.82%
Grated or powdered cheese 305.2 0.06% 336.4 0.06% 349.8 0.06% 390.1 0.06% 345.38 10.22% 3.97% 11.52% 13.15%
Processed cheese 2,820.1 0.52% 2,739.9 0.50% 2,771.4 0.47% 2,606.0 0.39% 2,734.35 -2.84% 1.15% -5.97% -3.04%
Blue cheese 792.1 0.15% 853.6 0.16% 844.1 0.14% 975.4 0.14% 866.29 7.76% -1.11% 15.56% 9.37%
Other cheeses (fine cheeses) 14,606.1 2.69% 14,606.1 2.66% 14,585.3 2.45% 16,256.1 2.42% 15,013.42 0.00% -0.14% 11.46% 2.79%
Beef 3,231.7 0.59% 3,218.3 0.59% 2,756.2 0.46% 2,668.9 0.40% 2,968.78 -0.41% -14.36% -3.17% -8.14%
Fresh or refrigerated 920.1 0.17% 1,069.5 0.19% 1,370.6 0.23% 1.297.1 0.19% 1,164.34 16.23% 28.16% -5.36% 26.54%
Frozen 2,311.6 0.43% 2,148.9 0.39% 1,385.6 0.23% 1.371.7 0.20% 1,804.44 -7.04% -35.52% -1.00% -21.94%
Pork 15,486.4 2.85% 19,111.5 3.48% 17,852.6 3.00% 20,656.8 3.07% 18,276.81 23.41% -6.59% 15.71% 18.02%
Poultry 5,431.6 1.00% 5,413.4 0.99% 5,342.2 0.90% 4,337.8 0.64% 5,131.24 -0.34% -1.31% -18.80% -5.53%
Onions 1.027.1 0.19% 925.3 0.17% 812.2 0.14% 1,270.1 0.19% 1,008.67 -9.91% -12.23% 56.38% -1.79%
TOTAL PRODUCTS 101,775.1 18.72% 103,407.5 18.85% 111,131.5 18.66% 119,893.6 17.82% 109,051.91 1.60% 7.47% 7.88% 7.15%
TOTAL AGRICULTURE 543,529.0 100.00% 548,468.8 100.00% 595,444.1 100.00% 672,766.9 100.00% 590,052.18 0.91% 8.56% 12.99% 8.56%
TOTAL EXPORTED 8,692,356.6 9,529,250.0 10,531,974.6 11,562,579.7 10,079,040.20 9.63% 10.52% 9.79% 15.95%
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON CE 2007A.
PRODUCTS 2003 P-AGR 2004 P-AGR 2005 P-AGR 2006 P-AGR PROM 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Manioc 4.9 0.00% 3.5 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 4.3 0.00% 4.09 -27.06% 3.12% 17.82% -15.81%
Peanut 38.3 0.01% 48.6 0.01% 47.5 0.01% 69.1 0.01% 50.88 26.82% -2.13% 45.44% 32.86%
Peanut with husk 7.5 0.00% 9.4 0.00% 6.7 0.00% 10.8 0.00% 8.61 24.87% -29.20% 62.10% 14.15%
Without husk, including cracked 30.8 0.01% 39.1 0.01% 40.9 0.01% 58.3 0.01% 42.27 27.30% 4.38% 42.72% 37.45%
Cardamom 5.9 0.00% 3.8 0.00% 3.7 0.00% 4.9 0.00% 4.57 -36.03% -2.18% 31.75% -22.75%
Fruit juices 3,567.3 0.66% 3,588.5 0.65% 3,847.1 0.65% 4,568.7 0.68% 3,892.89 0.59% 7.21% 18.76% 9.13%
Frozen orange juice 131.6 0.02% 126.3 0.02% 115.9 0.02% 134.9 0.02% 127.17 -4.06% -8.21% 16.37% -3.38%
158.5 0.03% 153.4 0.03% 160.5 0.03% 176.3 0.03% 162.19 -3.19% 4.60% 9.84% 2.32%
Other orange juices (concentrated) 158.0 0.03% 143.5 0.03% 201.2 0.03% 293.9 0.04% 199.17 -9.16% 40.14% 46.13% 26.04%
Grapefruit juice 48.8 0.01% 37.6 0.01% 60.8 0.01% 48.7 0.01% 48.97 -22.90% 61.37% -19.92% 0.29%
Citrus juices 189.4 0.03% 196.0 0.04% 214.0 0.04% 239.2 0.04% 209.65 3.49% 9.19% 11.75% 10.69%
Pineapple juice 112.2 0.02% 145.9 0.03% 146.3 0.02% 175.0 0.03% 144.87 30.04% 0.26% 19.57% 29.08%
Tomato juice 38.8 0.01% 36.0 0.01% 31.8 0.01% 33.7 0.01% 35.08 -7.27% -11.46% 5.82% -9.57%
Grape juice 382.3 0.07% 422.8 0.08% 547.3 0.09% 639.4 0.10% 497.95 10.57% 29.45% 16.84% 30.24%
Apple juice 788.4 0.15% 845.0 0.15% 668.5 0.11% 660.5 0.10% 740.61 7.18% -20.88% -1.20% -6.06%
Other fruit or vegetable juice 853.0 0.16% 865.9 0.16% 985.1 0.17% 1,259.7 0.19% 990.90 1.52% 13.76% 27.88% 16.17%
Mixed juices 706.2 0.13% 616.0 0.11% 715.7 0.12% 907.4 0.13% 736.33 -12.76% 16.18% 26.79% 4.27%
Unconcentrated milk 1,887.1 0.35% 1,814.1 0.33% 4,578.8 0.77% 1,842.7 0.27% 2,530.69 -3.87% 152.40% -59.75% 34.10%
With fat content less than 1% 48.6 0.01% 48.9 0.01% 55.4 0.01% 63.7 0.01% 54.17 0.56% 13.37% 14.94% 11.41%
With fat content between 1% and 6% 770.9 0.14% 722.5 0.13% 1,102.7 0.19% 658.6 0.10% 813.66 -6.28% 52.63% -40.28% 5.55%
With fat content higher than 6% 1,067.6 0.20% 1,042.8 0.19% 3,420.6 0.57% 1,120.5 0.17% 1,662.86 -2.33% 228.04% -67.24% 55.76%
Concentrated milk 18,089.4 3.33% 17,530.6 3.20% 16,564.2 2.78% 13,601.5 2.02% 16,446.42 -3.09% -5.51% -17.89% -9.08%
Powdered milk, fat 1.5% or less 4,954.6 0.91% 4,482.8 0.82% 3,420.6 0.57% 1,700.8 0.25% 3,639.71 -9.52% -23.69% -50.28% -26.54%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% without added sugar 9,967.3 1.83% 10,585.3 1.93% 10,730.6 1.80% 9,330.9 1.39% 10,153.52 6.20% 1.37% -13.04% 1.87%
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others 78.1 0.01% 79.2 0.01% 28.9 0.00% 30.3 0.00% 54.10 1.37% -63.53% 4.86% -30.72%
Others, with sugar (cream and evaporated) 2,587.9 0.48% 1,924.7 0.35% 2,054.6 0.35% 2,215.6 0.33% 2,195.69 -25.63% 6.75% 7.84% -15.16%
Others (condensed) 501.5 0.09% 458.7 0.08% 329.4 0.06% 323.9 0.05% 403.39 -8.54% -28.17% -1.68% -19.57%
Cheese and cottage cheese 19,855.9 3.65% 20,331.5 3.71% 20,328.7 3.41% 22,081.0 3.28% 20,649.27 2.40% -0.01% 8.62% 4.00%
Fresh cheese 1,332.4 0.25% 1,795.5 0.33% 1,778.1 0.30% 1,853.3 0.28% 1,689.83 34.75% -0.97% 4.23% 26.82%
Grated or powdered cheese 305.2 0.06% 336.4 0.06% 349.8 0.06% 390.1 0.06% 345.38 10.22% 3.97% 11.52% 13.15%
Processed cheese 2,820.1 0.52% 2,739.9 0.50% 2,771.4 0.47% 2,606.0 0.39% 2,734.35 -2.84% 1.15% -5.97% -3.04%
Blue cheese 792.1 0.15% 853.6 0.16% 844.1 0.14% 975.4 0.14% 866.29 7.76% -1.11% 15.56% 9.37%
Other cheeses (fine cheeses) 14,606.1 2.69% 14,606.1 2.66% 14,585.3 2.45% 16,256.1 2.42% 15,013.42 0.00% -0.14% 11.46% 2.79%
Beef 3,231.7 0.59% 3,218.3 0.59% 2,756.2 0.46% 2,668.9 0.40% 2,968.78 -0.41% -14.36% -3.17% -8.14%
Fresh or refrigerated 920.1 0.17% 1,069.5 0.19% 1,370.6 0.23% 1.297.1 0.19% 1,164.34 16.23% 28.16% -5.36% 26.54%
Frozen 2,311.6 0.43% 2,148.9 0.39% 1,385.6 0.23% 1.371.7 0.20% 1,804.44 -7.04% -35.52% -1.00% -21.94%
Pork 15,486.4 2.85% 19,111.5 3.48% 17,852.6 3.00% 20,656.8 3.07% 18,276.81 23.41% -6.59% 15.71% 18.02%
Poultry 5,431.6 1.00% 5,413.4 0.99% 5,342.2 0.90% 4,337.8 0.64% 5,131.24 -0.34% -1.31% -18.80% -5.53%
Onions 1.027.1 0.19% 925.3 0.17% 812.2 0.14% 1,270.1 0.19% 1,008.67 -9.91% -12.23% 56.38% -1.79%
TOTAL PRODUCTS 101,775.1 18.72% 103,407.5 18.85% 111,131.5 18.66% 119,893.6 17.82% 109,051.91 1.60% 7.47% 7.88% 7.15%
TOTAL AGRICULTURE 543,529.0 100.00% 548,468.8 100.00% 595,444.1 100.00% 672,766.9 100.00% 590,052.18 0.91% 8.56% 12.99% 8.56%
TOTAL EXPORTED 8,692,356.6 9,529,250.0 10,531,974.6 11,562,579.7 10,079,040.20 9.63% 10.52% 9.79% 15.95%
SOURCE: EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON CE 2007A.
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Annex 5. Central America and the EU. Comparison of the revealed comparative  
advantage index
PRODUCTS
EUROPEAN UNION CENTRAL AMERICA
PRODUCTS
VCI VCE RCAI RCAI VCE VCI
Maize 0.117 0.033 -0.084 -0.110 0.003 0.113 Maize
Seed maize 0.020 0.016 -0.004 -0.021 0.002 0.024 Seed maize
Other (white, yellow and others) 0.096 0.017 -0.079 -0.089 0.001 0.090 Other (white, yellow and others)
Palm nut 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.001 Palm nut
Dried beans 0.046 0.004 -0.042 -0.004 0.013 0.017 Dried beans
Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 Beans (green, kidney) vigna mung
Adzuki bean 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.001 Adzuki bean
Phaseolus bean 0.042 0.002 -0.040 -0.010 0.004 0.014 Phaseolus bean
Other beans 0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.002 Other beans
Rice 0.093 0.027 -0.066 -0.045 0.001 0.046 Rice
Paddy rice 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.042 0.000 0.042 Paddy rice
Flaked rice (cargo or brown) 0.059 0.002 -0.057 -0.001 0.000 0.001 Flaked rice (cargo or brown)
Semi-white or white rice 0.024 0.025 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.003 Semi-white or white rice
Split rice 0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 Split rice
Orange 0.084 0.028 -0.056 -0.002 0.001 0.003 Orange
Grapefruit 0.050 0.002 -0.048 0.001 0.001 0.000 Grapefruit
Potato 0.033 0.075 0.042 -0.003 0.002 0.005 Potato
Seed potato 0.000 0.048 0.048 -0.001 0.000 0.002 Seed potato
Other potatoes 0.033 0.027 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.003 Other potatoes
Sorghum 0.014 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 Sorghum
Coffee 0.720 0.141 -0.579 0.461 0.463 0.002 Coffee
Not roasted, not decaffeinated 0.698 0.009 -0.689 0.460 0.461 0.001 Not roasted, not decaffeinated
Not roasted, decaffeinated 0.001 0.051 0.050 0.085 0.085 0.000 Not roasted, decaffeinated
Roasted, not decaffeinated 0.018 0.074 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.000 Roasted, not decaffeinated
Roasted, decaffeinated 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 Roasted, decaffeinated
Others (instantaneous etc.) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Others (instantaneous etc.)
Banana 0.517 0.002 -0.514 0.369 0.375 0.006 Banana
Pineapple 0.096 0.005 -0.091 0.129 0.130 0.001 Pineapple
Sugar 0.283 0.368 0.085 0.153 0.154 0.001 Sugar
Raw cane 0.218 0.001 -0.217 0.144 0.144 0.001 Raw cane
Molasses 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Molasses
With flavouring 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 With flavouring
Others (sugar) 0.064 0.364 0.301 0.010 0.010 0.000 Others (sugar)
Melon 0.044 0.008 -0.036 0.043 0.043 0.001 Melon
Palm oil 0.112 0.014 -0.098 0.037 0.064 0.027 Palm oil
Raw palm oil 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.047 0.010 Raw palm oil
Others (palm oil) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017 Others (palm oil)
Living plants, foliage and flowers 0.260 0.394 0.133 0.077 0.083 0.006 Living plants, foliage and flowers
Bulbs, tubers and roots 0.009 0.117 0.107 -0.003 0.000 0.003 Bulbs, tubers and roots
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PRODUCTS
EUROPEAN UNION CENTRAL AMERICA
PRODUCTS
VCI VCE RCAI RCAI VCE VCI
Other living plants 0.051 0.149 0.098 0.035 0.037 0.002 Other living plants
Flowers and buds 0.146 0.113 -0.034 0.014 0.015 0.001 Flowers and buds
Foliage, leaves and branches 0.054 0.015 -0.039 0.031 0.032 0.000 Foliage, leaves and branches
Manioc 0.020 0.000 -0.020 0.014 0.014 0.000 Manioc
Peanut 0.083 0.001 -0.082 0.013 0.015 0.003 Peanut
Peanut with husk 0.016 0.000 -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 Peanut with husk
Without husk, including cracked 0.068 0.001 -0.067 0.013 0.015 0.002 Without husk, including cracked
Cardamom 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.030 0.030 0.000 Cardamom
Fruit juices 0.262 0.113 -0.150 0.022 0.047 0.026 Fruit juices
Frozen orange juice 0.009 0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 Frozen orange juice
Other orange juices (concentrated) 0.114 0.006 -0.108 -0.004 0.000 0.004 Other orange juices (concentrated)
Tomato juice 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tomato juice
Grape juice 0.001 0.014 0.013 0.000 Grape juice
Apple juice 0.035 0.021 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 Apple juice
Other fruit or vegetable juice 0.024 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.012 0.011 Other fruit or vegetable juice
Mixed juices 0.004 0.021 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.002 Mixed juices
Unconcentrated milk 0.003 0.073 0.071 -0.001 0.005 0.006 Unconcentrated milk
With fat content less than 1% 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 With fat content less than 1%
With fat content between 1%  
and 6%
0.000 0.024 0.023 -0.001 0.004 0.004
With fat content between 1% and 
6%
With fat content higher than 6% 0.002 0.048 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 With fat content higher than 6%
Concentrated milk 0.011 0.476 0.465 -0.040 0.009 0.049 Concentrated milk
Powdered milk. fat 1.5% or less 0.009 0.105 0.097 -0.004 0.001 0.005 Powdered milk, fat 1.5% or less
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5%  
without added sugar
0.001 0.294 0.293 -0.027 0.007 0.035
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% with-
out added sugar
Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 Powdered milk, fat over 1.5% others
Others, with sugar (cream and  
evaporated)
0.001 0.064 0.063 -0.002 0.001 0.003
Others, with sugar (cream and evap-
orated)
Others (condensed) 0.000 0.012 0.011 -0.005 0.000 0.005 Others (condensed)
Cheese and cottage cheese 0.084 0.598 0.513 -0.002 0.014 0.016 Cheese and cottage cheese
Fresh cheese 0.001 0.049 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.001 Fresh cheese
Grated or powdered cheese 0.000 0.010 0.010 -0.005 0.001 0.006 Grated or powdered cheese
Processed cheese 0.004 0.079 0.075 -0.001 0.004 0.006 Processed cheese
Blue cheese 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 Blue cheese
Other cheeses (fine cheeses) 0.079 0.435 0.356 -0.005 0.008 0.012 Other cheeses (fine cheeses)
Beef 0.246 0.086 -0.160 0.030 0.059 0.029 Beef
Fresh or refrigerated 0.162 0.034 -0.128 0.010 0.032 0.022 Fresh or refrigerated
Frozen 0.084 0.052 -0.032 0.019 0.027 0.007 Frozen
Pork 0.024 0.529 0.505 -0.006 0.002 0.009 Pork
Poultry 0.087 0.149 0.062 -0.012 0.002 0.015 Poultry
Onions 0.020 0.029 0.009 -0.002 0.002 0.004 Onions
SOURCE: CEPA EXTRAPOLATION. 
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XI. 3. Comparative 
annex
For the present work, two tables were assembled 
comparing the farming production of the Central 
American and European blocks. The first provides a 
comparison of the products from the export lists of 
both blocks in order to determine the most sensitive 
and important items. This table also includes data 
such as the import tariff rates and the RCAI. The sec-
ond table lists the conflicts that can be identified from 
the former. These are presented in a more reduced 
form in the study’s main text.
Annex 6. Comparative table of sensitive and important products between the EU and Central America.
European Union vs Central America European Union vs Central America
Product
European Union
Revealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(RCA)
Revealed 
comparative 
advantage 
(RCA)
Central America
Product
Subproduct Importance Import tariffs EU CA Protectionism / import tariffs (ACI/DAI) Importance Subproduct
Maize
Seed maize
Total average export of maize between 2003 
and 2006 was €1.47 billion (0.7% of agricul-
tural export). 
Essential as cereal in European production of 
cereals and grains, 18% of produced grains 
(2004).
Seed maize is equivalent to 25%, or € 505 
million.
•
•
•
Tariff-free• -0.004 -0.021
CR: 10-15%
SAL: 5-20%
GUA: 20-35%
HON: 15%
NIC: 10-15%
•
•
•
•
•
Average export between 2003 and 2006 was US$ 
7.3 million
Product for internal consumption
Particularly sensitive for Guatemala 37 million work 
days per year (1998).
Currently being reduced through CAFTA
Seed maize most exported, US$ 4 million
•
•
•
•
•
Seed maize 
(84.2%)
Maize
Other types of 
maize (primarily 
yellow) 
yellow maize equivalent to 74% of European 
exports 
Essential in European diet and food sustain-
ability policy
Compete with US exports through CAFTA
•
•
•
€ 94 per metric ton• -0.079 -0.089
CR: 0%
SAL: 0-15%
GUA: 0-35%
HON: 15%
NIC: 0-15%
•
•
•
•
•
Small and insignificant export amount of US$ 
788,000, though highly protected by Guatemala.
• Other types of 
maize
Palm nut
Average exports of € 3.2 million (insignificant in terms of agricul-
tural exports)
Little value national production
Little importance for production in ACP
•
•
•
Tariff-free• 0.000 0.005 0-5%•
Average exports of US$ 14 million (0.2% of exports), with a growth rate 
of 33%
Important in particular for Honduras with 21 million in 2006 
2.67 million metric tons of production
•
•
•
Palm nut
Dried beans
Phaseolus beans, 
white beans
Average exports of  € 78.4 million
63 million are this type of bean, equal to 
82.7%
•
•
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
Tariff-free
•
•
-0.040 -0.010 15%•
US$ 44 million in exports
Less than US$ 1 million exports to EU
Second highest exports at almost US$ 8 million
•
•
•
Phaseolus 
beans, white 
beans
Dried beans
Adzuki beans, 
kidney beans Exports low, around € 400,000 in 2006• Tariff-free• 0.000 0.007 15%•
Adzuki beans are equivalent to 81.6% of total ex-
ports of dried beans, or RS$ 36 million
• Adzuki beans, 
kidney beans
Rice
Paddy rice
The EU exported € 915 million of rice in 
2006, equal to 0.3%.
Paddy rice also produces € 112 million in 
exports
•
•
Tariff of 7.7% for 
paddy rice
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
• -0.001 -0.042
CR: 35%
SAL: 0-40%
GUA: 0-237%
HON: 0-45%
NIC: 20-45%
•
•
•
•
•
579,000 tons of rice produced over the year, princi-
pally in NIC and CR
Produces US$ 199,000 of paddy rice
•
•
Paddy rice
Rice
White or pro-
cessed rice
Principally semi-white or white rice with 70%, 
€ 640 million. Exports US$ 76 million to the 
world
Tariff-free access for ACP countries, though 
does not include precooked, white or semi-
white rice
•
•
€ 211 per metric ton
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
• 0.001 -0.002
CR: 35%
SAL: 40%
GUA: 118-237%
HON: 45%
NIC: 60%
•
•
•
•
•
CA’s main production of rice is semi-white with US$ 
1.4 million and split rice with US$1.2 million
Total exportation of rice is 2 million
•
•
White rice
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Orange
EU exported € 1.2 billion in oranges in 2006, with 0.4% of total
Exports just € 108 million outside the EU, hence more used on the 
internal market
•
•
Depends on the value 
of the export price, 
16% + € 0.7 to 7.1/
kg
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
-0.056 -0.002 15%•
US$ 1.1 million in exports in 2006, relatively insignificant
Entered into decline following CAFTA.
Value for internal production of juices
•
•
•
Orange
Potato Exports worth € 1.6 billion, principally non-seed potatoes, 0.6% of 
agricultural production
•
5.8% to 11.5% when 
potato like exported 
kind, 4.5% for seed 
potato
Tariff-free through 
GSP
•
•
0.042 -0.00
CR: 45%
SAL: 15%
GUA: 15%
HON: 15%
NIC: 15%
•
•
•
•
•
US$ 5.7 million in exports and in decline
Sensitive product in Costa Rica and subject to a degree of 
protectionism
•
• Potato
Coffee
EU exports € 4 billion in coffee, most of which is directed towards 
internal consumption and comprises re-exported products
Likewise, exports are based on roasted and processed coffee 
rather than raw product
•
•
Between 7.5 and 
11.5% according to 
the degree of pro-
cessing
Unroasted coffee 
enters tariff-free
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
•
•
-0.57 0.461 Uniform tariff  of 15%
•
CA’s main export product. US$ 1.5 billion, 8.9% of total
Main export product to EU. US$ 700.3 million, 30.7% of total
Main export product to CA-4
99% of exported coffee is unroasted and non-decaffeinated
•
•
•
•
Coffee
Banana
EU exports € 1.6 billion in banana for internal consumption, but 
exports just € 8 million outside the EU, plus re-exports a significant 
portion 
The ACP countries export € 503.9 million, 1.4% of export total, 
fourth agricultural product in importance, essential for Africa and 
Caribbean, which have a quota of exports to supply the market 
•
•
Tariff of € 680 per 
1000 kg net
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
-0.514 0.6 Uniform tariff  of 15%
• Third largest export product to world. US$ 1 billion, 6.2% of totalSecond largest export product to EU. € 317.1 million, 13.9% of total
Important for Costa Rica, which exports 94.8% of CA total to EU
•
•
•
Banana
Pineapple
Exports US$ 431 million in pineapple, however only US$ 26 million 
are for exports outside the EU, making it a product for internal 
consumption
For ACP signifies € 158 million, 0.5% of Africa’s total, no preferen-
tial treatment
•
•
Tariff of 5.8% for 
agricultural export
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.01 0.12
Uniform tariff  
of 15% 
•
Seventh largest export product US$ 461.3 million, 2.8% of total
Third largest export product to EU. US$ 228.1 million, 10% of total
Highest importance for Costa Rica,  94.2% of CA exports to world and 
94.5% of total to EU
•
•
• Pineapple
Sugarcane
EU is world’s biggest exporter of white sugar, equivalent to € 4 
billion in 2006, 1.5% of total production
Its production of sugar is derived from beetroot not sugarcane
Key product for the CAP
Some ACP countries produce sugar within agreements with the 
EU with which they obtain  market export quotas
Emphasis on production of refined sugar, 95% of exports
•
•
•
•
•
Tariff base of €33.9 
to 41.9 per 100 kg, 
additional protection 
tariffs, €419/MT for 
raw sugar, €339/MT 
+ €115/MT for re-
fined sugar
Not included in GSP-
Plus 
Free export quotas 
for ACP
High level of agricul-
tural subsidies
•
•
•
•
0.05 0.15
CR 45%
GUA 20%
NIC 55%
SAL-HON 40%
•
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 503 million to the world, 7.1% of agricultural exports. 
One of the main products.
However CA only exports US$ 5 million to EU.
Important at regional level as one of the top ten export products
High national protectionism
•
•
•
•
Sugarcane
Melon EU exports € 31 million of melon per year with a value lower than 
0.1% of agricultural exports
•
Tariff of 8.8%.
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.06 0.04 Uniform tariff of 15%
• Exports of US$ 122 million, 1.7% of agricultural exports, important product
Costa Rica controls a significant part, US$ 84 million
•
•
Melon
Palm oil
EU exported 682 million in 2006, 0.2% of its agricultural exports, 
with only 69 million exported outside the EU, meaning the product 
is mainly for internal consumption
Principal importer of raw palm oil, mainly for use in biodiesel
•
•
Granted an import 
tariff of 3.8%
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.0 0.07 Uniform tariff of 5%• Exported US$ 170 million in 2006, 2.4% of total exports• Palm oil
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US$ 1.1 million in exports in 2006, relatively insignificant
Entered into decline following CAFTA.
Value for internal production of juices
•
•
•
Orange
Potato Exports worth € 1.6 billion, principally non-seed potatoes, 0.6% of 
agricultural production
•
5.8% to 11.5% when 
potato like exported 
kind, 4.5% for seed 
potato
Tariff-free through 
GSP
•
•
0.042 -0.00
CR: 45%
SAL: 15%
GUA: 15%
HON: 15%
NIC: 15%
•
•
•
•
•
US$ 5.7 million in exports and in decline
Sensitive product in Costa Rica and subject to a degree of 
protectionism
•
• Potato
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internal consumption and comprises re-exported products
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•
•
Between 7.5 and 
11.5% according to 
the degree of pro-
cessing
Unroasted coffee 
enters tariff-free
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
•
•
-0.57 0.461 Uniform tariff  of 15%
•
CA’s main export product. US$ 1.5 billion, 8.9% of total
Main export product to EU. US$ 700.3 million, 30.7% of total
Main export product to CA-4
99% of exported coffee is unroasted and non-decaffeinated
•
•
•
•
Coffee
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Caribbean, which have a quota of exports to supply the market 
•
•
Tariff of € 680 per 
1000 kg net
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
-0.514 0.6 Uniform tariff  of 15%
• Third largest export product to world. US$ 1 billion, 6.2% of totalSecond largest export product to EU. € 317.1 million, 13.9% of total
Important for Costa Rica, which exports 94.8% of CA total to EU
•
•
•
Banana
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are for exports outside the EU, making it a product for internal 
consumption
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tial treatment
•
•
Tariff of 5.8% for 
agricultural export
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.01 0.12
Uniform tariff  
of 15% 
•
Seventh largest export product US$ 461.3 million, 2.8% of total
Third largest export product to EU. US$ 228.1 million, 10% of total
Highest importance for Costa Rica,  94.2% of CA exports to world and 
94.5% of total to EU
•
•
• Pineapple
Sugarcane
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Its production of sugar is derived from beetroot not sugarcane
Key product for the CAP
Some ACP countries produce sugar within agreements with the 
EU with which they obtain  market export quotas
Emphasis on production of refined sugar, 95% of exports
•
•
•
•
•
Tariff base of €33.9 
to 41.9 per 100 kg, 
additional protection 
tariffs, €419/MT for 
raw sugar, €339/MT 
+ €115/MT for re-
fined sugar
Not included in GSP-
Plus 
Free export quotas 
for ACP
High level of agricul-
tural subsidies
•
•
•
•
0.05 0.15
CR 45%
GUA 20%
NIC 55%
SAL-HON 40%
•
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 503 million to the world, 7.1% of agricultural exports. 
One of the main products.
However CA only exports US$ 5 million to EU.
Important at regional level as one of the top ten export products
High national protectionism
•
•
•
•
Sugarcane
Melon EU exports € 31 million of melon per year with a value lower than 
0.1% of agricultural exports
•
Tariff of 8.8%.
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.06 0.04 Uniform tariff of 15%
• Exports of US$ 122 million, 1.7% of agricultural exports, important product
Costa Rica controls a significant part, US$ 84 million
•
•
Melon
Palm oil
EU exported 682 million in 2006, 0.2% of its agricultural exports, 
with only 69 million exported outside the EU, meaning the product 
is mainly for internal consumption
Principal importer of raw palm oil, mainly for use in biodiesel
•
•
Granted an import 
tariff of 3.8%
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• -0.0 0.07 Uniform tariff of 5%• Exported US$ 170 million in 2006, 2.4% of total exports• Palm oil
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Living 
plants, 
foliage and 
flowers
Bulbs, tubers and 
roots
EU exported US$ 895 million, 0.3% of total 
agricultural exports
Mainly in flower bulbs
•
•
Tariff of 5.1% in gen-
eral except for tulips 
at 9.6%.
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
•
0.107 -0.00 Exempt from uni-form tariff
• US$ 322,000 of exports, relatively unimportant for 
CA, little significance in agricultural exports
• Bulbs, tubers 
and roots
Living 
plants, 
foliage and 
flowers
Flowers and buds
EU exported € 3.8 billion in flowers, 1.3% of 
agricultural exports
ACP countries export 353 million per year, 
especially East Africa and RSA
•
•
Tariff varies seasonally 
between 8.5% and 
12%
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
•
-0.04 0.014 Uniform tariff of 15%
• Exported US$ 43 million in 2006, 0.6% of total.• Flowers and buds
Foliage, leaves 
and branches
Exported € 2.7 billion in 2006, 1% of total 
agricultural exports
•
Free for lichens and 
from 2.5% to 5% for 
other plants
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
•
-0.0 0.01 Uniform tariff of 15%
• Most exports in plants: US$ 87 million, 1.2% of 
total agricultural exports
• Foliage and 
branches
Other living plants Exported € 2.8 billion in 2006, 1% of total 
agricultural exports
•
Between 6.5% and 
8.3% for all goods
Tariff-free through 
GSP-Plus
•
• 0.0 0.05
0-10% (only in  
seedlings and 
tobacco)
• CA exported US$ 100 million in these goods, 1.4% 
of total agricultural exports
• Other living 
plants
Manioc
Exports € 463 million, equivalent to 0.2% of total agricultural ex-
ports
Also produces other related goods
Establishes a safeguard of 6% at the discretion of EU authorities
•
•
•
Fixed tariff of 
€9.5/100kg.
ACP countries only 
obtain a reduction of 
€ 8.3 euros per 100 
kg
Not included in GSP
•
•
•
-0.020 0.014 Uniform tariff of 15%
•
US$ 35.5 million, 0.5% of agricultural exports
Costa Rica exports US$ 34.4 million in manioc to the world (96%) and 
all manioc to the EU (US$ 35.5 million)
EU exports show a continuing fall
•
•
•
Manioc
Peanut
Exports € 92 million in peanuts, making it an important part of total 
exports and concentrated on shelled peanuts
Just € 6 million are exported outside the EU which means part of 
this volume may be re-exportation 
•
•
Exempt from paying 
the common tariff
• -0.02 0.01 Uniform tariff of 10%
•
Exports US$ 42.6 million to the world, 0.6% of total agricultural ex-
ports, US$ 10.7 million to the EU 
Nicaragua is extremely important, producing US$ 42.3 million for ex-
portation
•
• Peanut
Cardamom
EU exports € 2.98 billion of cardamom in 2006, though just € 
488,000 outside the EU.
ACP countries send a small amount from CARICOM, 1.9% of total 
exports
•
•
Exempt from paying 
the common tariff
• -0.001 0.00 Uniform tariff of 15%
•
US$ 83.4 million to the world, 1.2% of agricultural exports
A very small amount is exported to the EU
Guatemala accounts for almost all exports with US$ 83.4 million to the 
world, including US% 2 million to the EU
•
•
• Cardamom
Fruit juices
Orange juice
EU exported € 1.69 billion in different forms 
of orange juice
The main form was concentrated orange juice
•
•
Subject to a percent-
age tariff of 15% to 
33% and a weight 
tariff of € 20.6 per 
100 kg net
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
-0.150 0.022
CA imposes 15% 
on unfrozen
0% on frozen, 
though HON im-
poses 30%
•
•
CA exported US$ 161.4 million to the world, 2.3% 
of farming exports
CR concentrates the market with US$ 49.9, HON, 
US$ 1 million of US$ 50 million exported to the EU
•
• Orange juice
Fruit juices
Other juices
EU exported almost € 2.46 billion in 2006 in 
other fruit juices, in particular apple juice with 
€ 782 million
•
Variable tariffs for all 
juices according to 
level of production
Between 14 and 18% 
fixed and € 20.6 per 
100 kg net according 
to degree of process-
ing
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
•
CA imposes ACI 
uniformly
Between 0 and 
15% according to 
degree of process-
ing
•
•
CA exported more than US$ 60 million in a variety 
of juices
Concentrates on various fruit or vegetable juices, 
comprising US$ 40 million
•
• Other juices
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Dairy 
produce
Unconcentrated 
milk
EU exported € 3.34 billion in 2006, equivalent 
to 1.2% of total agricultural exports
•
Between € 12.9/TM 
and € 182/TM
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
0.071 -0.001
CR: 65%
SAL: 40%
HON: 35%
GUA-NIC: 15%
•
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 14 million in 2006, accounting for 
0.2% of total agricultural exports
• Unconcentrated 
milk
Dairy pro-
duce
Concentrated 
milk
Includes powdered, skimmed, evaporated 
and condensed milk
EU exported € 3.59 billion in 2006, equivalent 
to 1.2% of total agricultural exports
•
•
Between € 1,.9 and 
130.4 per 100 kg of 
powdered milk
Between 34.7 and 
183.7 per 100 kg of 
other types
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
•
0.465 -0.040
CR: 65%
NIC: 60%
SAL-HON-GUA: 
15-20%
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 36 million in 2006, equivalent to 
0.5% of total agricultural exports
• Concentrated 
milk
Cheeses
Includes fresh cheese, as well as powdered, 
grated, processed and blue and fine cheeses
The EU exported € 11.7 billion in 2006, com-
prising 4.1% of agricultural exports
The main subproduct is fine cheese, account-
ing for € 7.6 billion this year, 67% of the total
•
•
•
From € 139.9 to 215 
per 100 kg net in the 
case of the first types
Between € 151, 167 
and 188 per 100 kg 
net for fine cheeses
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
•
0.51 -0.002
CR: 65-50% be-
tween fresh and 
fine cheeses
SAL: 40%
GUA: 15%
HON: 15-35% (fine 
cheese)
NIC: 35-40%
•
•
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 48 million in 2006, equivalent to 
0.7%
Mainly fine cheeses with almost US$ 30 million
Uncompetitive and highly protected product, with 
potential for conflict
•
•
•
Cheeses
Meat
Beef
EU exported € 7.5 billion in 2006, 2.6% of 
total agricultural exports
Mainly fresh meat, € 6.66 million, 88.6% of 
the total
•
•
Two tariff rates, one 
at  € 12.8 and the 
other between € 176 
and 303 per 100 kg
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
-0.160 0.00
NIC-HON: 30%
GUA-SAL-CR: 
15%
•
•
CA exported US$ 181 million, equivalent to 2.5% of 
total agricultural exports
Exports are butchered, fresh and congealed
Particularly important for Nicaragua which pos-
sesses advantages
•
•
•
Beef
Meat
Pork EU exported € 10.35 billion in 2006, 3.6% of 
total agricultural exports
•
From € 46 to 86 per 
100 kg net, the tariff 
rises with the degree 
of processing
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
0.505 -0.006
CR: 45%
NIC: 40%
GUA-HON-SAL: 
15%
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 9 million in 2006, equivalent to 
0.1% of total agricultural exports
• Pork
Poultry EU exported € 2.989 billion of poultry in 2006, 1.1% of total agricultural exports
•
Between € 26 and 
32 per 100 kg net, for 
cuts
€ 102 per 100 kg net 
for deboned poultry
Not included in GSP-
Plus
•
•
•
0.062 -0.012
Varies greatly ac-
cording to the type 
of cut (dark cuts 
are higher)
CRC: up to 150%
SAL-NIC-HON: up 
to 164%
 GUA: 5-15%
•
•
•
•
CA exported US$ 6 million in 2006, equivalent to 
0.1% of total agricultural exports. Faces a negative 
growth rate
Highly protected according to the type of cut
•
•
Poultry
Onions EU exported € 492 million in 2006, equivalent to 0.2% of total 
agricultural production
•
Single tariff of 9.6% 
on import price
Tariff-free for CA 
through GSP-Plus
•
• 0.00 -0.002
CR: 45%
CA-4: 15%
•
•
CA exported just US$ 4 million in 2006, equivalent to 0.1% of total 
agricultural exports
Product highly protected and sensitive in Costa Rica
•
•
Onions
SOURCE: CEPA EXTRAPOLATION BASED ON SIECA 2007A; EC 2007A AND BITD 2006.
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Annex 7. Distribution of agricultural products according to the level of conflicts  
expected between the blocks
Product
Explanation Interests in conflict
Very probable conflicts Very probable conflicts
Banana
Central America and especially Costa Rica (the world’s second biggest exporter) are net exporters of 
banana, generating US$ 1.02 billion in 2006 and highly competitive (0.369)
European production of banana is uncompetitive (-0.514) though highly protected, with very high 
import tariffs (€ 630/MT).
It also offers some protection to its former colonies of the ACP, providing preferential quotas
The EU absorbs bananas from CA and other countries, but applies import quotas, meaning entry is 
always limited
Banana as a product has involved conflicts in the past
Central America aims towards an opening of the European market, primarily through a complete 
lifting of customs barriers
The EU aims to gain freer access to the CA and CAN, recognizing that its products are highly com-
petitive and their exports would be more profitable than to ACP countries, particularly CARICOM, 
where its market advantages have been removed (PWC and Solagral 2005).
Sugarcane
Central American is a net exporter, generating US$ 503 million in 2006. The product is also highly 
competitive
The EU has a very high production of sugarcane and is the world’s largest exporter; the difference in 
comparison to CA is that the latter exports the product raw while the EU exports only the processed 
product (white sugar). However, the production of beetroot and sugarcane in the EU could be heavily 
affected by competition, meaning very high import tariffs exist
The EU offers preferential export quotas to ACP countries ACP and India through bilateral agree-
ments and other EAAs
For CA the product has a double value. Although an important export product in the form of sugar, 
cane as a raw material for producing biofuels is also important. Increased liberalization of the EU 
market is anticipated in this area
The EU will look to protect the sugar farming sector, especially if this receives significant and powerful 
lobbying; however, it may show a more flexible stance in relation to biofuels
Dairy produce
The EU is a net exporter of dairy produce, especially milk – in particular in powdered form – and fine 
cheeses. This is achieved through the use of high subsidies for its internal production and consider-
able protection against foreign competition
CA has a less competitive dairy sector, although it manages to export in certain areas, which inciden-
tally are the same as were the EU is strong (cheese and processed dairy produce). Nonetheless its 
dairy sector is strongly protected from European imports, especially in Costa Rica (between 50% and 
65%), Nicaragua (between 15% and 60%) and El Salvador (between 15% and 40%)
The EU will probably seek trade openings for this sector, achieving parity with the access obtained by 
the USA
Central America adopted a posture of liberalization over very long periods (almost 20 years) and in-
cluding safeguard measures in its negotiations with the USA, taking into account that its dairy sector 
is relatively uncompetitive at international level. It may therefore be reluctant to negotiate trade open-
ings with the EU
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CA has a less competitive dairy sector, although it manages to export in certain areas, which inciden-
tally are the same as were the EU is strong (cheese and processed dairy produce). Nonetheless its 
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ings with the EU
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Product Probable conflicts Probable conflicts
Meat
The meat sector, especially beef, is highly competitive for Central America, especially Nicaragua. In 2006 
it exported US$ 181 million, equivalent to 2.5% of total agricultural exports
In contrast, this situation is not found in the pork and poultry sectors, where regional exports are insignifi-
cant. However, the sectors are subject to high tariff protections
The EU’s meat exports are primarily directed towards the internal market; in the case of beef 96.5% of 
exports, poultry 90% and pork 80%. However, pork exports are very high (US$ 2 billion)
The main problem is in relation to meat cuts; CA is more competitive in fine cuts than the EU, but at the 
same time ‘dark’ cuts are less favoured in the EU, meaning that they enter CA in more competitive form
Both blocks impose high tariffs on meat imports
Central America would expect to obtain trade openings in the beef sector, but some degree of protec-
tion in the pork and poultry sector
The EU will probably seek a degree of protectionism in the beef and poultry sectors, but more opening in 
the pork sector
Since the conflicts between the two blocks are not likely to be so large and that the production of one 
block substitutes the production of the other in a specific area in which the economies are not them-
selves competitive, it is probable that there would not be a great problem in the EU gaining CAFTA parity 
in this area
Manioc
A very important export product for Costa Rica, although it faces a tariff of € 9.5 per 100 kg and is im-
ported through a small quota in contrast to the benefit obtained by some Southeast Asian countries
Costa Rica will probably seek a higher quota for the product so that it can export larger quantities at a 
lower tariff
The EU will probably allowing openings to the point that it does not threaten other sources of the prod-
uct or the limit offered to the ACP block for which the tariff was reduced to € 8.3
Potato
A domestically important product, especially for Costa Rica; exports are not very strong and the product 
is heavily protected through price controls and very high import tariffs
An important export product for the EU 
Costa Rica will aim to keep its protective import tariffs, the sector has declared itself in favour of exclud-
ing the same
The EU would prefer to greater trade openings to be able to export its surpluses
Onions
A domestically important product, especially for Costa Rica; exports are not very strong and the product 
is heavily protected through price controls and very high import tariffs
An important export product for the EU
Costa Rica will aim to keep its protective import tariffs, the sector has declared itself in favour of exclud-
ing the same
The EU would prefer to greater trade openings to be able to export its surpluses
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Product Unlikely conflicts Unlikely conflicts
Coffee
Although Central America’s main export product to the world and to the EU, almost all the exported 
amount comprises unroasted and undecaffeinated coffee (99.6%); in the case of the EU, it is comprised 
of unroasted, decaffeinated coffee (41.4%) or roasted undecaffeinated coffee (44.1%), meaning there is 
little risk of confrontation
On the contrary, Central American coffee serves to provide the EU with the possibility of processing and 
selling it with a higher added value abroad
The product exported by CA enters as a sensitive good within the GSP, meaning it is exempted from the 
ad valorem tariff.
Central American interests are aimed at maintaining the GSP-Plus advantages
The EU has other, more important interests and requires the exportation of unprocessed coffee to main-
tain its own exports of the processed product; hence it is very unlikely to cause a premeditated conflict 
in relation to this product
Fruit	juices
Both regions have highly competitive industries, although only the EU has high levels of protection in this 
area. However, seen in more broken down form, CA specializes in certain vegetable juices or specific fruit 
juices, while the EU specializes in apple and grape juices, meaning that no conflict is anticipated in these 
sectors. On the other hand, orange juice maintains a greater potential for conflict between the blocks
The interests of both blocks will be to exploit their respective specialist produce for exportation, except in 
the case of orange juice
Cardamom
An important product for Guatemala, which exports almost all the product from CA to the EU
The EU produces very little cardamom and exports an insignificant amount, meaning that demand is met 
from outside the EU and receives complete exemption from tariffs through GSP-Plus
If CA looks to maintain the exemption and free access of the product to the EU, it is unlikely that the 
European block will threaten its free entry
Peanut
An essential product for Nicaragua which exports almost all the product from CA to the EU
For the EU, peanut exports are high, but very little is exported outside the EU (€7 million). It currently offers 
a tariff-free regime
Nicaragua will probably look to maintain free access in the negotiations. It is relatively unimportant for the 
EU, meaning that this aim is not expected to meet any problems
Palm	oil
Essential for the EU, especially due to its importance in biofuel production; it should be stressed that the 
block is a net importer of the product
An important product for CA in terms of exports; it could benefit from the EU’s interest in importing raw 
material for non-fossil fuels
Both blocks will probably maintain the tariff-free scheme currently in operation in order to favour their 
trade and production interests
Pineapple
For CA, pineapple is an important export product, comprising 6.5% of agricultural exports
For the EU, pineapple is a non-essential product whose exportation outside the block is insignificant; it 
relies on CA to supply some of the internal demand
The product is included in the EU’s generalized preferences scheme (GSP-Plus), meaning it enters virtu-
ally tariff-free; no conflicts are anticipated in this area
Melon
For CA, melon is an important export product, comprising 1.7% of agricultural exports
For the EU, melon is a non-essential product whose exportation outside the block is insignificant; it relies 
on CA to supply some of the internal demand
The product is included in the EU’s generalized preferences scheme (GSP-Plus), meaning it enters virtu-
ally tariff-free; no conflicts are anticipated in this area
Orange
For CA its importance is internal, as in the EU case, since of the € billion produced, only € 100 million are 
exported outside the region
Central American production is directed towards internal consumption and supplying the fruit juice indus-
try, which is far more competitive
Both blocks will aim for market liberalization, since their mutual idea is to supply their own agroindustries 
with this product as an input
Dried	beans
For CA, dried beans include some products less important than other fruits and vegetables; exports are 
equivalent to 0.6% of agricultural exports
For the EU, dried beans are a non-essential product whose exportation outside the block is insignificant; 
it relies on CA to supply some of the internal demand
The product is included in the EU’s generalized preferences scheme (GSP-Plus), meaning it enters virtu-
ally tariff-free; no conflicts are anticipated in this area
Palm	nut
Although important for CA (0.4% of agricultural exports), this is not the case for the EU, whose imports 
are fairly low
The EU will probably maintain the entry benefits on this specific product
Maize
The sector has already been strongly affected by CAFTA-DR and the importation of maize from the USA. 
No additional impact is expected with the EU; on the contrary, it may act as a competitor for the USA
Maize retains a value as a biofuel along with sugarcane and palm oil; the region is likely to take this 
course of action
A conflict in relation to trade opening is not anticipated
Rice
Relatively uncompetitive for both sectors, both of which direct their production towards their internal 
markets
The most likely outcome is that the market is opened to allow access to the imported product for CA, 
although European interest in taking this course of action is not expected to be great
SOURCE: PRODUCED By CEPA.
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X. 4. Annex of Economic Association  
Agreements
Annex 8. Comparative analysis of the Trade Association Agreements between the EU  
and Chile and the EU and Mexico 
Main features Main features
General provisions Chile Mexico
General	description/	
implementation
Trade Association Agreement between Chile and the EU. It came into force in 2003 (in partial 
form). it is now in full operation.
Economic Association, Political Harmonization and Cooperation Agreement. Also called the Global Agreement 
(AGMUE). Came into force in 2000.
Agreed	objectives
The ultimate aim of this association is to achieve: reciprocity, respect for the common interests 
of both parties and a deepening of relations in all areas. It has an evolving nature (meaning that 
it is revised and changed over time). The three fundamental pillars of this agreement are:
Deepen the political dialogue in bilateral, multilateral and international matters.
Strengthen cooperation, especially in the areas of economics, politics, society, science and 
technology, education and culture, state reform and public administration.
Expand and diversify the economic exchanges
–
–
–
The objective of this agreement is to establish a more balanced framework of relations. Likewise it also aims to 
ensure reciprocal access to the EU and Mexican markets, consolidate deeper economic integration that will in-
volve trade in goods and services, capital movements, public purchases, protection of intellectual property and 
conflict resolution. The three pillars sustaining this agreement are to:
Obtain and consolidate an economic association between the nations.
Develop a political dialogue of harmonization of interests among the countries.
Achieve  cooperation between the countries in various areas: trade, politics, economics and education, 
among others.
–
–
–
Political	institutionality
Political dialogue (democracy, human rights, rule of law, international peace and security).
Institutional framework:
Association Council (executive body; supervises application of the treaty)
Association Committee (responsible for general application of the agreement)
Parliamentary Association Committee (composed of parliamentary members from both 
parties; holds annual meetings)
Consultative Committee (business and workers; responsible for attending meetings of the 
Association Council to promote dialogue between the different parts. Has not been pos-
sible to set up due to the lack of a Chilean forum of business and workers, similar to the 
EU’s EESC)
Conflict Resolution Mechanism (list of 15 arbitrators: 5 appointed by each party and 5 by 
mutual accord)
Civil Society (pending)
–
–
–
–
–
–
Democracy: Democratic clause that sustains the Agreement (not applied in practice).
Institutional framework:
Joint Agreement Council (governing body of the trade negotiations)
Joint Committee (responsible for the trade regulations)
Special Committee for Customs Cooperation
Special Committee for Technical Norms and Regulations
Special Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Special Committee for Public Sector Purchases
Special Committee for Financial Services
Special Committee for Liquor Protection
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Negotiation	process
Due to its joint nature, only those agreements that did not need national ratification (EU) were 
applied from February 1st 2003:
Institutional framework
Trade in goods
Liberalization program
Trade disciplines
Public contracting
Conflict resolution mechanism
Cooperation in the previous areas
Om March 1st 2005, following the process of ratification of ‘the Fifteen,’ the treaty came into 
full effect (Chile and the 25 European countries):
Political dialogue
Trade in services and financial services
Establishment (investments)
International payments
Intellectual property
Competition
Cooperation in these areas
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Negotiations began in 1997. In April 1998, the Mexican Congress and the EU authorities ratified the process and 
trade negotiations began via the Joint Council. Until 2001, time of the ratification of the Association Agreement by 
the European Union’s Council of Ministers, the chapters related to the following came into effect:
Trade in services
Payments
Investments
Capital movements
Intellectual property
–
–
–
–
–
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Main features Main features
General provisions Chile Mexico
Economic	Trade	
Environments
Access to markets
Customs procedures
Rules of origin
Sanitary and phytosanitary norms
Technical norms and standards
Services
Financial services
Investments
Wines and liquors
Trade policy
Trade defence
Intellectual property
Public sector purchases
Conflict resolution
Transparency
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Access to markets
Rules of origin
Technical norms
Sanitary and phytosanitary norms
Safeguards
Investments and related payments
Trade in services
Public sector purchases
Competition
Intellectual property
Conflict resolution
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Commercial	safeguards	
and	tariff	elimination	
periods
The following are applicable:
Stand still clause (prohibition on creating new obstacles to entry of Chilean exports).
Evolving clause (liberalizing revision every 3 years concerning product tariffs).
Maintenance of draw-back* for 4 years to EU
Asymmetry in tariff elimination periods:
Chile: 0, 5, 7 and 10 years
EU: 0, 3, 4, 7 and 10 years
Total or partial elimination of specific tariffs, agricultural quotas freed 
Includes special agricultural safeguards
•
•
•
•
–
–
•
•
Bilateral in response to sudden and substantial increases in imports resulting from the treaty; Global Safeguard, 
which will be adopted in the face of sudden increases in imports coming from the rest of the world. Asymmetry in 
tariff elimination periods:
EU: total elimination of tariffs after 3 years of agreement coming into force (from 2003).
Mexico: three stages according to the category of products from the Mexico Tariff Elimination Schedule (to 
2007).
Reduction or elimination of processed agricultural tariffs.
Prohibition on applying different quotas or measures in the quantitative tariffs to those in effect.
Scarcity clause. 
–
–
–
–
–
Farming	sector
On agricultural products:
Quotas for red meats (1,000 tons), white meats (7,250 tons), pork (3,500 tons), lamb (2,000 
tons) and dairy produce.
Most favoured fruits:
Apples and grapes in immediate tariff elimination.
Sensitive products duly safeguarded (dairy produce)
95% of the agricultural products exported from Mexico to the EU receive preferential access; however, there are 
sensitive products on waiting lists: cereals: maize, wheat, barley, beans, flour. Dairy produce: cheeses, milk. Meat 
products: offal, entrails (pigs, sheep, goats, poultry, etc.). Sugar, chocolates and temperate fruits. 
Agroindustry
Most products on list of immediate tariff elimination and 4 years (fruit juices, tomato concen-
trates, fruit jams).
86% of the agroindustrial products from Mexico entered the EU tax free in 2003. 
Tariff elimination period of 8 years on tropical fruit and grapefruit juices.
Application	of	trade		
discipline	
Rules of origin
Customs issues
Technical norms
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
Safeguards
Antidumping
Public contracting
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Rules of origin
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
Safeguards
Compensatory or antidumping quotas
Customs tariffs
WTO technical norms of agreement
–
–
–
–
–
–
Commercial	conflicts
 Due to problems outside their mutual trade, the EU and Chile have had to include situations 
related to safeguard measures, as stipulated in the norms of the WTO.
Imports of salmon and fish meal
Both situations have resulted from the consultation process that allowed the agreement to be 
institutionalized
•
– None observed.
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Main features Main features
General provisions Chile Mexico
Cooperation
35 areas:
Economic cooperation (18 areas)
Cooperation in science, technology and information society (2 areas)
Culture, education and audiovisual (3 areas)
Social cooperation
Other areas
•
•
•
•
•
On the following themes:
Economics
Customs
technical norms
State purchasing techniques
Information and scientific technologies
In its chapter on cooperation, the Global Agreement includes 29 different areas, ranging from industrial coopera-
tion, encouraging investments and PyMES, knowledge society, refuge and human rights, to cooperation in the 
farming sector, poverty and healthcare. The funds targeted at Mexico are small (€56 million for the 2002-2006 
period, which represents 4.5% of the funds targeted at Latin America).
Local	exports
Chile’s exports
Copper: main product.
Other exports:
Most dynamic products: 
Wine, molybdenum, wood pulp, methanol, fruits, poultry, timber, card, seafood and seed 
maize.
Diversification (new products): manufactured (boats, vehicles, shrimps and langoustines, 
salt, combed wool, curry, turbojets, drilling tubes, injection ampoules, trousers and en-
zymes).
Non-traditional products: 
Molybdenum, potassium nitrate, southern hake and salmon steaks.
–
–
–
–
Mexico exports mainly the following products to Europe:
Machinery and mobile equipment parts. Motor parts for automobiles, boats, etc. Turbine parts, etc. (second-
ary exports).
Petroleum and its derivatives.
Transport equipment.
Chemical products.
Agricultural products: onions, beans, apple, mango, guava, avocado, maize, tomato, peppers, meat, cucum-
ber. 
Metals and textiles.
–
–
–
–
–
–
EU	exports
Intermediate industrial goods (manufacturing machines, wood pulp, foods and drinks); automo-
biles, mobile phones, medicines, petrol.
Machinery and manufactured equipment.
Transport equipment.
Chemical products.
Agricultural products: soya, maize, meat, wheat, cotton fibre, sorghum, cereals.
Iron and steel.
Textiles.
–
–
–
–
–
–
General	Assessment
February 2006: three years of trade liberalization.
In these three years, the international trade context has shown an overall increase in the prices 
of raw materials –especially copper, Chile’s main product for exportation – and by the rapid 
process of revaluation of the Euro, which promotes exports to the EU but slows down imports 
from the region.
Chile’s trade balance with the EU has significantly improved and is today in the black. 
Although the agreement has succeeded in diversifying Chile’s exports to Europe, these are 
concentrated around a few companies and there is a limited contribution in SMB exports.
In 2006, six years after its implementation, the Global Agreement has not met expectations. Mexico confronts a 
trade deficit with the EU and only exports to Europe 7% of total national exports, primarily in oil products and 
derivatives. The European FDI in Mexico does not create new companies or jobs; rather, the trend has been the 
purchase of the assets of national companies. European companies have looked to prepare better conditions for 
ensuring the profitability of their investments through the signing of Agreements for Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (AMPPI): 16 of the 23 agreements negotiated by Mexico have been with European 
countries. There is a very low involvement of SMBs in the trade exchange with the large companies mostly ben-
efiting.
Other
In contrast to the Agreement with Mexico, the EU-Chile Agreement anticipates a dialogue on 
social issues and cooperation in the social area. It encourages the participation of civil society 
and the dialogue between civil societies of Europe and Chile.
In contrast to the Agreement with Mexico, the EU-Chile Agreement anticipates a dialogue on social issues and coop-
eration in the social area. It encourages the participation of civil society and the dialogue between civil societies of 
Europe and Chile.
SOURCE: TEXT OF BOTH AGREEMENTS; CELARE 2006; CALDERóN 2005; DOMÍNGUEZ AND VELáSQUEZ 2004.
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•
•
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